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This dissertation introduces a new definition of insurgency for academic 
discourse. It also argues that four components of a defined relationship framework must 
interoperate to satisfy organizational requirements and processes in order for an 
insurgency to achieve increasing levels of scale. From a systemic perspective, it presents 
a connective theory of constitutive and destructive mechanisms to assess why certain 
movements expand or ignite while others degrade or get stuck in a particular phase. The 
proposed perspective provides improved analytic leverage over existing phasing models. 
Chapter 1 introduces the scope and definition of the politics of insurgency. 
Chapter 2 presents academic, military, and legal perspectives of the phenomenon. 
Chapters 3 and 4 explain the limitations of existing insurgency models within the context 
of two historic case studies, the Chinese and Algerian Revolutions. Chapter 5 introduces 
the dissertation’s full phasing model. Chapters 6 and 7 present case studies to further 
elucidate the proposed relationship framework and composite phasing construct, 
assessing strengths and weaknesses in light of two comparable cases. The Chechen and 
Kosovar Albanian insurgencies provide insight and applied examples of the activities that 
occur within each phase. Chapter 8 then consolidates the findings and analysis from the 
case studies and assesses the viability of the phasing model as a usable tool to better 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction, The Politics of Insurgent Movements 
1.1 Introductory Vignettes: A Legacy of Insurgency across the Centuries 
1.1.1 Eighteenth-Century America  
 The American Revolution came to an end with the Treaty of Paris in April of 
1783. The Continental Army, by then a conventional military force, had defeated the 
British at the Battle of Yorktown, effectively capturing thousands of soldiers. The initial 
rebellion, however, began through political channels eighteen years earlier when the First 
Congress of the American Colonies protested the British Stamp Act and issued a 
Declaration of Rights and Grievances addressed to Parliament and the king. Also in 1765, 
the resistance established the Sons of Liberty, a very capable growing underground 
organization that circulated propaganda across the colonies, mobilizing colonists into 
mobs and persecuting loyalists. Many participants in the underground served as members 
of state and continental governing bodies. They leveraged connections within business 
and trade and joined the leadership of local communities through church congregations 
and other important civic organizations. 
Although independence was not declared until 1776, the American resistance 
established a unified federated government in the Continental Congress in 1774. As John 
Adams’s personal letters suggest, “the revolution was effected before the war 
commenced” because the inhabitants of the colonies were “formed by law into 
corporations, or bodies politic,” possessing the right to assemble in town halls “to 
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deliberate upon the public affairs;” it was “in these assemblies of towns or districts that 
the sentiments of the people were formed in the first place.”1  
Political constitution-making ran in parallel to armed resistance and achieved 
milestones toward statehood in numerous areas.2 Local guerrilla forces such as the 
Minutemen and the Green Mountain Boys confronted British troops while George 
Washington, who was appointed commander in chief in 1775, developed a viable 
conventional military capacity out of regional militias and resisting local communities. 
The nation also moved away from colony-based currencies toward the establishment of 
the Continental dollar. The first Bank of North America was founded in 1782 and soon 
transitioned the colonial confederation to a gold-based economy. In 1777, the leaders of 
the revolution published the Articles of Confederation, a constitutional framework based 
on principles of democratic governance. What began as an insurgent movement matured 
into a viable state that continues two centuries later. 
1.1.2 Nineteenth-Century Egypt 
 Between 1880 and 1882, Ahmad Urabi led a growing nationalist movement 
against Egypt’s established political regime. Opposed to foreign interference in Egyptian 
affairs and discontented with economic hardships and social displacement created by a 
corrupt and extravagant government,3 Colonel Urabi’s movement began with “Egypt for 
                                                          
1 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (The Viking Press, 1963; repr. with introduction by Jonathan Schell, New 
York: Penguin Group, 2006), footnotes 4 and 5 on p. 109. Arendt quotes Adams’s letter to Niles on January 
14, 1818, and letter to the Abbe Mably in 1782.  
2 “These two altogether different stages of the revolutionary process began at almost the same moment and 
continued to run parallel to each other all through the years of the war” (Arendt, On Revolution, 132). 
3 Because of government bankruptcy, “Egypt was effectively delivered into the hands of European financial 
interests who, with the support of the British and French governments, progressively took over the running 
of the country.” John Newsinger, “Liberal Imperialism and the Occupation of Egypt in 1882,” Race & 
Class 49, no. 3 (2008): 59, doi:10.1177/0306396807085901. 
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Egyptians” and yet ended in the nation’s occupation by the British.4 The transition in 
governance to British control represented one link in a longer chain of cooptation 
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Egypt moved from Ottoman control 
(1517–1798), to French occupation (1798–1802), back to Albanian/Ottoman control 
(1802–1879), to government collusion with and indebtedness to Britain and France 
(1879–1882).  
Native Colonel Urabi unified Egypt’s military and advanced it to become a self-
proclaimed independent political actor; for example, in 1880, the military published a list 
of grievances against the government and began to intervene on behalf of civilian 
revolutionaries forwarding the cause of an independent state.5 Initially, the movement 
supported a moderate reformist agenda, and Urabi successfully leveraged Egypt’s 
political leadership to create a new nationalist government, which appointed him minister 
of war.6 In 1882, the movement distributed a moderate political manifesto entitled the 
Programme of the National Party of Egypt. The program honored Egypt’s debt to its 
Anglo-French debtors, called for an end to European control, and sought to introduce a 
constitutional government.  
Britain, however, was unable to conceive of Egyptian self-determination and 
feared losing investments, trade, and status.7 Popular riots within the city began between 
Egyptian and European inhabitants after British warships gathered around Alexandria to 
                                                          
4 Newsinger, “Liberal Imperialism,” 60. 
5 Newsinger, “Liberal Imperialism,” 61–62. 
6 Marco Pinfari, “The Unmaking of a Patriot: Anti-Arab Prejudice in the British Attitude Towards the 
Urabi Revolt, 1882,” Arab Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2012): 98. Also, Newsinger in “Liberal 
Imperialism” (61) writes: “[G]rowing unrest adopted an Islamic rhetoric, provoked not just by the 
European takeover of the country, but by the ensemble of racist attitudes that accompanied it.” For this 
reason, there is a rhetorical debate on the authenticity of the party’s desired political outcome and its 
connections to Islamic holy war. 
7 Pinfari, “The Unmaking of a Patriot,” 94. 
4 
 
compel capitulation to European interests. The British bombarded the city and then 
defeated the Egyptian army during a surprise attack at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir in 
September 1882; once defeated, the British occupied Cairo and took control of Egypt. 
Urabi’s insurgency temporarily leveraged state institutions and garnered popular political 
support from Egyptians. Because Egyptians could not overcome European dominance, 
British troops did not leave Egypt until 1954.  
1.1.3 Twentieth-Century China 
In October 1949, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party (CPC) established 
the People’s Republic of China after a twenty-two-year insurgency against China’s 
Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek. Two years after the CPC’s initial founding in 
1921, and prior to its split with the Nationalist-led Kuomintang (KMT), Mao joined other 
Chinese communists as a member of the KMT. At the time, the Nationalist affiliation 
with Soviet communism was on the rise. In 1926, however, after Chiang Kai-shek took 
control of the KMT army and began his famous Northern Expedition to unite China’s 
divided provinces under one state, the CPC attempted to take over the KMT in his 
absence. In 1927, Chiang expelled the communists from the KMT and the Chinese Civil 
War began.  
Over the course of the protracted conflict, which also included a temporary cease-
fire that enabled CPC and KMT adversaries to focus on routing Japan’s invading army, 
the CPC grew beyond a political party with limited infrastructure and administrative 
capacity. Mao’s organization strategically developed and co-opted institutional 
components necessary for state agency, to include scaling from localized guerrilla tactics 
to broader conventional military capabilities, growing local and national political 
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organizations, and then inserting an overarching secret service loyal to the communist 
leadership. At great human expense, Mao’s party founded and shortly thereafter 
solidified an authoritarian state that persists sixty-five years later.8 The Chinese 
Communists learned from successful revolutionary predecessors to infiltrate and take 
over “popular societies” that would then declare the prominence of the party over a 
nascent grassroots council system.9  
1.1.4 Twenty-First-Century Mexico 
 It is estimated that since 2007, more than 77,000 Mexicans have died as a result 
of drug-related violence.10 Cartels such as the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, La 
Familia Michoacán, and Los Zetas began to multiply in strength and number in the late 
1990s. After Colombian drug-trafficking organizations fragmented, Mexican cartels 
eventually gained enough prominence and power to confront state institutions and 
legitimacy; today they compete to capture the United States’ $40 billion market for 
illegal drugs.11 Territorial-based operations move major drug shipments across corridors 
called plazas as cartels alternately collaborate and fight with one another. Recent 
conflicts have become particularly brutal because public violence enforces compliance 
                                                          
8 Richard Louis Walker, Casualties to Communism, Report to the United States Senate Committee of the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, (China: US Government Printing Office, 1971). According to Walker’s report, the 
communist insurgency between 1927 and 1949 cost 1.5–2 million human lives. The political liquidation 
campaigns that then consolidated the state led to 15–30 million deaths. 
9 The development of grassroots social organizations into political machinery became “very familiar 
through the course of the Russian Revolution, where the Bolshevik party emasculated and perverted the 
revolutionary soviet system with exactly the same methods (as the French). For Robespierre’s rule of terror 
was indeed nothing else but the attempt to organize the whole French people into a single gigantic party 
machinery” (Arendt, On Revolution, 239). 
10 “Who Is Behind Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence?” BBC News, February 10, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10681249. 




and dissuades opposition. In a lethal dance that the state is unable to overcome and with 
which its representatives are sometimes complicit, “arrests, killings, and betrayals give 
rise to kaleidoscopic changes in alliances.”12 
 Mexican cartels, a type of Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO), “are in 
fact commercial insurgencies designed to influence . . . national power to seek economic 
gain from illicit drug trafficking.”13 They garner enough political and territorial 
autonomy to leverage local populations and the Mexican government to achieve their 
objectives. “They do so by hollowing out the state and creating criminal enclaves to 
maneuver.”14 As insurgencies, cartels take political, military, economic, and social 
control within their associated zones; they create parallel states that erode government 
legitimacy and solvency; and they combat the state directly by engaging in belligerent 
acts.15  
1.2 Where is the Comparative Anatomy of Insurgency? 
 Whether posterity calls the American, Egyptian, Chinese, and Mexican cases 
above revolts, rebellions, or revolutions, each story is, at its base, one of insurgency. 
Regardless of its success or failure, each shares an anatomy of political resistance that 
exhibits distinct attributes in structure, process, and character—falling within the broader 
ontology of contentious politics and collective violence. For example, as contentious 
politics, insurgency often involves “discontinuous, public, collective claim making in 
                                                          
12 G. W. Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2010), 3. 
13 Christopher Martinez, “Transnational Criminal Organizations, Mexico’s Commercial Insurgency,” 
Military Review, September–October 2012, 62. 
14 John P. Sullivan, “States of Change: Power and Counterpower Expressions in Latin America’s Criminal 
Insurgencies,” International Journal on Criminology 2, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 65. 
15 Sullivan, “States of Change,” 65. 
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which one of the parties is the government” as the object of claims or third party to 
claims.16 As collective violence, insurgencies include a spectrum of orchestrated violence 
that moves beyond individual aggression toward increasingly mature means of 
“coordinated destruction” against the state or reigning regime, including lethal contests, 
campaigns of annihilation, and conspiratorial terror.17   
This dissertation argues that insurgencies exhibit comparative patterns and 
innovations in violence that repeat and mature across time and geographic regions. They 
blend with forms of interpersonal violence in which persons or organizations specialize in 
the deployment of coercive means.18 At the same time that destructive processes tear 
down or resist incumbent regimes, however, insurgencies also support and build new 
constitutive and civic political processes. As seen in the opening exemplars, they build 
armies, establish constitutions, collect taxes, control currency, align with civic 
organizations, generate and enforce laws, and engage in international relationships. 
Therefore, similar to traditional social movements, insurgencies exhibit adaptive 
strategies, calling upon a common repertoire of political and violent action to establish 
alternative political futures. They require a psychological motivation and bond to drive 
                                                          
16 “A government is a substantial, durable, bounded organization that exercises control over the major 
concentrated means of coercion within some territory.” In this respect, a government is not necessarily a 
state government. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 9. 
17 Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, 14-16. Tilly’s typology of interpersonal violence moves from 
individual aggression to collective violence in which the extent of coordination among violent actors 
increases. This includes brawls, opportunism, scattered attacks, broken negotiations, violent rituals, and 
coordinated destruction. Although coordinated destruction is a requirement for civil war, insurgency may 
use all of these means. These categories are interesting but are optimized later in this dissertation to 
expressly connect to increasingly levels of violence geared toward scaling insurgencies. 
18 Political entrepreneurs overlap “with the category of violent specialists. At the intersection of the two we 
find leaders of mercenaries, international weapons merchants, regional warlords, military rulers, and many 
a political figure who disposes of his or her own armed force. Over the long run of human history, indeed, 
most important political figures have combined entrepreneurship with control of coercive means” (Tilly, 
Politics of Collective Violence, 36). 
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commitment, unity, and displays of worthiness, within and across participants and 
supporters.19  
Ultimately, revolts, rebellions, and revolutions, like those described above, should 
comprise their own distinctive ontology. Uniquely categorized as insurgencies, these 
kinds of movements develop interconnected institutions and capabilities designed to scale 
in power and authority. Their leaders coordinate public support, establish political and 
administrative mechanisms, and control destructive mechanisms to create an altered 
legal, economic, political and social system for their constituency. Their resulting success 
and scalability varies according to the successful mastery of common processes across 
four relationship components that signify thresholds of regime maturity. See Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Insurgency Relationship Framework  
Even so, as an area of concentrated academic focus, the field of inquiry regarding 
insurgency is wide open, particularly regarding how operational trends change over time 
                                                          
19 Charles Tilly and Lesley Wood, Social Movements 1768-2012, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, LLC, 2013). 
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across the relationship framework. In part, this is because insurgency is more often an 
area of practice than study. Additionally, when insurgency is considered by academics, it 
is defined by a movement’s success rather than by its association to a broader political 
context. Without exception, the same activity when unsuccessful or limited is considered 
a revolt or terrorism, when somewhat successful is considered a civil war, and when 
extremely successful is considered a revolution. Scholars have yet to analyze the body of 
insurgent movements within the context of the international system as a unique form of 
politics; this is surprising because insurgencies yield observable and repeated expressions 
of authority, power, and violence.  
More surprising, a substantive insurgency framework from which to compare and 
analyze the differences between insurgencies simply does not exist. There is no systems 
model available to assess the comparative growth and best practices of insurgencies over 
time. For example, the 1776 American Revolution and its aftermath successfully 
packaged the nation in a form that other societies later adopted and customized for their 
own insurgencies.20 “The independence movements in the Americas became, as soon as 
they were printed about, ‘concepts,’ ‘models,’ and indeed ‘blueprints.’”21 In successive 
geographic regions, similar and yet distinctly unique events converged to produce 
changes necessary to foster growth elsewhere. If this is true though, and the American 
Revolution provided a repeatable blueprint for other insurgencies, where is the associated 
field of comparative analytics driven by data rather than conjecture regarding their 
                                                          
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 67. “When nationalism started to spread in the eighteenth 
century, the emergence of national identities in other countries was no longer a result of original creation, 
but rather of the importation of an already existing idea. The development of national identities thus was 
essentially an international process, whose sources in every case but the first lay outside of the evolving 
nation.” Greenfeld, “The Formation of Russian National Identity,” 550. 
21 Ibid., 81. 
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influence and impact? The composite analytic insurgency model presented in the 
following chapters attempts to fill this gap. 
The outcome of previous ad hoc diagnoses is that practitioners and academics 
look at insurgency in insular ways, even among themselves, preventing a broader 
systemic perspective of scalable requirements.22 Practitioners include those who make 
decisions and act within the insurgent space, for example, national and international 
policy makers, military forces, or nongovernmental organizations who try to understand 
organizational constructs, threat networks, and behaviors. Practitioners confront 
insurgency as a political and military form but have been unable to define or address it 
from the insurgent perspective; they lack analysis from which to draw. Without an actual 
theory of insurgency, decision-makers frequently move to a one-size-fits-all concept of 
counterinsurgency operations in response.  
Most academics, on the other hand, are removed from the realities of insurgency 
characteristics and practice because data are difficult to acquire. Studies are created in 
order to make measurements and find connections between variables that lack substantive 
meaning to practitioners; they don’t necessarily provide a deeper understanding of the 
problem frame or the broader picture. As a result, the differences in lexicon between 
practitioners and academics who study violence and politics prevent an integrated 
framework from which to approach insurgent movements.  
The overarching purpose of this exploration therefore is to connect these two 
worlds, to provide those practitioners trying to make a positive impact with a useful way 
                                                          
22 Doug, McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics,” Mobilization: An 




to understand and begin to address the complex problem of insurgency. It is to identify 
processes specific to insurgency that might allow for further study, criticism, and 
contribution. Ultimately, this analysis brings these disparate communities together by 
synthesizing the academic and operational literatures that exist, to add my findings, and 
to present the resulting arguments in such a way that they resonate with those who must 
act.  
1.3 Purpose 
Because there is little work to delineate the politics of insurgency as its own domain, 
the goals of this dissertation are fourfold: 
• To develop clear conceptual categories regarding a theory of insurgency that 
begins to define its scope within a coherent domain and provide analytic leverage 
for future study; 
• To synthesize associated competing and complementary models on insurgency 
into an empirically based (anatomy) construct that will help to account for its 
evolution and variation over time, place, groups, and forms; 
• To introduce a mechanism for mapping the health and maturity of insurgency 
movements as political phenomena; and 
• To identify recurrent socio-institutional insurgent processes and requirements 
through a series of case studies that supports the synthesized construct. 
 
The politics of insurgency comprises a dialectic process, though not necessarily a 
linear one. I attempt to capture that process.23 And, although the purpose of this work is 
not to test or validate the proposed model through an explicit set of measurable variables, 
the relationships between variables are observed across four case studies so that we might 
                                                          
23 Stathis Kalyvas calls this meso-level analysis. Macro-level analysis treats violence as a natural outcome 
of war, in military strategy, comparative politics, and international relations. Unitary actors fuse elites and 
their populations. Micro-level analysis looks specifically at intracommunity dynamics and individual 
behaviors, dividing populations and groups into competing families, clans, and factions. Meso-level 
analysis problematizes processes and operational structures within wars. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10–11. 
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begin to see behavioral patterns and organizational requirements.24 I hope to introduce 
new ways of thinking about insurgency as a constituting mechanism for the state as well 
as to provide scaling limitations associated with isolated insurgent movements. The 
proposed model in Chapter 5 begins to provide empirical requirements for insurgencies at 
scale that may be assessed and analyzed over time. 
1.4 Organizing Questions 
This dissertation is organized around the following questions. 
 
1. How is insurgency a political form? How are insurgencies organized in 
relationship to the evolution of the state over time—both as constitutive and 
destructive mechanisms?  
2. Are existing operational insurgency models sufficient to accommodate the broad 
range of contemporary insurgent political goals and processes? 
3. From a political perspective, what nominal capacity thresholds exist to 
differentiate shifts into and out of insurgent forms or phases?  
4. When is an insurgency an insurgency and not some other form of political 
violence or expression?  
5. Do insurgencies exhibit patterns of behavioral development that link insurgent 
political capacity to associated mechanisms and networks across social, 
economic, and security domains?  
1.5 Defining Insurgency and the Literature 
In light of the questions above, and given the expressed associations between 
insurgency, nationalism, social movement theory, and contentious politics, the definition 
of insurgency in this context is not the same as that presented in conventional academic 
descriptions. Therefore, before peeling back the layers of various divisions and camps 
within the literature, it will be helpful to provide the ontological definition of insurgency 
                                                          
24 One exception to this is the adaptation of collective violence and social movement theory to the 
framework. “We can fashion theories by importing existing theories from one domain and adapting them to 
explain phenomena in another.” Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 29. 
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to be used throughout the rest of this work. An insurgency is a condition of formalized 
resistance or revolt against a governing authority in which the perpetrating parties are not 
initially recognized as belligerents.25 Rather, at the outset they are insurgents and as such 
act without the protection of or subjection to the laws of war that govern the behavior of 
state forces.26 A governing authority may include “an established government, a military 
occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process.”27  
Insurgent goals are political and focus on influencing who makes political 
decisions and who has access to political power within a given constituency.28  For 
example, an insurgency may renounce allegiance or subjection to a government; 
challenge political control; demand participation in the political process; or attempt to 
end the rule of one government and start a new one by means of subversion or 
interpersonal violence.29 Subversion encompasses a broad range of activities designed to 
undermine the “military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a 
governing authority.”30 Fundamentally, insurgencies “attempt to modify the existing 
political system at least partially through the unconstitutional or illegal use of force or 
                                                          
25 Belligerent status may be reached eventually as an insurgency progresses to the point it is recognized as a 
de facto state. If this happens, the Law of Armed Conflict applies and its forces receive combatant and 
prisoner of war (POW) status. 
26 Erin N. Hahn and W. Sam Lauber, Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance, ed. Erin N. 
Hahn (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, forthcoming), 6. If and when an 
insurgency attains the status of a “belligerency” and legally begins to interoperate with the international 
community, it then becomes subjection to the laws of war that govern the behavior of state forces. See 
Chapter 2 for further information. 
27 According to Joint Publication 3-24 (JP 3-24), Counterinsurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 
2013), I-1. 
28 Terrorist organizations interested in affecting laws regarding the environment or nature would not be 
considered insurgencies. If these organizations determined that their agendas would be better served if they 
changed their political leadership and developed coordinated plans to replace that leadership, then they 
would constitute an insurgency. Also, mere targeted assassination does not count. 
29 This definition selectively borrows terms and concepts from the Merriam-Webster dictionary. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgency, /insurgent, /revolution, /revolt, and /belligerent. 
30 Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010), 245.  
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protest.”31  This means that even nonviolent movements, if illegal, constitute an 
insurgency. Additionally, an insurgency is not limited or constrained by duration; it may 
build over a century or transpire more quickly – as in the case of a coup.32   
Part of an organized movement designed to cross the threshold between 
discontinuous collective claim making and the execution of persistent campaigns, 
insurgents act in ways that show they do not accept the control or influence of the 
governing authority. At the least, the insurgent vanguard33 displays worthiness, unity, 
obligation, and a commitment to use illegal or unconstitutional methods.34 These 
attributes may be hidden at first and then grow with an expanding social movement. 
Insurgents are not anarchists and often maintain a design—however valid or mature, 
invalid or immature—for an alternative political system, even if that system cohabits 
alongside an existing regime.  
Some insurgents are concerned with breaking down the existing political regime 
at the start with the intent to develop a political alternative at a future date. Some 
insurgents are parasitical to the state and do not intend to take the burden of rule if they 
can achieve their political objectives without gaining international legitimacy. Others 
design a political solution first then grow their military and internal security capabilities. 
(Chapter 2 provides further discussion of insurgency categorization, particularly Section 
                                                          
31 Chuck Crossett, ed., Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009 (Fort 
Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), xvi.  
32 Even the back end support to a coup is likely to take quite some time to build should the outcome 
produce a stable regime. 
33 The use of the term vanguard in this dissertation should not be confused with Paul Staniland’s use of the 
vanguard organization. Staniland creates a typology of four kinds of insurgent organization: integrated, 
vanguard, parochial and fragmented. The vanguard exhibits robust processes of central control while 
maintaining weak local processes of control. In this dissertation, the vanguard is represents the core, or high 
level, of insurgent leadership. Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and 
Collapse, (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 6-8. 
34 Insurgent organizations that have not transitioned to the strategic use of force, and rather stay more 
within the realm of protest, are frequently called resistance movements. 
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2.2.)  Regardless of their intent, insurgents and insurgencies should not be thought of in 
terms of good or bad as an ontological class. Each insurgency follows a unique path that 
exhibits similar processes and physical anatomy. Decisions within each scaling phase 
engage a range of options that subsequently configure one insurgency to be viewed 
pejoratively and another to be viewed positively by different constituencies. 
There is an extensive amount of work to be done to connect common pathways 
that distinguish insurgency as a distinct form of intrastate politics.35 Although the 
definition provided above is well-founded, part of the task of the dissertation itself is to 
substantiate why it is accurate, how it was developed, and where it may be improved. The 
proposed framework introduces insurgency mechanisms at an operational and strategic 
level, “specific causal patterns” that more fully explain interconnected processes and 
“actions over a wide range of settings.”36 By looking at how insurgencies pass through 
various levels of scale, we may begin to overcome the current analytic box of treating 
insurgent organizations as static entities with capped capability levels of violence or 
governance. Riots may become popular rebellions that may become revolutions because 
of the actions taken to leverage the categorical relationships within framework. Riots may 
also, however, become rebellions that disintegrate into extremist terrorist organizations. 
                                                          
35 The capacity to use insurgency as a form of interstate politics represents an additional field of study 
outside the scope of this work. There are two ways to think about external involvement. The first is in 
reference to the globalization of insurgency. This concept is briefly explored later. The second focuses on 
external support to resistance movements and insurgencies—in which foreign states attempt to impact the 
behavior of other states through substate actors. In the latter case, external support still must work through 
the insurgent pathways identified in this work. At this point in time, such activity is called hybrid warfare 
by practitioners. Russian behavior in the Ukraine serves as a primary example.  
36 Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 10.  
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Numerous areas of academic literature contribute to explaining insurgency in 
addition to the nationalism,37 contentious politics and collective action literature.38 For 
example, political science literature specific to insurgency and civil war approaches 
environmental causes and consequences of the phenomenon. As will be further explored 
in Chapter 2, this literature links measurable environmental variables to the onset of 
domestic conflicts at various thresholds of casualties or fatalities.39 It also looks at 
specific social movement mechanisms and limited insurgent strategies of controlled or 
uncontrolled violence; limited refers to both the rural terrain (non-urban environments) 
and the specificity of guerrilla-related activity.  
                                                          
37 This dissertation does not focus specifically on the nationalism literature because the model does not 
require insurgencies to define their desired end as a nation state. For relevant nationalism literature, see 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1983); Mark Ashley, “It Takes a Victim: 
The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National Victimization,” Draft Paper 
(University of Chicago, 2001); Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology, 
19 (1993): 211–239; Maegen Gandy, “A Case Study of Identity Politics in America,” Master’s thesis, 
(Virginia Tech University, 2003), (ETD-08262003-164836); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, 
Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, 1990); John Hutchinson and Anthony 
D. Smith, Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2000); and Louis Wirth, “Types of Nationalism.” American Journal of Sociology 41, no. 6 (May, 1936): 
723-737. 
38 Recall that contentious politics is a much vaster category of politics and collective claim-making than the 
identified subset here. Additionally, this dissertation does not ask what accounts for the “enormous 
variability” within methods of public claim interactions. Rather, it is interested in what activities must 
occur in order for an insurgency to move through designated phases. For collective action literature, for 
example, see Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1995) ; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Roger D Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons 
from Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Elizabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent 
Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
39 Kalyvas explains that a “recent boom in civil war studies has been fueled by the global shift from 
interstate to intrastate conflict: of the 118 armed conflicts that have taken place between 1989 and 2004, 
only 7 have been interstate wars (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)” (Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 16). On the 
same page, he reviews literature that has explicitly or implicitly studied revolution, rebellion, or ethnic 
conflict from the perspectives of onset, resolution, social bases, outcome, political and social consequences, 
rebuilding and reconciliation, and postwar justice. 
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Existing literature does not emphasize enough the constituting processes 
associated with political mechanisms. It also fails to incorporate the connectivity between 
violent and passive antiregime activity necessary to insurgent practice.40 To most in this 
grouping of political scientists, insurgency begins with a threshold of violent behavior by 
definition. It starts after the guerrilla force or terrorist organization is already in play. It 
doesn’t illustrate how youth groups, social-patriotic organizations, economic 
organizations, trade unions, political parties, and families connect by design or by chance 
to the official political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency.41 
Political theory regarding revolution also speaks to causes and consequences of 
insurgency.42 Either in the form of detailed case study or theoretical analysis, this 
literature addresses the complexities of constituting a new political framework. It does so, 
however, on an individual state basis or without a systemic perspective. Hannah Arendt, 
for example, addresses the choices and tensions during revolution between developing a 
political solution that safeguards participation in the resulting political process and the 
dominance of the revolutionary party. She asks whether the end of the revolution marks 
the end of the revolutionary party, or whether it marks the beginning of the dominance of 
                                                          
40 Weinstein does speak to the challenge of collective action and social movement impacts as a resource 
mobilization challenge at the beginning of a rebellion. Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, The Politics of 
Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8–9. And Chenoweth and Stephan 
ignore the connection between passive civil resistance and its frequent connection and interplay with 
violent measures. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, the Strategic Logic 
of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 11-15. 
41 Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion, 48-5. Petersen looks at some of these connections 
specifically for lower levels of collective opposition in light of triggering and sustaining norms and 
psychological mechanisms.  
42 See the “Introduction” to Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 6–12. Walt summarizes the vast literature on revolution and explains that, “Our theoretical 
understanding of revolution and war thus consists largely of untested ‘folk theories.’ We may group the 
alternative explanations into three broad families, whose focus, respectively, is on revolutionary ideology 
(the regimes aggressive beliefs), domestic politics (conflicts within the state encourage aggressive 




the revolutionary regime. Meaning, will the insurgency lead to true reforms and a new 
governmental system? Will it represent simply regime change or decapitation with new 
rulers? Or will the new environment remain socially unstable and political fragile through 
the violent enforcement of insurgent norms? I contend that the identification and 
qualification of various insurgent processes, when systemically observed, will be able to 
answer questions regarding the nature, stability, and maturity of the resulting state. The 
practices of the insurgency are illustrative of the future regime; they become the 
constituting mechanisms for an altered state.43  
The final category of literature that needs to be addressed and synthesized with 
various academic perspectives includes military doctrine and international legal 
perspectives. This literature better aligns increasing levels of violence for growing 
insurgencies than the collective violence literature. By connecting each of these 
literatures, we may begin to see broader general patterns across the insurgency landscape. 
Because insurgent practices connect to one another, establishing a comparative meta 
framework will identify the milestones and relationships insurgencies must foster and 
develop in order to scale to levels of increasing maturity.  
Challenges to the arguments presented in the following chapters may come from 
numerous sources. First, when synthesizing the models or constructs of others, there is 
always the possibility for misinterpretation, particularly when dealing directly with the 
                                                          
43 Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws discusses the cultural mechanisms and passions that lie underneath 
a state’s political form. He links the structure, or nature, of states with an associated internal disposition, a 
phenomenon that he labels a principle. “There is this difference between the nature of the government and 
its principle: its nature is that which makes it what it is, and its principle, that which makes it act. The one is 
its particular structure, and the other is the human passions that set it in motion. Law should be so 
appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit 
another.” Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 21, 8. 
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nature of relationships. Similarly, data regarding critical model relationships may not be 
available or may come from inaccurate sources and opinion. Second, information and 
analysis may exist that could counter the architecture I develop across phases of maturity 
or repudiate the connections required across noted groups and capabilities during the 
progress of those phases. Third, the case studies utilized to verify the utility of the model 
in Chapters 6 and 7 are intended to map two comparative forms of insurgency across the 
model. There may be contradictory evidence within any given case that would counter 
my findings. And fourth, logical flaws may exist in my analysis. 
1.6 Research Methods and Procedures 
Because no meta-framework exists to enable the comparison of insurgent 
practices and methods as they scale over time, I develop my own composite model in the 
first part of the dissertation. Chapters 2 through 4 explore the insufficiency of existing 
insurgency theory to accommodate comparative analytics of the broad range of 
contemporary insurgent institutions and processes across phases. As briefly mentioned in 
the last section, Chapter 2 organizes and synthesizes academic literature on insurgency, 
as well as legal and military doctrinal views. It uses this material to build the foundation 
for a simple conceptual model that defines thresholds of insurgency phasing. Scaling 
boundaries are represented by six phases in which the insurgency continues to advance 
toward its goals, loses capability, or stalls in a given category. It argues that scaling is 
accomplished by the manipulation of four components of a relationship framework: the 
vanguard, public support, political constitutive mechanisms, and destructive violent 
mechanisms. Again, see Figure 1.1. 
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Once the basic fundamentals of insurgency are proposed in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 
and 4 analyze four classic insurgency theories and two case studies. These theories are 
applied to associated historic exemplars that illustrate their utility as well as their 
limitations for contemporary use. The case studies include the Chinese Communist 
Revolution (1927-1949) and the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962). The phasing models 
include the work of observers and participants in those insurgencies: Mao Tse-tung, 
David Galula, and the United States’ Special Operations Research Office (SORO). Mao, 
Galula, and SORO were selected in combination with the insurgencies that informed their 
work because these theorists continue to impact national operational thought and 
planning today. Additionally, such well known classic cases make any subsequent 
findings easier to assimilate and to refute should they be off the mark. 
Because Chapters 3 and 4 find the current phasing models to be historic artifacts 
and poorly compartmented, Chapter 5 returns to the phasing construct and relationship 
framework proposed in Chapter 2. It uses the cumulative findings of the first four 
chapters to propose a more advanced composite model from which to view and assess 
maturing, or declining, insurgencies. It illustrates the logical process behind the 
development of the composite model and presents clear conceptual categories of the 
resultant analytic framework. Chapter 5 provides the mapping mechanism used to assess 
the development, health and maturity of the Chechen and Kosovar Albanian movements 
in Chapters 6 and 7. I chose Kosovo and Chechnya because they share numerous pre 
insurgency attributes while experiencing vastly different outcomes. They are also rich in 
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available data, widely recognized as insurgencies, and span numerous phases of the 
model.44  Neither insurgency began with the monolithic intention to create a new state. 
Chapters 6 and 7 should be considered an application of the model to identify its 
utility over previous constructs. Stephen Walt calls his methodology “process tracing” 
after the work of George and McKeown, Stephen Van Evera, Bruce Russett, and others. 
“Process tracing allows the analyst to ‘get inside’ the case… and to evaluate the separate 
causal links that connect the explanatory variables with the predicted outcomes.”45  
Although not all insurgencies need to reach the highest phasing levels to obtain their 
political objectives, a qualitative case study methodology illustrates phasing processes 
and relationships extremely well, showing how phasing variables connect and scale. The 
selected movements drastically change over time – declining from national movement to 
terrorist organization or expanding from a simple network of like-minded underground 
organizations to a national movement and eventually a state regime. 
Overall in terms of case selection, this dissertation consists of four historic and 
high-profile insurgency studies. As previously mentioned, Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 
examine the Chinese and Algerian revolutions, as well as more recent insurgencies that 
played out in Chechnya and Kosovo, respectively. Across all four cases, the insurgency 
pathways, as well as their “timing, geographic location, and ideological orientation” vary 
                                                          
44 “Picking relatively uncontroversial examples of revolution may reduce controversy over whether the 
cases chosen were appropriate for testing the theory” (Walt, Revolution and War, 14). The selection of 
these cases intends for the same effect. “Most theories of war are best tested by case-study methods 
because the international historical record of prewar politics and diplomacy, which serves as our data, 
usually lends itself better to deep study of a few cases than to exploration of many cases” (Van Evera, 
Guide to Methods, 30). 
45 Walt, Revolution and War, 15–16. 
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considerably from one another.46 For example, the Chinese revolution leveraged 
communism and nationalism as ideological principles. The Algerian insurgency began 
under the Communist banner and then transitioned to Islamic nationalism. The Chechen 
nationalist movement transitioned from democratic intentions to Sunni-led 
fundamentalism. And the Kosovar Albanian insurgency shifted in the opposite direction, 
becoming more democratic and politically inclusive over time – though always focusing 
on ethnic nationalism as a unifying theme. The proposed model itself is agnostic to the 
reason behind an insurgency and focuses instead on the ability of the vanguard as well as 
political and violent mechanisms to connect with the public – or some supportive feeding 
element like a diaspora – to grow and scale. 
  Finally, Chapter 8 reframes the overall arguments regarding the needed analytic 
shift toward insurgency as part of a broader ontological phenomenon and the associated 
proposed framework. It summarizes the impact of each case study and looks at important 
findings enabled by the framework. Chapter 8 introduces possible avenues for future 
research and explores policy implications based on initial findings. Ultimately, security 
policies designed to drive nations toward stability without an understanding of the 
necessary mechanisms and processes of growth miss opportunities to find tailored 
solutions. They don’t significantly account for the nuances of the relationship framework 
at substate levels that might be leveraged or engaged to prevent or induce phasing 
transitions. 
 
                                                          
46 Walt, Revolution and War, 14. Walt references Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune’s use of the ‘most 
similar systems’ design. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry 
(New York: John Wiley, 1970), 34–39. “By applying the theory to a diverse set of (insurgencies) rather 





2.1 Insurgency Theory 
 
In spite of the practical and theoretical importance of better understanding the 
anatomy of insurgencies, their comparative structures and processes, there is little work 
that exists to connect variation of insurgent forms within one domain.1 The current 
literature is divided into two broader perspectives previously mentioned: academic and 
practitioner approaches. The next three sections review prevailing academic, US military, 
and international legal perspectives of insurgency and intertwined forms of civil war and 
revolution.2 Although military operations must fall in line with international legal 
                                                          
1 For example, Paul Staniland focuses specifically on social resources of trust, information, and shared 
political meaning along vertical and horizontal elements of guerrilla organizations, distinguishing between 
the relational fragility and robustness of their central and localized forces. Paul Staniland, Networks of 
Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 
2014). This dissertation does not contradict these findings but illustrates additional methods of motivation.  
Fear, ideology, emotional engagement, proximity and payment are also important mechanisms to 
manipulate, sustain, and develop what operational theorists call the united front. Numerous mechanisms are 
used in every insurgency depending on the targeted audience. For additional information on this topic, see 
Scott Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance, The Microfoundations of Rebellion, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46, no. 1 (February 2002): 111-130. Zacharia Mampilly. Rebel Rulers, Insurgent Governance 
and Civilian Life During War (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). Elizabeth Jean Wood, 
Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). Mark Irving Lichbach,. The Rebel’s Dilemm (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1995).  
2 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the 
Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1 
(Winter 2009): 67–106; Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Cunningham, David E. "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," American Journal 
of Political Science 50, no. 4 (2006): 875-892; Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, The Politics of 
Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); J. David Singer and Melvin Small, 
Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Nicholas Sambanis, 
“What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 814–58, doi:10.1177/0022002704269355; Jack A. Goldstone et al., 
“A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 
(2010): 190–208, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x; Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 
“International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal 
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standards, differentiating academic and practitioner approaches pulls out distinct 
attributes that will fit into the ensuing model. Each section builds upon another and 
includes the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the associated perspectives, 
highlighting systemic concepts regarding processes and structural components of 
insurgency. Section 2.4 then synthesizes all three “camps” and leverages them to provide 
the model that will be explored and developed throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
2.2 Academic Perspectives of Insurgency, Civil War, and Revolution 
2.2.1 Insurgency Basics 
This category introduces the prevalent academic definition regarding insurgency. 
It immediately establishes the inaccuracy and inadequacy of understanding regarding the 
concept. Even though current methodologies attempt to determine what environmental 
conditions impact the onset and cessation of war, they hold little help or meaning for 
decision-makers. For example, Fearon and Laitin explain insurgency as “a technology of 
military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare 
from rural base areas.”3 According to this definition, insurgency is an operational tactic 
limited to and conflated with rural guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, is 
distinct from insurgency because it focuses on military objectives and may be practiced 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Conflict,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 415–29, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000286; Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (The 
Viking Press, 1963; repr. with introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York: Penguin Group, 2006); Theda 
Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Samuel 
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Delhi: Adarsh Enterprises, Yale University, 
1968); and Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). It also 
briefly touches on social movement theory of Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Rex Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process, A Frame of Reference for the Study of 
Revolutionary Movements,” Social Forces 28, no. 3 (1950): 270–79, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2572010; 
and Doowan Lee,  “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 26, no. 3 
(July–September 2013): 27–32. 
3 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75, 79. 
25 
 
by state forces or by insurgents in urban or rural environments. Insurgents are more than 
guerrillas. They “fight to attain political, not military ends” and are not confined to rural 
environments or defined by military measures alone.4   
Lyall and Wilson describe insurgency as “a protracted violent struggle by 
nonstate actors to obtain their political objectives – often independence, greater 
autonomy, or subversion of existing authorities – against the current political authority 
(the incumbent).”5 This definition moves closer to capturing insurgency from a political 
perspective. At the same time, however, similar to Fearon and Laitin, Lyall and Wilson 
also see insurgency confined to guerrilla warfare. To recast the response above, insurgent 
movements may adopt a guerrilla warfare strategy that “uses small, mobile groups to 
inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct 
battle when possible.”6 But they may also use terrorist tactics strategically, conventional 
capabilities as they develop, or a combination of all three.7  In addition to this limitation, 
Lyall and Wilson suggest that guerrilla warfare “seeks to win the allegiance of at least 
some portion of the noncombatant population.”8 This is not part of guerrilla warfare; it is, 
however, an attribute of insurgency at particular stages, though not necessarily all stages 
depending on conditions of capability and human geography.9 
                                                          
4 Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine, From the American Revolution to the War on Terror (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 99. 
5 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” 70. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Tedd Gurr looks at collective violence in stages akin to the phases utilized in this dissertation framework. 
Gurr buckets sporadic terrorism and unsuccessful coups with other low levels of violence. He differentiates 
strategic terrorism from low levels of guerrilla activity. He combines civil war, revolutionary war and 
guerrilla activity involving more than 1,000 armed fighters over a large area. And then caveats protracted 
civil war fought from base areas. This work shares topics later in this chapter but phases these activities by 
levels of needed training and maturity. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk. A Global View of 
Ethnopolitical Conficts, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). 
8 Ibid. 
9 In some cases, it is easier to drive unassimilated populations out of an area, as ISIS did in Northern  
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Both quantitative studies introduced here employ an additional caveat that reduces 
insurgency to a threshold of casualty outputs for study. In order to provide measurable 
and testable requirements for data collection and hypotheses, an insurgency exists when 
1) at least 1,000 people are killed in the conflict, “with a yearly average of at least 100” 
and 2) when “[a]t least 100 [are] killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by 
rebels).10 For the purposes of this dissertation, insurgency is not about counting deaths. 
Rather, it is about using numerous forms of resistance for political ends. Insurgency is 
defined by claimant political goals, processes of violence, control and authority, as well 
as organizational components. 
The largest limitation of the casualty threshold when assessing insurgent politics 
is that events considered as independent civil wars may be connected within one broader 
insurgency.11 As is often the case with insurgent movements, fighting stops and starts as 
an insurgent organization or movement strategically uses a cease fire to gain political 
ground or some other measure of power or advantage.12  Within the social movement 
literature, this time may be labeled as abeyance, a period “characterized by little or no 
mobilization. During this period, SMOs (Social Movement Organizations) often focus 
                                                          
10 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 76. Fearon and Laitin hold to additional 
criteria for coding shared by others in the field. For example, data set requirements are often pulled from 
David Singer and Melvin Small’s Correlates of War (COW) Project 
(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/9905); Nicholas Sambanis’s (2004) work on 
definitional complexities; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Dataset that tracks 
conflicts back as far as 1946. See www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/dataset/. 
11 In “International System and Technologies of Rebellion,” Kalyvas and Balcells (418) argue that civil 
wars may be conventional wars, symmetric nonconventional wars, or insurgencies, ‘guerrilla’ or 
‘irregular’. But Kalyvas and Balcells utilize the COW criteria in their coding and limit the definition of 
insurgency to a “technology of rebellion whereby the rebels privilege small, lightly armed bands operating 
in rural areas.” 
12 Liberia. Chechnya. 
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inward on identity or values.”13 Under other circumstances, fighting may stop while an 
insurgency rebuilds materiel or personnel strength to reengage in violence.  
2.2.2 Insurgency and Civil War 
 Civil war literature builds upon the concepts above. It looks more closely at local 
level behaviors during insurgent movements to better understand the internal dynamics of 
insurgent organizations and their relationship to surrounding populations. This means that 
concepts of resourcing, training, logistics, persuasion, and coercion are investigated, to 
include methods of implementation and their effects.14 For this reason, academic 
definitions of civil war and revolution come closer to an appropriate summation of 
insurgency, in part because they are forms of insurgency, and in part because revolution 
and civil wars are overtly political phenomena.15 The contributions of Stathis Kalyvas 
and Jeremy Weinstein are introduced below.  
According to Kalyvas, beyond the casualty requirements described in the previous 
section, “[c]ivil war is defined as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized 
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the 
hostilities.”16 This is frequently true for insurgencies, although external intervention or 
motivation may play a large role in the development of a movement. It may also be true 
that transnational organizations include foreign nationals who are part of an insurgency in 
                                                          
13 Jonathan Christiansen, “Four Stages of Social Movements,” EBSCO Research Starters (EBSCO 
Publishing Inc., 2009). 
14 Kalyvas found fault in macrolevel analysis that explained local behavior by referencing elite actions. 
“The current emphasis on the macrolevel implies that ‘on-the-ground’ dynamics are perceived as a rather 
irrelevant local manifestation of the macrolevel” (Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 390). This work attempts to 
make a connection between the macro and micro levels of analysis. 
15 Certain scholars argue revolution is a pinnacle to be reached in terms of intrastate violence. Others 
suggest that revolution is “one of the most common events producing civil wars.” Goldstone et al., “Global 
Model,” 191. 
16 Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 5. 
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a given state. This trend will increase as the globalization of insurgency continues. Take 
the current context of Syria, for example. The number of foreign fighters contributing to 
numerous sides of the civil war is estimated to include 15,000 militants from eighty 
nations. 17  In this respect, the government contributes to one side while a number of 
organizations with competing interests vie for supremacy across the state. 
 
Figure 2.1 Washington Post October 12, 2014, A globalized web of militancy18 
                                                          
17 “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” The Washington Post, October 11, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-
8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html.  
18 Note: “Figures for fighters from Western Europe are from the International Center for the Study of 
Radicalization’s high-estimate category. All other numbers are from the Soufan Group. Per country fighter 
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Kalyvas looks specifically at the use of coercive homicidal violence in irregular 
civil wars against noncombatants. Irregular civil war includes “large-scale insurgencies 
with a predominantly rural basis” and should not be confused with “spontaneous peasant 
uprisings, jacqueries, food riots, and the like. These undisciplined, unstable, anarchic, and 
decentralized processes are not sustained long enough to challenge sovereign authority 
effectively.”19 Because Kalyvas focuses on local rural conditions, the lack of urban 
diversity within his theory does not detract from his focus on how violence is enacted 
against populations where “at least two political actors... enjoy partial and/or overlapping 
monopolies of violence.”20 A corresponding hypothesis could logically be made that 
similar conclusions might result in urban environments as well. 
Kalyvas argues that during civil war, violence “aims primarily to deter defection” 
but also to help mobilization efforts at the local level; he finds that in the cases he 
studied, violence is more 
related to local issues rather than the ‘master cleavage’ that drives the civil 
war at the national level. This is the case despite the fact that local 
cleavages are usually framed in the discursive terminology of the master 
cleavage.21 
 
Because the use of violence can backfire, “collective and individual preferences, 
strategies, values, and identities are continuously shaped and reshaped in the course of a 
war.22 Popular loyalty, disloyalty, and support cannot be assumed as exogenous and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
estimates determined from a date range of December 2013 to October 2014. Small numbers of fighters are 
also reported to have come from Bangladesh, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore and Trinidad 
and Tobago. These countries are not shown because they are off the map.” “Foreign Fighters Flow to 
Syria.” 
19 Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 19. 
20 Ibid., 31. 
21 Ibid., 364. Chapters two and three will discuss the changing use of narrative in much more detail. 
22 Backlash is more often associated with indiscriminate violence. Indiscriminate violence is used more 
frequently when there is a lack of information. “If the ‘guilty’ cannot be identified and arrested, then 
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fixed.”23 It makes sense then that a resultant theory of selective violence should indicate 
that areas experiencing the greatest levels of homicidal violence are those villages split24 
between warring groups. Violence patterns shift when a particular organization gains 
complete control, or when control in an area is entirely fragmented. 
Weinstein’s work follows Kalyvas. He also builds upon Fearon and Laitin’s 
standard quantitative definition of insurgency and civil war as political violence between 
state agents and organized nonstate groups. In addition to the casualty caveat, he 
identifies “conditions under which rebellion mobilizes the disenfranchised for political 
change, and when it serves only the narrow interests of its leaders”25 – when it produces 
“insurgents that seek to transform governance while others give rise to predatory 
organizations that sow terror among noncombatant populations.”26 In doing so, Weinstein 
adopts a typology that distinguishes between conflicts in which participants “seek to 
capture the center,” secede, or “use violence but have no interest in achieving territorial 
control of any sort.”27 His work looks specifically at micro-level patterns of selective and 
uncontrolled violence as a function of internal movement characteristics, including 
“membership, policies, structures, and culture.”28   
                                                                                                                                                                             
violence ought to target innocent people that are somehow associated with them… the targeted population 
will collaborate with” one side because they are feared more than another (ibid., 150).  
23 Ibid., 389. 
24 Labeled as “dominant but incomplete control” (ibid., 328). 
25 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, xvi. 
26 Ibid., 327. Weinstein begins to approach the organizing question listed above, “Might we surmise what 
kinds of insurgent behavior would lead to the creation of sustainable states?” 
27 Ibid., 17. 
28 Ibid., 19. “Selective violence is difficult to implement in practice. Differences in the membership and 
structure of rebel groups are reflected in the quality of a group’s institutions – its capacity to obtain 
information and use it to direct violence without making mistakes. Activist rebellions attract individuals 
committed to longer-term goals and embedded in networks of repeated interaction that enable leaders to 
shape the incentives and interests of their followers. Opportunistic rebellions, on the other hand, attract 
participants interested only in short term, material gains. Joined together by nothing more than their 
material interests, opportunistic groups are plagued by indiscipline, as combatants often sacrifice a group’s 
objectives to their individual interests” (ibid., 204). 
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Weinstein’s approach addresses insurgent behavior regarding resourcing, 
recruitment, governance and violence within Mozambique, Uganda and Peru. Similar to 
the definition of insurgency introduced at the beginning of Section 1.3, he treats “civil 
wars as a form of political violence” that seeks “to capture control of the government or 
over a region or to influence government policy.”29 He indicates that groups seeking 
actual control of the state constitute only “56 percent of belligerent groups in civil wars 
fought since 1945.”30 His framework opens the aperture of insurgency to terrorist 
organizations as well as transnational criminal organizations like the Mexican drug 
cartels.     
[T]he imperative of capturing a national territory creates a unique set of 
opportunities and constraints that may or may not hold in other types of 
warfare. The prospect of territorial control disciplines rebel behavior 
across geographic regions because it embeds insurgents in an interaction 
with civilians that, if they are successful, will be repeated over time.31 
 
Weinstein allows for insurgency to exist where and when the state cannot control or 
govern the entirety of its territory, and is therefore a second or third party to internal 
conflict within its borders. His work forms part of the basis of the model presented later 
in the chapter.  
 Where Kalyvas is concerned, we learn how and why violence is used by parties in 
given various demographic environments during civil wars. Where Weinstein is 
concerned, we begin to understand that the maturity of insurgency is heavily dependent 
upon the central leadership’s ability to control forces of organizational entropy. He looks 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 16. 
30 Ibid., 17. Weinstein references Monica Tofts unpublished data regarding the belligerent group objectives 
since 1945. The term belligerent here is not used in a legal way that identifies a state participant. It just 
means fighting or warring groups. 
31 Ibid., 17. Weinstein references Monica Tofts unpublished data regarding the belligerent group objectives 
since 1945. The term belligerent here is not used in a legal way that identifies a state participant. It just 
means fighting or warring groups. 
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more specifically at the ability – or inability – of different kinds of insurgent 
organizations to discipline and restrain the use of force, finding this quality to depend 
upon the resources that the leadership has available at the beginning of rebellion.32 This 
is a partial story, which will be elaborated in chapters three and four. 
2.2.3 Insurgency and Revolution 
Academic literature regarding revolution adds greater depth to the understanding 
of insurgency in five ways. First, revolution is described with respect to varied levels of 
violence. Second, some revolutions may not be insurgencies. Third, revolution is more 
clearly framed in the language of social movements and resistance movements. Fourth, 
revolution is depicted as distinct from other forms of insurgency. And fifth, revolutionary 
theorists present broader typologies regarding these full blown forms of insurgent 
movements.  
Academic descriptions of revolution further illustrate the breadth and depth of the 
insurgency spectrum and are more prone to provide corresponding theoretical 
explanations of resulting change. Revolution presents an aspect of the insurgency process 
that gathers extensive social momentum and penetration into political, social and 
economic structures and communities within a state. Because revolution is not defined by 
degrees of violence but rather by the permeation of psychological and structural 
transformation within the fabric of an existing nation, it exhibits diverse collective 
                                                          
32 According to Weinstein, “Leadership, skill, and ideology all take a backseat to broader, macro-level 
factors that structure the universe of possibilities individual rebels confront. Rebel organizations are 
transformed, at least in theory, from groups defined by the personalities and ideologies of their leaders to 
teams of would-be rebels shaped by conditions that affect the viability of challenging the state. Violence 
becomes the natural outcome of a path of organizational evolution rather than a strategic choice made in 
response to changing conditions on the ground” (ibid., 21). Chapter 3 of this dissertation directly confronts 
this finding, though resources are part of the calculus. The use of particular forms of violence, particularly 
in urban settings, may certainly be a strategic choice. 
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activities. In a handful of examples, such as the 1989 Velvet Revolution in 
Czechoslovakia, violence is not fundamental to the insurgency.33   
Processes that yield revolution with limited levels of violence fall into traditional 
social movement or resistance movement categories. Recall that certain revolutions and 
social movements are not insurgencies at all and fall outside the scope of this study. To 
review briefly, insurgencies accompany a commitment to the unconstitutional or illegal 
use of force or protest. Figure 2.2 may make this concept clearer given the associated 







Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges by people with 
common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and 
authorities.”34 Charles Tilly adds the “WUNC” behavioral requirements presented 
previously – that is social movements must display worthiness, unity and commitment. 
Tilly would argue that movements that engage in sustained violent campaigns, 
                                                          
33 The 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia ended over forty years of communist control of the state. 
Mass demonstrations and strikes yielded a shift to democracy, a multiparty state, and market economy that 
persists today, although it is now called Slovakia. Jonathan Schell speaks to a series of democratic 
revolutions in the late twentieth century. “[T]he series seemed to begin in southern Europe with the 
overthrow of the Greek junta in 1974, the autocracy in Portugal that same year, and the transition to 
democracy in Spain in 1975.” Jonathan Schell’s introduction in Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (The 
Viking Press, 1963; repr. with introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York: Penguin Group, 2006), xxi. He 
also references the fall of Brazil’s dictatorship in 1985, the Philippines in 1986, Georgia’s Rose Revolution 
in 2003, and others. 
34 On p. 28 of “Social Movement Approach,” Lee references p. 4 of Tarrow’s Power in Movement. 
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particularly at the level of coordinated destruction, are not social movements. For this 
reason, I call movements that do not exercise violence in a sustained or strategic way, 
“traditional social movements” and claim that they are insurgencies when they fit the 
definition. Public protest that is legal in one state may be illegal in another.  
In comparison, other academic theorists do connect social movement theory to the 
broader politics of insurgency and revolution. Rex Hopper, for example, postulates that 
revolutionary “movements pass through four stages in their development: the Preliminary 
Stage of Mass (Individual) Excitement, the Popular Stage of Crowd (Collective) 
Excitement and Unrest, the Formal Stage of Formulation of Issues and Formation of 
Publics, and the Institutional Stage of Legalization and Societal Organization.”35  
Hopper’s work – as well as that of Herbert Blumer who in 1969 similarly described four 
stages of social movements as Social Ferment, Popular Excitement, Formalization, and 
Institutionalization – continues to be relevant; today these stages are called Emergence, 
Coalescence, Bureaucratization, and Decline.36  Because many insurgencies comprise 
contentious social movements, they necessarily interact with a public, especially if the 
goal of the movement is to ascend to state leadership or to assume territorial control. 
Chapter 5 will put this framework into further context. 
 To return to the concept of levels of violence in insurgency and the discussion of 
Figure 2.2, the term resistance movement has a similar nuanced distinction regarding the 
use of violence. According to the “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms,” 
                                                          
35 Hopper, “Revolutionary Process,” 270. 
36 On p. 2 of “Four Stages of Social Movements,” Christiansen references both Herbert Blumer, “Collective 
Behavior,” in Principles of Sociology, ed. A.M. Lee, 3rd ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1969) 
and Donatella De la Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006). These social movement stages will be incorporated into the insurgency model 
in Section 1.4. 
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a resistance movement is, an “organized effort by some portion of the civil population of 
a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to 
disrupt civil order and stability.” 37   Resistance movements may begin as traditional 
social movements and by definition are limited in means of violence. Revolutionary 
processes, however, often impact resistance movements. For example, they may be 
suppressed by the state. In many cases, due to controlled or uncontrolled levels of 
increasing collective violence, they may become contentious social movements and 
transition from resistance movements to full blown violent insurgencies.  
Numerous theorists who study revolution consider this particular form of 
insurgency distinct from factional strife, civil war, coups d’états and national liberation 
movements.38  Although they are all brought about by comparative processes of political 
violence and organizational constructs, as Hannah Arendt argues, “only where change 
occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether 
different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic… can 
we speak of revolution.”39  Similarly, Samuel Huntington argues that, “revolution is a 
rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values, and myths of a 
society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity 
and policies.”40  Stephen Walt defines revolution as “the destruction of an existing state 
                                                          
37 Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through August 15, 2014), 218. 
38 Walt, Revolution and War, 13. 
39 Arendt, On Revolution, 25. 
40 “Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of 
independence. A coup d’état in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or 
insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a 
war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not 
necessarily involve changes in the social structure of either community. What is here called simply 
‘revolution’ is what others have called great revolutions, grand revolutions, or social revolutions.” Samuel 
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (Adarsh Enterprises, Yale University, 1968), 264. 
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by members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order;” he too 
references new “values, myths, social classes, political institutions, and conceptions of 
the political community.”41   
Revolution, however, does not stand independently of other insurgency forms. I 
contend rather that it is differentiated by its ends and not necessarily its means or even 
duration.42  Doowan Lee studies the mobilization and manipulation of social movements 
during social revolution and other forms of state resistance.43  He illustrates that 
resistance movements may be manipulated and that social movements are not only part of 
a bottom up form of revolution. Lee leverages Skocpol’s definition of social revolution as 
“rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in 
part accomplished through popular revolts from below.”44  Lee distinguishes between 
reform-oriented traditional social movements; indigenous movements seeking to 
overthrow or disrupt a target regime; indigenous coups d’états; and externally sponsored 
insurgencies. Each of these types of activity represents a pathway within insurgency 
politics that might begin as factional strife, civil war, coups d’états or national liberation 
movements and end in revolution. In the case of the coup d’états where top down change 
is initiated, the revolution may happen after the transition of political power.45 
To delve more specifically into aspects of political theory regarding typologies of 
revolution, both Huntington and Walt simplify revolutions into polarized standards. Walt 
describes those that occur from above and those that occur from below. 
                                                          
41 Walt, Revolution and War, 12. 
42 Even though Skocpol, Walt, and Huntington describe revolution as a rapid transition, insurgent 
movements thus far in history tend build slowly. In fact, insurgency is frequently described as being 
protracted or prolonged. By the time it reaches the stage of revolution, however, it is like a car with a turbo 
engine – acceleration that began slowly picks up exponentially over time. 
43 Lee, “Social Movement Approach,” 27–32. 
44 On page 28 of “Social Movement Approach,” Lee references p. 5 of Skocpol’s Social Revolutions.  
45 Arendt would agree.  
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In a mass revolution, the old regime is swept away in an explosion of 
political participation by individuals or groups that were marginalized or 
excluded under the old order. In an elite revolution, by contrast, the old 
regime is challenged and eventually replaced by a movement whose 
leaders were themselves part of the old regime—normally military and 
civil bureaucrats who become convinced that the old order can no longer 
defend vital national interests.46   
 
In both cases, methods of action against the existing regime are illegal and usually 
include violence. These behaviors are accompanied by an “explosion of political 
activity.”47 Walt connects the inner leadership of the revolution to both the social 
community as well as the political community. “By definition, successful revolutionary 
organizations are good at mobilizing social power and directing it toward specific 
political ends.”48 Beyond these observations though, Walt presents no theory regarding 
the revolutionary process.49 There are numerous hybrids, other potential pathways to 
explore for revolution that fall between the extreme elite and mass movement types. 
Huntington speaks of Eastern and Western typologies that are based on a pre-
1968 understanding of insurgency and are accompanied by linear patterns of steps and 
actions. He writes that Western revolutions evolve  
from the fall of the old order, through the revolutionary honeymoon, the 
rule of the moderates, the efforts at counterrevolution, the rise of the 
radicals, the reign of terror and of virtue, and, eventually, the thermidor.50  
The pattern of the Eastern revolution is quite different. The expansion of 
political participation and the creation of new political institutions are 
                                                          
46 Walt, Revolution and War, 12–13. 
47 Ibid., 20. 
48 Ibid., 22. Interestingly, Walt expresses less conviction about the role of ideology in revolution. He argues 
that, “ideological themes are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for revolutionary success” (ibid., 
28). Some form of psychological unifier or platform is necessary for this to occur. 
49 Walt is more concerned with the external effects a revolution in one state has upon the behavior of the 
international system. 
50 His account falls in line with Arendt’s description of the French Revolution and completely ignores the 
American revolutionary experience, perhaps because he sees it as an aberration. According to the Merriam 
Webster Dictionary, a thermidor is a “moderate counterrevolutionary stage following an extremist stage of 
a revolution and usually characterized often through the medium of a dictatorship by an emphasis on the 




carried on simultaneously and gradually by the revolutionary counterelite 
and the collapse of the political institutions of the old regime marks the 
end rather than the beginning of the revolutionary struggle. In the Western 
revolution the revolutionaries come to power in the capital first and then 
gradually expand their control over the countryside. In the Eastern 
revolution they withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, 
establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win the 
support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the 
scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military 
operations from individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile 
warfare and regular warfare. Eventually they are able to defeat the 
government troops in battle.51 
 
Huntington describes a variety of important facets of the politics of insurgency within 
this short narrative even though it is dated given the proliferation of hybrid typologies 
that exist today.  
For example, having read Mao Tse-tung’s theory regarding the Chinese 
Communist Revolution, he touches on the use of political methods that include a broad 
range of violent tactics, both rural and urban. He accounts for terrorism, guerrilla warfare, 
conventional warfare, the growth of administrative and political institutions, as well as 
the rise of numerous competing groups during the course of the insurgent movement. 
Although his description does not necessarily cover the scope of what can be understood 
about the developmental process of contemporary globalized insurgencies, he identifies a 
level of complexity that is missing from the insurgency or civil war academic literature. 
Huntington grasps important administrative and tactical variables of insurgency that will 
be explored further. 
Section 2.1 introduced academic literature regarding insurgency, civil war, and 
revolution that begins to piece together interrelated ideas needed for a broader conceptual 
understanding of the politics of insurgency. Once the military and legal perspectives of 
                                                          
51 Huntington, Political Order, 271–72. As his Western template is based on the French Revolution and his 
Eastern template is based on the Chinese Communist Revolution. 
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insurgency are presented below, I will return to connect concepts within all three sections 
and synthesize a more refined framework of insurgency politics divided into phases of 
increasing maturity and capability. From this framework, we might begin to see how 
insurgency practice changes over time, both in its repertoire of violence and 
administrative political and economic capacity. 
2.3 Operational Perspectives of Insurgency 
In contrast to the contemporary academic descriptions of insurgency in the last 
section, this section provides a practitioner’s perspective – at least a U.S government 
military operational perspective of insurgency. Much of the academic literature looks at 
insurgency from a pre-9/11 vantage. Insurgency, however, like terrorism changes over 
time. For example, political terrorism can be divided into three primary categories of sub-
state terrorism, state supported terrorism, and regime or state terrorism.52  Within the sub-
state category, we seldom see the social revolutionary terrorism of the left, or the right 
wing terrorism that dominated the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those 
activities, like today’s forms of terrorism, were part of insurgent movements that no 
longer hold psychologically for a constituent audience. Their “business processes,” 
however, if not their technologies, are very similar to today’s equivalent practices. 
Interestingly, the academic community has addressed the emergence of religious 
fundamentalist terrorism as a separate area of study that is seldom connected to the 
broader insurgency framework in which terrorists move. When politically motivated by 
substate actors, terrorism does not stand apart from insurgency, except in lone wolf or 
                                                          
52 Gerald Post class notes. 
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sociopathic/psychopathic situations. Rather, it reflects the context and maturity of an 
insurgent base.53 
Military doctrine does not question why individuals behave in particular ways but 
instead explores how they behave. It asks, “what do these actors do and what functions 
do we see repeated over time?  Military strategist David Kilcullen suggests that 
insurgents are members of “an organized movement that aims at overthrowing the 
political order within a given territory, using a combination of subversion, terrorism, 
guerrilla warfare and propaganda.”54  In this context, subversion includes “[a]ctions 
designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or 
morale of a governing authority.”55  Kilcullen describes apparent impacts of globalization 
and urbanization on the emergence of insurgent networks moving in and against the 
international political order; the connotation of insurgency as a rural phenomenon or a 
military function associated with counting casualties quickly disappears. At the same 
time though, Kilcullen’s description looks at insurgency solely from a perspective of 
breaking down existing political regimes and ignores conventional warfare as a means of 
coordinated destruction. He says nothing about establishing a new order or building an 
alternative social, security or political framework. Although not all participants are 
witting, at its core, insurgent movements attempt to offer an alternative political design or 
change to the status quo.  
                                                          
53 For example, Walter Laqueur notes that terrorism is largely a matter of “historical, social, and cultural 
traditions, and of political calculus.”  Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism, Fanaticism and the Arms of 
Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8-9. 
54 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars In the Midst of a Big One (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 12. 
55 JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 245. According to Joint Publication 3-24 (JP 3-
24), a governing authority could be “an established government, a military occupation government, an 
interim civil administration, or a peace process.” JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
November 22, 2013), I-1. The definitions of subversion and governing authority were introduced earlier in 
the dissertation definition of insurgency. 
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Kilcullen writes from a Western military ethos and uses current operational 
lexicon. It therefore is not surprising that the U.S military similarly defines insurgency as, 
“[t]he organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political 
control of a region.”56  An insurgency in its nascent stages may not yet have the means to 
utilize violence, even though the intent exists and the movement has begun. As a 
“protracted politico-military struggle” insurgencies do not begin once violence erupts.57  
Rather, “conflict often begins long before it is recognized, allowing the insurgency to 
spread and develop a covert organization within the host nation until it reveals its 
presence through overt subversive acts and violence, as will be explored in future 
chapters.58  
Insurgencies “struggle for some form of political power, whether that power is 
sought through reform, revolution, secession, nullification, or resistance.”59   In some 
circumstances, “achieving victory for an insurgent may depend less on defeating an 
armed opponent [and taking control of a state] and more on a group’s ability to garner 
support for its political interests and to generate enough violence to achieve political 
consequences.”60  In other words, as Weinstein and others indicate, gaining control of a 
state may not be in the interest of the movement. It may reach its goals by acquiring and 
maintaining autonomy in a prescribed area to carry out criminal or economic objectives. 
                                                          
56 Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through January 15, 2015), 119. 
57 JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, I-1. “Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts of 10 to 20 years… and 
often end through a negotiated settlement involving political reform by the incumbent host nation 
government” (ibid., II-1). 
58 Ibid., II-1. 
59 Ibid., I-3. 
60 Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 13, 2014), 1–2. 
42 
 
It may also reach its goals by forcing the government to the negotiating table in order to 
gain access to local and national political processes. 
This is the current context of thought and practice regarding insurgency within the 
U.S. Department of Defense. From the perspective of a state, the politics of insurgency 
touches security sectors within it, but also commercial and economic sectors, political 
and administrative capacities, as well as social organizations and movements. We see 
Huntington’s arguments scattered across this landscape. As Moises Naim indicates, the 
numbers of insurgencies proliferate because human beings proliferate – there are two 
billion more people than there were twenty years ago and there will be four times more 
people by 2050 than there were in 1950.”61  Most states simply cannot keep up with the 
growing bureaucratic demands of administering to their own populations.62  
Opportunities to develop or take control of ungoverned spaces are increasing where both 
the state and the insurgent vie to organize personnel, finances, logistics, intelligence and 
communications.63 
   Given this operational context, there are three primary documents available 
within the U.S. operational literature that explore insurgency related operations. These 
                                                          
61 Moises Naim, The End of Power (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 54. 
62 In addition to his systemic observations of revolutionary impacts on political, military, social and 
economic facets of the state, Huntington (1968) speaks directly to the impact of affiliation and association 
between members of society. He quotes de Tocqueville on page 4. “Among the laws that rule human 
societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain 
civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which 
the equality of conditions is increased.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. (Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc, 1945. Repr. and abridged with introduction by Thomas Bender, New York: Random House, 1981), 
408. 
63 It is from this vantage that the original academic focus on conditions that enable insurgency and civil war 
become helpful. See Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 190–208. Goldstone et al. found that regime type, 
infant mortality, and armed conflict in more than four bordering states were the variables most associated 
with civil war onset and adverse regime change. 
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are the Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Field Manual (FM 3-24)64, the 
Counterinsurgency Joint Publication (JP 3-24), and the Special Operations Joint 
Publication (JP 3-05).65  The latter publication introduces the core activities that special 
operators may be required to perform at large. Those that necessitate a significant 
understanding of insurgency include counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism, 
unconventional warfare (UW), special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security 
force assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil affairs operations, and military 
information support operations.66  A significant understanding is required for these 
specific activities because U.S forces conducting them operate through, with and by local 
populations within the environment of the insurgency.  
Take, for example, COIN and UW. 
Counterinsurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort 
designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its 
root causes. UW consists of operations and activities that are conducted to 
enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 
overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with 
an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.67 
 
The last sentence in the quote above provides a unique framework from which to identify 
and explore insurgency politics because it starts to get at an organizational view of 
capabilities and personnel requirements. Clearly the military has a vested interested in 
                                                          
64 Field Manual No. 3-24 is also referred to as the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-
33.5. 
65 Interestingly, within the two-hundred page FM, only twenty-seven pages are spent on the foundation of 
insurgencies. The Joint Publication is little better spending eighteen pages on insurgency within a 229 page 
document. 
66 This list is derived by my own analysis. Direct action is left off the list, for example, because little time is 
spent working with the local populations during in and out operations. Each of these are described more 
fully throughout Joint Publication 3-05 (JP 3-05) and are highlighted on pages x–xii. JP 3-05, Special 
Operations (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf. 
67 JP 3-05, Special Operations, xi. 
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better understanding the broader politics of insurgent movements. Doctrine provides 
insight into concepts of insurgency structure, organization, and phasing. 
Within military parlance, the underground, the auxiliary, and the armed 
component represent three base structural components, interdependent parts of the 
anatomy, of insurgent movements. “Underground cells conduct clandestine combatant 
and logistics operations in areas controlled by government forces.”68  The auxiliary 
includes active workers who contribute to various support requirements such as 
intelligence, political and information operations and economic support. And the armed 
component comprises the members or groups that engage in violence.  
This doctrinal list should also include a public component that connects the 
insurgency to forms of prescribed or tolerated resistance. The Assessing Revolutionary 
and Insurgency Studies (ARIS) Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies casebook provides greater definition to these components and includes the 
public component. 
Underground—A clandestine organization established to operate in areas 
denied to the armed or public components or conduct operations not 
suitable for the armed or public components.  
Auxiliary—The support element of the irregular organization whose 
organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose members 
do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the irregular 
movement. Members of the auxiliary are more likely to be occasional 
participants of the insurgency with other full-time occupations.  
Armed component—The visible element of a revolutionary movement 
organized to perform overt armed military and paramilitary operations 
using guerrilla, asymmetric, or conventional tactics.  
Public component—The overt political component of an insurgent or 
revolutionary movement. Some insurgencies pursue military and political 
strategies. At the termination of conflict, or occasionally during the 
                                                          
68 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-17. 
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conflict, the movement can transition to the sole legitimate government or 
form part of an existing government.69 
 
In terms of development, an insurgency may begin within a public - moderate or 
peaceful – political or social resistance movement. Over time, an elite or vanguard may 
emerge that breaks away from the mainstream group to try and accelerate claim making 
through collective violence. Conversely,  
At the start of an insurgency, the underground might be the only active 
sphere. As time goes on, auxiliary and guerilla contingents begin to grow 
and operate. Eventually, pursuant to a political agreement, the insurgency 
can begin to operate in the public political process. If successful there, the 
entire movement might at some point become public.70 
 
The public component of an insurgency is integral to the success of the movement and 
bears an interesting relationship to the political outcome of associated emergent states. In 
fact, the human relationships and networks across an insurgency are critical to the kind of 
state that might ensue. The role of the vanguard will become increasingly clear over the 
next few chapters, so much so that I argue that it should be a distinct component.  
In addition to concepts regarding the standard organizational components 
described above, current doctrine lightly introduces insurgent phasing and timing in two 
ways. First, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual introduces a conflict resolution model 
to understand insurgent strength through a generic phasing process. It defines insurgent 
strength as a “subjective measure of the size of a movement, its ability to mount attacks 
and inflict causalities, popular support, logistics capacity, and/or territorial control.”71  As 
one of eight dynamics, the construct is completely hypothetical, not actually tied to 
                                                          
69 Nathan Bos, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 2nd ed. (Fort Bragg, 
NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 35. 
70 Robert Leonhard, ed., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Fort Bragg, 
NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), vii–viii. 
71 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-15, Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model 
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organizational growth or functional political or administrative capability.72  Beyond the 
minimalist definition of insurgent strength, the proposed model depicts in a single graph 
the hypothetical trajectory of an insurgency’s strength across four specific phases. (See 
Figure 2.3.)  
 
Figure 2.373 (FM 3-25, Figure 4-1 Conflict Resolution Model) 
According to doctrine, the first phase is called the preinsurgency phase and is not 
on the chart though it is a crucial period of insurgency development. This “nonviolent” 
stage may last from days to years. Nonviolence is misleading because this time is often 
full of contentious politics and collective violence on a discontinuous timeline. It may 
even last fifty to one hundred years. The Algerian case study in Chapter 4 will describe 
                                                          
72 The eight dynamics include leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external 
support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns. Doctrine does 
not capture the fact that leadership, ideology, objectives, and support change over time, often in association 
with phasing requirements. FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-8–4-20. 
73 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-15, Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model 
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the extremely long duration of this first and second phases. “Preinsurgency activities 
include the emergence of insurgent leadership; creation of initial organizational 
infrastructure and possibly training; acquisition of resources, and unarmed, political 
actions, such as organized protests.”74  The early (growth) phase is suggested to last from 
three to five years, the middle (mature) phase from three to five years, and the end 
(resolution) phase for 2 plus years.  
FM 3-24s conflict resolution model gives some insight into the potential impact of 
a more rigorous and systematic phasing construct. The contribution of this particular 
model to doctrine, however, is minimal because it provides little insight into potential 
insurgent movements. Primarily the model communicates that insurgencies have a 
beginning, middle, and an end – ignoring most activity prior to overt violence. It does not 
look at what insurgencies need to do in order to grow during different phases and says 
nothing of activities in the last two phases.  
 The second brief description of insurgent phasing and timing dynamics within the 
Field Manual utilizes another three phased approach that is based on Mao Tse-tung’s 
communist insurgency model developed prior World War II. This is the same theory 
Huntington referenced.75 According to Mao’s prescription, the first phase, the latent and 
incipient phase, marks the beginning of the organization, its training, political activities, 
and protests. The second phase transitions to guerrilla warfare and small unit tactics. And 
                                                          
74 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-15, Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model 
75 Other theorists also reference Mao concepts. For example, Brian Crozier noted, “Terrorism is the natural 
weapon of men with small resources, fighting against superior strength… But the pattern of the rebellions 
that have been allowed to run their course suggests that when the opportunity comes, the rebels will drop 
terrorism in favor of guerrilla activities, or at least relegate it to second place.” Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A 
Study of Post-War Insurrections (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), 127–28. Thornton similarly 
postulates five stages of insurrection based on Mao: a previolent preparatory stage, initial violence through 
terrorism, expansion through guerrilla warfare, victory through conventional warfare, and postviolent 
consolidation. Thomas Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” in Internal War: Problems 
and Approaches, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 92.  
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the third builds to a more conventionally styled war of movement. Mao’s long term 
success was heavily based upon his own ability to transform the communist insurgent 
apparatus into the follow-on state apparatus. This said, in order take down an opposing 
regime or government power, “an insurgency does not necessarily need to transform into 
a conventional military;”76 “insurgent success can occur in any phase.”77 Mao, for 
example, continued to consolidate power within China long after the opposing regime 
fled to Taiwan. To briefly continue this line of logic, “Not all insurgencies progress 
through all three phases, and progression through all three phases is not a requirement for 
success.”78   Although this is technically true, the challenge of maintaining power is 
significant once initial control is taken of a state. Internal residual social friction, war torn 
economic conditions, and external influencers must be confronted. Additionally, in many 
regions, a conventional military is needed in order to protect the state once power is 
assumed.  
Doctrine does little to fully express the richness of Mao’s nuanced phasing model 
or to highlight the criticality of phasing to other dynamics like leadership development or 
support requirements. Within the presentation of Army doctrine, Mao’s protracted 
approach becomes one of many disjointed approaches to insurgency.79 And although his 
perception of insurgency is dated, similar to Huntington – history simply hadn’t 
happened yet - his systemic perspective is the focus of the next chapter and is part of the 
foundation of the model constructed here.  
                                                          
76 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-14. 
77 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-13.  
78 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-13. 
79 Others include the urban terrorist approach, the subversive approach, and the military-focused approach. 
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Military doctrine does a better job than academic publications at capturing the 
diversity of insurgent environments and scoping the range of persuasive and coercive 
means of activity. One weakness is that without a broader theory of insurgency to support 
counterinsurgency operations, it holds a perspective that, “Political power is nearly 
always the end, not the method, of the insurgent’s strategy and tactics.”80 This is not the 
case. At certain levels of political and evolutional maturity, insurgent movements 
frequently utilize political power as a method of gaining legitimacy and status. This can 
be seen as various administrative capacities shift during insurgent movements.  
These capacities may be economic, financial, oriented toward social services, or 
judicial responsibilities. Insurgent movements “include acts of sabotage, violence against 
individuals, public demonstrations, small-scale attacks, and eventually larger attacks and 
mobile warfare, on the military side;” but they “also include the exercise of 
administrative and governmental jurisdiction (village aid projects, education and training, 
formation of youth and other organizations concerned with group action programs).” 81  
Often the term shadow government is used to describe those insurgent groups that have 
attained enough capability to provide social services and political services to local 
populations. Think of Hezbollah today. Another way to conceptualize this notion of 
advancing political power is to look at insurgency from a legal perspective of armed 
conflict and deduce corresponding political requirements at each level of insurgent 
advance.  
 
                                                          
80 JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, I-3. 
81 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 34. 
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2.4 Legal Perspectives of Insurgency and the Foundation of a Synthesized Model 
 This section represents a preliminary phasing exercise to provide the groundwork 
of the dissertation’s phasing model. It combines lessons from academic and military 
perspectives with legal parameters and caveats. Ultimately, when we think about putting 
an insurgent movement into a broader systemic frame of reference, we want to leverage 
existing caveats and thresholds – not only in functional areas of politics, economics, 
social movement, and violence – but also across the organizational structure. Legal 
perspectives help to categorize the politics of insurgency because levels of violence and 
resistance already fall under standardized legal provisions. Increasing levels of intensity, 
duration, and organization, indicate corresponding changes within resistance methods and 
capabilities.  
Erin Hahn explores the status of personnel in nonviolent and armed resistance. 
She illustrates conceptually how the legal status of forces is divided during the growth of 
an insurgency into five categories. The first two fall within nonviolent resistance 
classifications and include the use of legal processes for political advantage as well as 
illegal political acts. The last three categories of increasing armed resistance include 
rebellion, insurgency (narrowly defined), and belligerency. Although it may be 
temporarily confusing to call one subdivision of the broader insurgent movement context 
insurgency, it is of temporary necessity. Categories are based on nominal levels of 
intensity of the fighting, the duration of the conflict, and the constitution of the resistance 
organization. As further organizational detail and nuance are added to her categories 




Figure 2.482 Resistance Movements on the Continuum 
At the lowest level, the first of five categories, nonviolent opposition occurs when 
individuals or groups use existing legal processes of resistance such as litigation, 
lobbying, peaceful sanctioned demonstrations, or social media messaging where legal.83  
In some circumstances, this resistance may be widespread and already part of a 
traditional social movement. At the second level, methods regarding political change 
become more intense and turn to collective violence as individuals and groups resort to 
illegal political acts, refusing to comply with certain laws. Activities include civil 
disobedience, illegal demonstrations, passive noncompliance with the law, short-lived 
riots, or malicious destruction of property.84 Organizational structure and networking 
across political actors, financial backers, protestors and activists increases as the 
complexity of a movement expands. Under both of these circumstances, citizens are 
subject to civil and criminal law procedures of the state. These forms of resistance may or 
                                                          
82 “Figure 1-2. Resistance movements on the continuum.” In Erin Hahn and Sam Lauber, Legal 
Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance, ed. Erin N. Hahn (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army 
Special Operations Command, forthcoming), 7. 




may not be part of an insurgent movement, though the likelihood at this stage is low in 
the absence of additional contributing factors.  
The next level of intensity constitutes rebellion and may include “short-term, 
isolated, violent engagements” such as riots, protests, and “armed attacks by disparate 
groups separated in time by weeks or months.”85As law enforcement mechanisms 
successfully engage violent behavior, participants continue to be subject to domestic 
criminal law. When associated with an insurgent movement, more sophisticated acts 
necessitate additional administrative and support capabilities from the movement. 
Additionally, as levels of violence continue to intensify, a threshold of violence may 
surpass a state’s ability to maintain the rule of law. Stated another way, at some relative 
location along the spectrum of violence, rebellion- also called insurrection, challenges the 
control of the state. To return to the doctrinal perspective, “Rebellions are forms of 
insurgency in which an organized group is leading the population, the causes of 
instability exist, and the movement enjoys some passive support among the 
population.”86 Legally speaking, and according to the Geneva Convention, members of a 
rebellion are described as insurgents.87    
As the level of intensity, duration and organization of an insurgent movement 
continues to build, the insurgency may act in ways that increase its political, economic, 
and administrative capital. It will continue to use as appropriate the mechanisms of 
previous phases – such as the use of legal processes for political advantage, illegal 
                                                          
85 Ibid. “What constitutes “low intensity” remains highly debated. There is as yet no standard legal 
definition. Instead, a court’s analysis would compare the alleged conflict under review with conflicts 
previously found to be noninternational armed conflicts (NIACs) or falling short of that threshold. One 
must ask: do the violence and organization of the alleged conflict under question approximate closely 
enough those of conflicts known to be NIACs?” (Hahn and Lauber, Legal Implications, 14). 
86 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-1. 
87 See volume II, section B of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949. 
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political acts, and rebellion. But it will also attempt to grow into an externally identifiable 
and full-fledged insurgency, category 4.88  This often includes limited areas of territorial 
control. At this stage, insurgent “fighting is more sustained and intense and cannot be 
easily suppressed by the government;” legally, as a noninternational armed conflict 
(NIAC), insurgencies with this level of associated violence come under International 
Humanitarian Law protections and protocols.89  
After the level of full-fledged insurgency, there is one additional legal category 
and two additional doctrinal descriptors of increasing violent intensity, duration and 
organization. They are familiar categories of insurgency from the academic perspectives 
section above. And yet they don’t necessarily match the definitions used in academic 
research. Militarily speaking, both revolution and civil war fall into the broader 
insurgency movement classification – often expanding through legal categories one 
through five.  
The doctrinal definition of revolution is very close to the academic conception. It 
is described as a form of  
popular insurgency with plans to overthrow a government and transform 
its society and government from one form to another. Revolutions 
generally evolve from a rebellion but in revolutions popular support comes 
in the form of a fully mobilized population, which differs from simply 
passive or active support.90 
 
The distinguisher here is that revolution is more about the level of mobilization within the 
population than social, psychic, or political changes to the state. From the same frame of 
                                                          
88 The category four descriptor is, “In general, the fighting is more sustained and intense and cannot be 
easily suppressed by the government. Other elements include increased levels of insurgent group 
organization and territorial control.” Erin Hahn and Sam Lauber, Legal Implications, 6. 
89 Ibid. 
90 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4-1. 
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reference, doctrine finds civil war to be “condition-based” and another distinct 
permutation of insurgency; 
Once the insurgency achieves certain characteristics of organization and 
resembles an alternate government, the conflict reaches the state of civil 
war. This is often characterized by performing tasks associated with a state 
and having a defined government. If the insurgency loses the ability to 
meet these criteria, the status or state of the insurgency is no longer that of 
a civil war.91 
 
The associated legal perspective of civil war is defined by the Geneva Convention. It also 
looks at political and administrative capacities of an insurgency when determining civil 
war status. Without providing detailed specifics of what constitutes a state, it stipulates 
that 
insurgents must have an organization purporting to have the characteristics 
of a State; that the insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto 
authority over persons within a determinate territory; that the armed forces 
must act under the direction of the organized civil authority and be 
prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; that the insurgent civil 
authority must agree to be bound by the provisions of the Convention.92 
 
Interestingly there is no litmus test to determine what capabilities do or do not comprise a 
state.  
Clare Lockhart and Ashraf Ghani provide a list of ten functions of a state. These 
include the monopoly on the legitimate means of violence; administrative control 
managed by government professionals; the management of public finances, investments 
in human capital; the creation of citizenship rights through social policy; the provision of 
infrastructure services; the formation of a market; the management of public assets; and 
                                                          




effective public borrowing.93 On a very small scale, an insurgent movement has 
corresponding categories of operation that must scale up, transition from support of the 
organization alone to penetration of the components across a state. Part of the task of this 
dissertation will be to see how this transformation may take place over time. What are the 
indicators and practices that have been used during this transition? Many insurgencies 
take control of a state tenuously without meeting these kinds of requirements.What do 
these states look like?  
 This said, there is still a final legal category of transition during insurgency that 
connects revolution, civil war and the state. This is the category of belligerency. Both 
revolution and civil war fall into the belligerency category when they meet the following 
four criteria. First, conflict becomes general rather than local armed conflict. Second, 
belligerents control and administer to a substantial portion of territory. Third, 
“belligerents follow the laws of war and use a command system;” and fourth, 
“circumstances require states to define their positions in relation to the conflict.”94 
Belligerents are considered to be state representatives according to the Law of Armed 
Conflict.  
This means that by this level of advanced insurgency, the resistance is “deemed a 
de facto state and its forces receive combatant/POW status.”95 The crossover is extremely 
important for antigovernment forces fighting in revolutions and civil wars because it is 
the first step to legal sovereignty. Although the classification transition from insurgent to 
belligerent may change back to insurgent at some future point of the conflict, the 
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appellation requires the international community to provide recognition of that status and 
behave accordingly. 
 Given this legal paradigm, we may now return more fully to the previous 
reference from military doctrine that, “Political power is nearly always the end, not the 
method, of the insurgent’s strategy and tactics.”96  Political capacity is as much a part of 
the context of insurgent activity as the use of violence. The model introduced in the next 
section provides a framework from which to assess insurgency maturity and capability.  
2.5 A Theory of the Politics of Insurgency 
  A place to start then, in order to build a theory on the politics of insurgency, 
begins with the five legal thresholds established in Section 2.3: the use of legal processes 
for belligerent acts, illegal political acts, rebellion, insurgency and belligerency. See 
Table 2.1. These categories already correspond to conceptual levels of intent and maturity 
regarding an insurgency’s capacity for political leadership as well as its security and 
military capabilities. They serve as a basis of thought for the broader requirements 
needed to grow an insurgent movement. 
Legal Thresholds of Insurgency 
 Use of legal processes for belligerent acts 




Table 2.1 Legal Thresholds of Insurgency 
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 Also implied across the legal thresholds, however, is a connection between the 
insurgency’s monopoly on violence and scalable control mechanisms of the inhabitants 
living in or associated with a particular territorial area. Control mechanisms may inspire 
supportive behavior through hard or soft power constructs, fear or affinity respectively. 
The case studies in the following chapters explore those behaviors internal to the 
insurgency that enable it to acquire or lose control across stages; this happens through the 
actions of the vanguard, the political apparatus that represents constituting mechanisms, 
and the security apparatus that enables destructive mechanisms through a monopoly on 
violence. I argue that the maturity and efficiency of an emergent regime depends upon 
the vanguard’s capability to develop and master political constitutive and destructive 
mechanisms associated with each phase of the insurgency. If it cannot scale, the only way 
to progress to the next level of maturity is through external support. 
External support might come at any time during the growth of an insurgency and 
contribute to or detract from its cause. For example, external actors routinely provide 
resources that impact  funding and finance methods; trade, the illicit and licit economy; 
manpower; sanctuary, passage and refuge; logistics and supplies; and local or long 
distance communications. External actors may impact the development and execution of 
strategy, ideology, or training and development. They may help to isolate an enemy 
internationally or provide a second front kinetically. Finally, they may support 
intelligence collection and dissemination functions or control information and tailor 
messaging to support the insurgency’s institutional legitimacy.  
 Figure 2.5 presents the primary relationships that will be explored to explain 
insurgency phase transitions in future chapters. It illustrates necessary connections 
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between the vanguard, public support, political mechanisms and organizations, as well as 
violent mechanisms and organizations. These four categories are different than the 
doctrinal groupings discussed earlier regarding the underground, the auxiliary, and the 
armed component. In this construct, the vanguard uses formal and informal organizations 
of politics and violence to draw support and participation from social networks within the 
public. Participation includes both licit and illicit activity from within the state or 
externally from a diaspora or transnational organizations.  
 
Figure 2.5 Insurgency Relationship Framework  
Although the doctrinal components are not explicitly called out, their activities are 
still required to serve the overall political, economic and violent needs of the movement. 
This work changes the focus of analysis from intelligence on individuals to information 
regarding systemic licit and illicit activities and communications that impact 
organizational and institutional relationships that vary across insurgent movements. I 
look at broader systems of interaction rather than deduce who is in the underground and 
who is in the auxiliary. For the purposes of this work, the underground, the public 
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component, and the auxiliary roll into illicit clandestine political and violent mechanisms 
as well as the public that supports them. The armed component falls clearly within 
emergent security mechanisms of the movement over time.  
Citizen support feeds and builds an insurgency’s political bureaucracy as well as 
its military and security apparatuses. The politics of insurgency as a phenomenon should 
more explicitly connect vanguard influence over the public through political 
administration and the use of violence, whether those components are part of state 
institutions, social hierarchies such as clans, or underground political organizations. The 
nature of and relationships between framework components over time indicate what type 
of a regime will emerge. Analysis of the framework will explain how the developing 
regime rectifies the disparity in licit and illicit behaviors, and whether the insurgency is a 
national movement capable of building a national army or a networked organization 
capable of supporting a limited paramilitary unit. How pervasive is the insurgency within 
the public and how adept might it become in overtaking the anatomy of the state?   
There are two ways to look at the optimal relationships within this framework for 
a given state. The first outcome for regime success over time is the assimilation and 
growth of the vanguard identity with the political and security apparatuses, as well as 
public support. This relationship appears in Figure 2.6. In cases such as these, the 
vanguard disperses into the political apparatus of the new state or the political apparatus 
becomes entirely subordinate to the vanguard leadership. The same concept holds for the 
military or security apparatus. The military and security organizations of the state 
incorporate the insurgent forces, or become an extension of the insurgent force and 
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leadership. The case studies in chapters six through eight will more fully express these 
connections and changes across phases.  
 
Figure 2.6 Internal Insurgency Assimilation across the Relationship Framework 
The second perspective to achieve the optimal outcome for a movement merges 
the illicit or informal mechanisms of control of the insurgency with the formal state 
mechanisms across stages. The former subsumes the latter through defeat or assimilation; 
at the least it must achieve some form of parity across the balance of capabilities and 
relationships.97 Figure 2.7 depicts this movement. Picture the state framework moving to 
the left as the bottom overlay and the insurgent framework moving to the right as the top 
overlay. In Figure 2.7, the insurgency begins to overcome the existing regime while 
Figure 2.5 speaks to the necessary balance and maintenance of the relationships within 
the insurgency.  
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conventional force, there is little reason for the movement to attempt to grow its own conventional force. It 





Figure 2.7 Insurgency Assimilation of State Mechanisms across the Relationship 
Framework 
As an exemplar, take the Tea Party movement in the United States. Not an 
insurgency, but not unlike an insurgency. The Tea Party “vanguard” began to support 
political candidates running under the Republican Party in 2009. Responsible for making 
gains in Republican victories following 2010, the Tea Party began to gain enough traction 
from public support through elections – a constitutive political mechanism – that it began 
to challenge traditional Republican leadership and prevent the overall party from 
reaching internal consensus on some issues and external compromise with the 
Democratic Party on others. In this sense, with respect to Figure 2.6, the Tea Party gained 
political access and a voice within the Republican Party through public support and 
constitutive political mechanisms. With respect to Figure 2.7, it gained political access 
and voice within the U.S. legislative branch through those same processes.  
Comparative examples include the American Revolution and Civil War. With 
respect to the American Revolution, the vanguard and the political mechanisms of the 
emergent resistance developed from existing representative colonial political institutions. 
These bodies then coalesced into a new political organization that overtook the 
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incumbent power. One of the first tasks of this group included the institutional 
establishment of a military mechanism of resistance that subsequently grew and 
overcame the British forces. With respect to the American Civil War, while the coupling 
of all components within the internal insurgent framework developed quickly, it failed to 
assume or subsume the existing state framework depicted in Figure 2.7. 
Given the primary internal organizational stakeholders within an insurgency (the 
vanguard, the political apparatus, the military apparatus, and the public) and the 
milestones that a movement must reach as it matures, Table 2.2 adapts the five legal 
categories to incorporate a construct that includes six generic insurgency phases. The 
content of these phases are developed within chapter three and four case studies.98 They 
represent distinct stages in insurgent maturity and growth for which each component has 
correlated requirements, to include the acquisition of physical space or territory, levels of 
political administration, and levels of military capability.  
It should be understood that the security and political apparatuses, or public 
affinity, may not achieve the same phase of maturity at the same time. One may lag or 
lead the other in movement development, even from the outset. Take again the example 
of the American Revolution, where the political mechanisms of the resistance began at a 
much higher level of maturity than the ensuing development of an Army. General George 
Washington literally brought over a Prussian officer to build a conventional capability. 
French warfighting manuals were distributed among conscripts and a training program 
ensued to enable American forces to fight the British on their own terms.  
                                                          
98 This section gives away some of the findings of future chapters. But the concepts will be reintroduced 
and substantiated in greater context and rigor. 
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Phase Insurgent Movement Phase 
    
phase 0 Perceived inequity / injustice 
    
phase 1 Violence as a possibility 
  Building to systemic violence 
    
phase 2 Internal Darwinism 
  Path toward public legitimacy 
  
 phase 3 Monopoly on localized violent resistance 
  Emergent identity 
    
phase 4 
Violence and regional political 
administration 
    
phase 5 
Violence and national political 
administration 
Table 2.2 Basic Phases of Insurgent Movements 
Table 2.3 shows the next level of depth within the phasing model that might show 
comparative aspects of the insurgency across phases. This particular chart illustrates the 
specific legal alignment discussed above, but it also incorporates very basic military 
milestones across phases. Chapter 5 will introduce a more mature variation of the phasing 
framework, to include the comparative political mechanisms associated with each phase. 
Table 2.3 is intended to build the concept to a level appropriate for more detailed 









Movement Phase Military  Legal 
        
Phase 0 
Perceived inequity / 
injustice 
Existing militant or 
violent culture 
Use of legal 
processes for 
belligerent acts 
        
Phase 1 Violence as a possibility 
Begin terrorist 
tactics Illegal political acts 
  




        
Phase 2 Internal Darwinism Strategic terrorism Rebellion 
  Path toward legitimacy Small unit tactics    
        
Phase 3 
Monopoly on localized 
violent resistance Guerrilla warfare Insurgency 
  Emergent identity     
        
Phase 4 
Violence and regional 
political administration 
Reconquest Mobile warfare Insurgency 
        
Phase 5 





Table 2.3 Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements 
Basic discussion of the phases is as follows. 
• Phase zero begins with perceived injustice or inequity within a region or 
environment. It is a state of mind and action that sets the starting context of the 
location, associated stakeholders, and their claims, goals and interests within a 
developing movement. In the language of Hopper and Blumer, Phase zero 
comprises increased individual excitement and social ferment of the movement. 
   
• During phase one, ad hoc insurgent violent behavior begins and builds toward a 
systemic application. The insurgency reaches coalescence as a movement, a time 
of collective excitement and unrest. At the least, land and buildings are required 
to conduct or support the necessary activities that comprise its activities. In many 
cases this means terrorism.  
 
• Phase two builds upon destabilizing, inconsistent, and opportunistic terrorist and 
small unit tactics  to provide an ability to control territory in limited duration and 
emerge as the primary stakeholder in a given constituency and region. Issue 
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formulation and the rise of public coalitions of support to the insurgency create 
competition between elements of a given organization or between insurgent 
organizations in the same environment.  
 
• Phase three ties the monopoly of violence to an insurgent brand that is able to 
conduct guerrilla warfare in limited areas. The insurgency attempts to formalize 
political and security institutions and connect them to public via an expanding 
bureaucracy. Heavy competition between elements of a given organization or 
between insurgent organizations in the same environment persists. 
 
• Phase four insurgent movements control both a monopoly of violence through 
maneuver warfare as well as administer politically and economically to defined 
regions of the state. The insurgency defeats, is defeated by, assimilates or coopts 
the broader public and state functions. Truly, at any time the insurgency may be 
defeated. External support to the insurgency will become key to its accession into 
the international community. 
 
• By the end of phase five, the insurgency controls national level military assets and 
administers to state political and economic assets. The acceptance of the 
international community is required. Often, this phase is completed after a 
turnover in power but while another state subsides the transition. 
 
Arrival on the dynamics across the particular phases introduced above is informed by two 
insurgency case studies and my own analysis of four insurgency models that correspond 
to those cases. The case insurgencies include the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927-
1949) and the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) while the models incorporated include 
the work of Mao Tse-tung, David Galula, and the United States’ Special Operations 
Research Office. The next two chapters unpack each case, to include the narratives that 
link the dynamic of the vanguard, the political institutions, the security institutions, and 
the public in a unique relationship that yielded the Chinese and Algerian states of the 





The Chinese Communist Revolution and Basic Insurgency 
Modeling 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate and deepen the phasing framework 
introduced at the end of Chapter 2. The following sections analyze the Chinese 
Communist Revolution (1927–1949) in light of two comparative phasing theories on 
insurgency. Section 3.1 synthesizes the work of Mao Tse-tung while Section 3.2 brings 
David Galula into the discourse. What Galula labeled the communist “orthodox pattern” 
differs extensively from Mao’s model, although both make significant contributions to a 
meta-theory on insurgency. Because US military operations today take direction from 
these two key insurgency theorists, addressing and deconstructing their work is important 
to use as a foundation for new ways to approach related operations. This chapter 
identifies the content, limitations, and characteristics of their models in association with 
the attributes and dynamics of the Chinese insurgency. 
3.2 Mao’s Theory on the Practice of Revolution 
In 1938, when Mao argued that China’s conflict with Japan would progress 
through three stages of war, his strategy aligned with the details of his circumstance. 
China was a heavily agrarian, semi-feudal and semi-colonial state whose leaders spent 
much of the nineteenth century resisting Western and regional imperialism. When the 
Qing dynasty fell in 1911 and the Republic of China stood up in 1912, division within the 
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country proliferated—fragmenting further along political, economic, and cultural lines.1  
Competing feudal warlords controlled the north while the Kuomintang (KMT), variously 
backed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviets, began to dominate the 
south. “The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 in Shanghai, originally existed 
as a study group working within the confines of the First United Front with the (KMT) 
Nationalist Party.”2  In 1923, when Mao joined the KMT, the Nationalist Party affiliation 
with the Soviets was still on the rise.  
During the ten years that preceded the publication of On Guerrilla War (1937) 
and On Protracted War (1938), the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party 
(CPC) and the KMT disintegrated at the same time that conditions with the Japanese 
came to a head. In 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek took control of the KMT army, he began 
the Northern Expedition to unite China’s divided provinces under one state. The CPC 
grew to about 10,000 strong and attempted to take over the KMT in his absence. In 1927, 
Chiang expelled the Communists from the KMT and the Chinese Civil War began. The 
CPC openly rebelled when the two parties split, failing to seize power through armed 
urban uprisings.3 “A Communist group with Mao Tse-tung took refuge in the Kiangsi-
Hunan area, while other groups scattered in various places. They slowly initiated guerrilla 
                                                          
1 “The fall of the dynasty stirred the national consciousness and the desire for change in only a small 
number of Chinese, and there was little agreement as to what should replace the old order. Revolutionary 
and counterrevolutionary elements competed for domestic and foreign support.” Paul A. Jureidini et al., 
“The Chinese Communist Revolution: 1927-1949,” Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, 
Volume I: 1927–1962, rev. ed. (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, 2013), 
571. 
2 “The Chinese Revolution of 1949,” Office of the Historian, accessed February 26, 2015, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev. 
3 Arthur Waldron and Edward O’Dowd, Second Edition Introduction to On Guerrilla War (Yu Chi Chan), 
by Mao Tse-tung. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 
1992), 7. “At this time, Mao Tse-tung was assigned the task of organizing the peasants into unions. The 




warfare, and, although at first they committed the mistake of attacking well-defended 
towns, they managed to develop their military strength.”4  
In 1931, when the Japanese invaded Northeast China (Manchuria), Chiang 
directed his army to continue its course against the warlords and the communists—not to 
confront the Japanese. By 1933, the CPC membership reached roughly 300,000 members 
and the KMT controlled China’s government.5  During 1933, the Nationalists strongly 
persecuted the CPC which lost 60,000 soldiers when surrounded by 500,000 KMT troops 
in the Jiangxi province. The Communist forces within southeastern China retreated under 
attack in 1934 for roughly 6,000 miles. Beginning the trek with around 85,000 troops, 
they lost roughly 90% of their numbers along the route to the Shensi province in the 
northwest. “When those who survived the march reached Yenan, they combined with the 
communist troops there to form a fighting strength of 80,000.”6  
In 1936, as the Japanese threat to China intensified, Chiang’s military leadership 
pressured him to sign a cease-fire with the CPC and to work together against the 
Japanese. When Japan’s army invaded central China in 1937 and the Sino-Japanese War 
broke out in earnest,7 the CPC and KMT established a tenuous unified front. On 
Guerrilla War and On Protracted War are products of Mao’s contradictory 
                                                          
4 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 
Inc., 1964), 25.  
5 Ibid. Galula also wrote that, “By V-J day, the Party had grown to 1,200,000, controlled an area of 350,000 
square miles with a population of 95 million, and had a regular army of 900,000 men and a militia force of 
2,400,000. It was no longer vulnerable.” 
6 “The Long March 1945 to 1935,” History Learning Site, accessed February 26, 2015, 
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/long_march_1934_to_1935.htm. 
7 “The first great battle of the war in China began at Shanghai on 13 August 1937 and was totally 
conventional. It pitted fifty Nationalist Chinese divisions, numbering about 700,000 men, against more than 
ten Japanese divisions, totaling more than 300,000 men plus three hundred heavy guns, two hundred tanks.. 
etc.. Ten thousand of China’s irreplaceable junior officers were killed and seventy percent of her modern 
German-trained forces destroyed. It lasted four months.” Waldron and O’Dowd, Introduction to On 
Guerrilla War,13. Previous Japanese presence on the mainland was isolated in Manchuria. 
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circumstances, written to support the united front but after the Long March when the 
Nationalists continued to be a viable threat and long-term enemy.8   
Although both of Mao’s seminal works focus on the defeat of Japan’s army, not 
the Nationalists, they reflect Mao’s lessons and experiences against the KMT. They 
illustrate a partnership between the Nationalist army and communist forces against Japan 
and promote the perception of a unified front between the KMT and the CPC.9  Mao’s 
works present arguments in which guerrilla war is one component of a broader strategy 
that depends on an active conventional capability, albeit one inferior to Japan’s forces. 
Mao argued that if the KMT could tie up the Japanese army temporarily, this would allow 
the Communists time to build bases and mature their guerrilla component; in this way 
they might eventually work with the KMT army to counter their mutual enemy. Even 
though the CPC continued to drive toward legitimate state leadership, not a Nationalist–
Communist coalition, Mao’s resulting doctrine and written strategy is silent regarding 
any coordinated political solution beyond the Japanese defeat.10  On the surface Mao 
                                                          
8 This work does not discuss Mao’s rise to power within the CPC or the tactical split – for both political and 
military reasons with the Soviet Union. His works represent lessons learned after difficult tactical failures 
against the Nationalists – under the advisement of the Soviets and even against the CPCs own military 
leadership. Mao’s leadership in the party was not always secure and the Japanese threat helped the 
Communists remain viable during a critical point in their path to power. “Mao’s closest colleagues were 
skeptical of his military views for two reasons. One was political: Mao consistently opposed the orthodox 
and pro-Moscow position within the party; but secondly and more importantly, Mao’s ideas went against 
the military concepts of some Chinese Communist soldiers who had received formal military training, and 
most importantly, often did not lead to success on the battlefield.” Waldron and O’Dowd, Introduction to 
On Guerrilla War, 9. 
9 U.S. Marine Corps FMRP 12-18, Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla War (Yu Chi Chan). Translation and 
introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Headquarters, U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1989), 19. Forward is dated 5 April 1989. Introduction and Translator’s note is dated 1940. Further 
note is dated 1961.  
10 “The final group of Mao’s articles, written from 1946 to 1949, outline the strategy for defeating the 
Nationalist army in a conventional war of maneuver.” Edward O’Dowd, Bibliographic Essay in On 
Guerrilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan), by Mao Tse-tung. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992), 139. 
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targets the Japanese, but under the surface he intends for the Communists’ full dominion 
over China.  
As a result of this context, On Protracted War and On Guerrilla War do not 
signify factually accurate representations of history. They don’t depict the unadulterated 
insurgent strategy of a party that starts a revolution from nothing against an isolated 
ruling government regime.11  They don’t communicate what transpired during the Sino-
Japanese War—or what transpired before and after between the Nationalists and the 
Communists.12  Rather, On Protracted War and On Guerrilla War serve as primary 
examples of Mao’s operational and strategic narrative, distributed within China at the 
time and intended for a number of audiences.13   
In this way, Mao’s two texts served as tools of the communist revolution. 
[C]ommunist fighting doctrines were written with the intent of 
indoctrinating in every sense of the word. Soldiers and auxiliaries were 
politically educated. They were imbued with the ideology of the Party, and 
provided with the tools of propaganda applicable to themselves, the 
populations they lived off of, and their enemies, which they invariably 
sought to rally” 14   
Mao argued that the internal communication and reception of the Communist political 
message should focus on the relationships across a trinity of players. Rather than think of 
the army, the people, and the enemy as independent targets, he spoke to messaging that 
                                                          
11 A useful distinction should be made between “partisan and pure guerrilla war.” In partisan warfare, 
irregular forces operate in coordination with large state or party-supported conventional formation. This 
style of war, as Clausewitz observed, could prove very successful, and it has from the Spanish campaigns 
of the early nineteenth century right down to recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and other states. But 
without the main forces, the partisans or guerrillas are far less effective.” Waldron and O’Dowd, 
Introduction to On Guerrilla War, 29–30.  
12 Competition between the two internal enemies never truly stopped and fighting in earnest began again by 
1940 so that the armies fought the Japanese separately. 
13 Mao’s ideas rely on those who preceded him, including other Marxist theorists, Clausewitz, and even 
Sun Tzu. Although his ideas transcended into broader revolutionary theory, he did not personally export his 
ideas or ascribe them to other situations for other states 
14 A. A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of 
Counterinsurgency (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 74. 
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layers relationships across the operational environment. This practice appeals to the 
spiritual identification of individuals affected by the movement, as is common to the 
practice of nationalism. “The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of 
officers and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the army and the 
people; and last, destruction of the unity of the enemy.”15  This concept, though modified, 
forms the basis of the insurgency framework of relationships introduced in Chapter 2, 
between the vanguard, the political and violent mechanisms or institutions of the 
insurgency, and the people. The strength of the relationships between these institutions 
and mechanisms provides insight into the level of support those relationships provided to 
vanguard goals and desired outcomes. The nature of this relationship as it plays out over 
time also enables analysis and assessment of emerging regimes and political 
environments.16   
  The Communist message was designed to appeal to the entire Chinese population, 
an attribute Mao claimed to be integral to the success of the national movement.17  
Although his propaganda was written with the intent of full-spectrum national appeal, his 
leadership directed communist supporters to focus particularly on the semi-colonial and 
semi-feudal mass constituency.18  Whereas Lenin’s revolutionary model looked to an 
                                                          
15 Mao, in USMC On Guerrilla War, 90.  
16 This will be seen in future dissertation chapters. 
17 “Guerrillas must never forget that primitive weapons alone, without political work, will never suffice to 
gain victory over a stronger enemy. Every guerrilla fighter must engage in political work, becoming an 
armed agitator and organizer in the war of resistance.” On p. 86 of Galula, Cohen quotes Chu Te, 
“Problems in Guerrilla Warfare,” in Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics, ed. Gene Z. Hanrahan (Boulder, 
CO: Paladin Press, 1974), 67. 
18 “The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring forth 
men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines.” Tse-tung, Mao, “On Protracted War.” In Strategy 
for Conquest, Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare, edited by Jay Mallin. (Coral Gables, FL: 
University of Miami Press, 1970), 118. 
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industrialized proletariat, China’s agrarian society compelled a modified approach to 
access the greatest potential for political and ideological support.19   
Beyond the trinity of the people, the army, and the enemy, Mao also targeted 
international support, not excluding the sympathy of Japan’s people who were ambivalent 
about the Japanese military.20  To this contingent, he argued that China’s fight for 
independence was just and that Japan’s goal to enslave the Chinese population was 
“barbaric”.21  China needed international support in order to gain access to resources and 
to isolate the enemy.22  In fact, Japan’s final defeat on the mainland corresponded to and 
coincided with Japan’s defeat in World War II and not to the actions of the resisting 
Chinese; therefore, external support played a very large role in the Communist success.23 
While On Protracted War and On Guerrilla War are primary sources of Mao’s 
ideology—meant to stir up support and generate a political base—they also provide a 
variety of heuristics regarding how the CPC’s revolution should be successfully fought, 
given China’s specific circumstances in 1937 and 1938.24  Interpretations of this direction 
                                                          
19 Once Mao came to power, he attempted to alter China’s agrarian base through a forced Industrial 
Revolution. This effort failed and decimated much of the country.  
20 Mao, On Protracted War, 59. 
21 “The Japanese bandits have invaded our country not (68) merely to conquer territory but to carry out the 
violent, rapacious, and murderous policy of their government, which is the extinction of the Chinese race.” 
Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 68–69. 
22 Mao, On Protracted War, 70.  
23 In addition to Japan’s surrender after World War II in 1945, the Communists also received help from the 
Soviet Union who occupied Manchuria just before the surrender. The Soviet Union barred the KMT from 
entering Manchuria and supported the CPC; “the arms and equipment of the Japanese Kwantung Army 
were turned over to 100,000 soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army who had crossed into Manchuria 
from Jehol and Shantung. The Communists in Manchuria were at once able to conduct large-scale 
sustained operations, and the nature of the fighting in this area was markedly different from the Communist 
operations south of the Great Wall. Access to the Japanese Army stores was not the decisive factor in the 
outcome of the war, since the Communist forces in China proper, who received few supplies from 
Manchuria, succeeded in arming themselves with captured Nationalist equipment; but it certainly hastened 
the defeat of the best Nationalist troops in Manchuria.” Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 29. 
24 Throughout history, there have been many famous political and military theorists like Mao, who, for 
whatever political reason at the time, could not speak openly or freely regarding their views. Mao was 




and guidance were exported outside of China after the war and still serve as the basis of 
thought for organizations both interested in revolution and countering revolution. 
 For example, Mao argued for a series of linear and “fundamental steps necessary 
in the realization” of his political goals. In addition to these steps, he also introduced and 
elaborated upon three phases, or stages, of protracted conflict. The alignment between 
steps and stages is indicated in Figure 3.1. There is a limited alignment between Mao’s 
steps and stages and the broader model introduced at the end of Chapter 2. Across the rest 
of Chapters 3 and 4, this figure will transform into the dissertation’s final version that 
will be used to assess future case studies in Chapters 6 through 8. 
Mao's Stages Mao's Steps 
1. Strategic Defense 1. Arouse and organize the people 
  2. Achieve internal unification politically 
  3. Establish bases25 
2. Strategic Stalemate 4. Equip forces 
  5. Recover national strength 
3. Strategic Counteroffense 6. Destroy the enemy's national strength 
  7. Regain lost territories 
Table 3.1 Mao Stages and Steps 
                                                                                                                                                                             
partnership with the Nationalist party. This does not mean that we cannot learn or identify the true nature of 
his teaching. Leo Strauss, a contemporary of Mao, wrote a piece entitled “Persecution and the Art of 
Writing” in 1941. Strauss argued that “the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels 
all writers who hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing, the technique which we 
have in mind when speaking of writing between the lines.” Leo Strauss, “Persecution and the Art of 
Writing,” Social Research 8, no. 4 (1941): 488.  
25 “A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out 
their duties of training, self-preservation and development.” Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 
107. “There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded 
by territory occupied by the enemy is a ‘base area.’  On the other hand, the area east and north... is a 
guerrilla (109) area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy 
them.” Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 109–10. 
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The next three sections describe and dissect Mao’s strategic stages and explore how his 
steps are incorporated within them in the case of the CPC insurgency and resistance 
against the Japanese army.  
3.2.1 Stage One: The Strategic Defensive26 
In alignment with the brief historic backdrop of the last section, Mao argued that 
the first stage of China’s protracted war of liberation ought to begin with the 
Kuomintang’s conventional forces as the primary point of kinetic contact with Japan.27  
The external threat would continue to push into the country with overwhelming force and 
superior technical and organizational capabilities. China’s limited conventional forces, 
supported by the United States and the British, would slow down the enemy’s offensive 
gains, impact the Japanese economy and negatively affect their troop morale.28  
Conventional engagement would enable communist guerilla units to grow and circle 
around behind the Japanese army to build needed base areas of support within and among 
the local population.29   
While the KMT’s conventional forces engaged the Japanese, Mao’s doctrine 
directed the CPCs political movement to promote national “internal unification” and spur 
the development of guerrilla units, local self-defense units, and corresponding political 
                                                          
26 The subheading labels are appropriated from the categorization found within Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-
24), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
May 13, 2014), paragraph 1-31. This particular one stems from Mao’s On Protracted War concept that the 
first stage is the enemy’s strategic offense and China’s strategic defense. 
27 Mao’s stage one sits squarely within phase 2 of the Chapter 2 framework, “Internal Darwinism / Path to 
internal legitimacy. 
28 Mao, On Protracted War, 72. 
29 “It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert the enemy’s rear into 
an additional front. Thus the enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied 
territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive.” Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung 
On Guerilla War, 107. 
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committees that would lead political and military decision making at local levels.30  For 
example, On Guerrilla Warfare describes numerous sources of guerrilla forces, what 
types of positions and skills to accommodate, and how to “harmonize military operations 
and local political affairs.”31  For example, guerrilla units are to “exterminate small 
forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of 
communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the 
enemy’s rear; (and) to force the enemy to disperse his strength.”32  
Comparatively, self-defense units incorporate all men and women between the 
ages of sixteen and forty-five voluntarily. These forces self-organize and arm themselves. 
With the help of the CPC leadership, they receive military and political training—to 
include transporting the wounded, providing food, “local sentry duties, securing 
information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy 
propaganda.”33   Neither the self-defense forces nor the guerrilla units begin as 
disciplined organizations. Over time, the political and military leadership gradually 
overcomes “the lack of discipline, which first prevails; they will establish discipline in 
their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency.”34 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 63. 
31 Ibid., 78. 
32 Ibid., 53.  
33 Ibid., 80. 
34 Ibid., 45. Even where Mao introduces his stages in On Protracted War, he does not discuss how to build 
a guerrilla force or explain how to rally the people or mobilize them politically to form new institutions. He 
limits his guidance to the use various media – such as schools, films, word of mouth, or leaflets, bulletins, 
newspapers and the like to build support. Mao does explain that in order to transform the country into a 
new China, “It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to understand why the war must be fought and 
how it concerns him” – both the aim and “the steps and policies for its attainment.” 
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And finally, the political apparatus incorporates each element to awaken the 
“national consciousness.”35  According to Mao, all people needed indoctrination to the 
political military struggle. “Hence a concrete explanation of the political systems used is 
important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the 
realization of our political goal.”36  For this reason, propaganda and associated tools are 
integral to the success of national unification. Along these lines, Mao suggested that, 
“Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They 
must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be 
supplied with chalk and large brushes.”37         
During the course of the first stage of the protracted conflict, Mao argued that two 
types of changes, good and bad, would occur in both China and Japan. (See Figure 3.2.)  
While Japan might expand its territory and gain certain resources, it would also incur 
heavy casualties, a “drain on arms and ammunition, deterioration of troop morale, 
popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade,” a heavy financial burden, and a decrease 
in international opinion.38 China, on the other hand, would experience “decreases in 
territory, population, economic strength, military strength and cultural institutions.”39  
The CPC specifically, however, would accomplish goals critical to future 
resistance during the first stage. The communists would begin to develop a national army 
from its emergent self-defense units and guerrilla capability,40 make political progress 
                                                          
35 Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 89. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 85. 
38 Mao, On Protracted War, 75.  
39 Ibid.  
40 “The organization of self-defense units is a transitional step in the development of universal 
conscription;” this provides “reservoirs of manpower for the orthodox forces” (Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung 
On Guerilla War, 81). 
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and mobilize people to its cause, foster a unifying culture around the communist 
ideology, and increase international support.41  The strategy implied greater negative 
effects on both the KMT and the Japanese while the CPC built its capability. 
Impacts Positive    Negative 
Japan  Expand Territory   Heavy Casualties 
Expand Resources   Drain on Arms/Ammo 
Drop in Troop Morale  
Financial Burden   
Decreasing Trade   
Discontent at Home 
Decline in World Opinion 
 
Impacts Positive    Negative 
China  Increase Guerrilla Capability  Decrease Territory 
Grow National Army   Decrease Population 
 Mobilize the People   Decrease Economic Strength 
 Make Political Progress  Decrease Conventional Mil Strength 
 Develop Communist-based Culture Decrease in Cultural Institutions 
 Increase International Support 
 
Table 3.2 Mao’s Strategy Impacts 
 
A particular relationship between offensive and defensive gains and attributes 
then signifies the beginning of Mao’s second stage of protracted conflict. He described it 
as a point of “strategic stalemate” whereby the gains made in the maturity and capability 
of the Chinese national movement would correspond to a cessation in the Japanese 
offensive advance.42  Mao projected that by the end of the first stage, Japanese forces 
would experience an offensive limitation due to troop shortages and increased Chinese 
                                                          
41 Mao, On Protracted War, 75. Interestingly, positive gains which would impact the transition between 
strategic stages depended upon increasing levels of maturity within the communist movement and guerrilla 
forces, not the Kuomintang. 
42 Ibid., 72. 
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resistance. Forced to safeguard occupied territory, stage two would be ruthless, seeing the 
growth of puppet governments and serious widespread devastation.43   
For this reason, the second phase would find the Chinese resistance to be 
increasingly vulnerable to compromise with Japan. Mao suggested that, “We will have to 
call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, oppose splits, 
and systematically improve our fighting technique, reform the armed forces, mobilize the 
entire people, and prepare for the counteroffensive.”44  When US Marine Corps Brigadier 
General Samuel Griffith first translated and introduced On Guerrilla Warfare to the 
American military in 1940, he warned that,  
Revolutions rarely compromise; compromises are made only to further the 
strategic design. Negotiation, then, is undertaken for the dual purpose of 
gaining time to buttress a position (military, political, social, economic) 
and to wear down, frustrate, and harass the opponent.45  
General Griffith, however, advised that the use of negotiation as a strategic tool would be 
more endemic to stage three than stage two. 
3.2.2 Stage Two: Strategic Stalemate 
With the expectation that some territory would be regained in the second stage, 
On Protracted War describes the development of a playing field comprising three 
categories: “first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, 
third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides.”46  Mao’s second-stage strategy directed 
widespread guerrilla warfare within the enemy’s rear to limit Japanese “occupation to 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 74.  
44 Ibid., 73.  
45 Griffith’ s introduction to U.S. Marine Corps, Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 22.  
46 Mao, On Protracted War, 73.  
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narrow zones” in between the Kuomintang forces and the guerrilla forces.47  At this 
point, conventional mobile warfare was to be supplemental and guerrilla war primary.48   
Except for the troops engaged in frontal defense against the enemy, our 
forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy’s rear in 
comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the 
areas not actually occupied by the enemy and coordinating with the 
people’s local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla 
warfare against enemy-occupied places, keeping them on the move.49  
 
As the most pivotal stage of the conflict, Chinese independence or subsequent 
colonization would be determined by “the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself 
in the second (stage),” not by the initial territorial footprint captured by the enemy in 
stage one.50  Participation and mobilization of local people would be crucial to the effort.  
In fact, Mao argued that unification of the Chinese people would be more critical 
to the success of the war than weapons,51 in part because of a holistic “dependence upon 
the people themselves to organize battalions and other units” across each stage.52  
Popular political mobilization “throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to 
drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 76.  
48 Overall, Mao describes three types of warfare: positional, mobile, and guerrilla. Positional and mobile 
warfare are conventional forms. The first regards the offense and defense of fortified positions and 
territory; the Chinese could not use positional warfare during stage one. On the offense, their forces could 
not match the Japanese in weapons and tactics. Ibid., 107. On the defense, because the country was so 
large, the Japanese would simply go around their fortified positions. China’s conventional forces had to be 
agile on both the offense and defense in order to preserve manpower and capability. By stage three, 
however, China would have to develop a positional capability in order to push the Japanese out of occupied 
territories.   
49 Ibid., 72. 
50 Ibid., 74. “[I]t is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy, in order that 
they may arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy, and also prevent the 
leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; thus the enemy is kept in the dark about where 
and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis is created for misconceptions and unpreparedness 
on his part” (ibid., 98). 
51 Ibid., 77. 
52 Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 51.  
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other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in war.”53  Once 
accomplished, the end of the second phase would be signified by an increased level of 
maturity of China’s new national forces—the professionalization of its emergent local 
armed groups; continuing challenges for Japan; and a buildup of international support.54 
With respect to the development of China’s national forces, Mao discussed a very 
specific vision of the requirements and benefits of different forms and capabilities. He 
argued that mobile warfare, not guerrilla warfare, was more important to China’s success 
against Japan.55  “The outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially 
in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in 
deciding the outcome.”56  Guerrilla units at that time could not coordinate operationally 
across the country and instead worked independently—communicating if possible with 
adjacent guerrilla groups or nearby conventional forces. Mao projected that if they could 
“gradually develop into regular units,”57 the emergent orthodox capability would be able 
to execute unification of efforts through command and coordinated operations.58  For this 
reason strategically, the CPC needed to develop independent localized guerrilla units into 
an interconnected unified capability that would conduct mobile and conventional 
                                                          
53 Mao, On Protracted War, 87.  
54 In the third stage, Mao argued that better weapons would be needed to fully drive the Japanese out of 
their fortified positions to regain lost holdings and deplete their forces - hence the need for external support. 
He also said that “China’s strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall have to rely on the support of 
international forces and on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able 
to win; this adds to China’s tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy” (ibid., 74). 
55 Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles 
on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. Its characteristics are regular 
armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive and fluidity. We must adopt offensive 
mobile warfare as our primary mode of operations, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into 
mobile warfare” (ibid., 102). 
56 Ibid., 103.  
57 Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 55. 
58 He called this “decision” (ibid., 56). 
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warfare.59  “Guerrilla warfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel 
war, but will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare… to transform itself 
into regular warfare.”60 
As previously discussed, Mao contended with two critical enemies. The first was 
the external threat of the Japanese army – which he argued required a conventional force 
to defeat it. The second was the internal threat – primarily comprised of a conventional 
force as well.61  In order for the communists to gain legitimate political power over the 
state, Mao had to defeat the Japanese, the Kuomintang and other regional internal parties 
and political institutions within China. By building a guerrilla capability from the ground 
up that aligned directly with his socio-political movement, he could accomplish all three 
interrelated tasks. Mao intended to foster an integrated nation – unified around a central 
party narrative – and to embed local participation around the country within the military. 
In this way, the army would “become one with the people… the richest source of power 
to war… so that they see it as their own army.”62   
                                                          
59 “There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The 
necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention 
must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of equipment 
must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. 
Orthodox standards of discipline must be established” (ibid., 113). 
60 Mao, On Protracted War, 104. “During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into 
orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly 
organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level 
of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war” (Mao, USMC Mao 
Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 42). 
61 Neither work spoke directly to confronting the KMT because at the time of publication, the appearance 
of a unified front against the Japanese was more important. 
62 Mao, On Protracted War, 116. Mao argued that China’s strength lay in an ability to outnumber the 
enemy. “The fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units 
directly from themselves” (Mao, USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 73). 
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3.2.3 Stage Three: Strategic Counteroffensive 
Mao understood that unification of the nation in support of a guerrilla force was 
not enough to constitute a functional state. To him, war signified a political tool, a 
“political action.”63  As such, by the end of stage three, the CPC had to accomplish two 
complementary tasks. First, it needed to attrite the Japanese and KMT forces and push 
them out of remaining occupied territories. Second, the party’s emergent political 
apparatus had to fill any subsequent leadership vacuums and control the state. 
With respect to the first, Mao considered the overall attrition of the enemy a 
component of all three stages, not just the third. He argued that “campaigns of 
annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition,” where the 
combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare both attrite and annihilate the enemy.64  
“Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare 
performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs both simultaneously.”65  
This interrelationship is apparent across the transition stages of the revolution.  
The forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance 
are as follows. In the first stage mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla 
and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage guerrilla 
warfare will advance to the first place and will be supplemented by mobile 
and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again 
become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and 
guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer 
be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an 
important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally 
guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile 
warfare.66  
 
                                                          
63 Mao, On Protracted War, 85. Mao referenced Clausewitz when he wrote that “[w]ar is politics and war 
itself is political action” (ibid., 85).  
64 Ibid., 106. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 104. 
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During the first stage, Mao relies on the Kuomintang to give the communists time to 
build needed bases and support. The second phase professionalizes and institutionalizes 
the guerrilla movement into a national movement. And the third stage begins when an 
alignment of the force and the political institutions of the people emerge.67   
Mao wrote that, “Because of the unevenness in China’s political and economic 
development, the strategic counteroffensive of the third stage will not present a uniform 
and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but will be regional in 
character, rising here and subsiding there.”68  At this point, however, “[o]nce the 
insurgent has acquired strength and possesses significant regular forces, it would seem 
that the war should become a conventional one, a sort of civil war in which each camp 
holds a portion of the national territory from which he directs blows at the other.”69 The 
insurgency in this case does turn into a more conventional engagement, though Mao 
suggested the continued use of guerrilla components and asymmetric approaches where 
appropriate.  
3.2.4 A Solid Foundation from Which to Grow 
 The groundwork of the relationship framework and the phasing model presented 
in Chapter 2 clearly link to Mao’s popular guidance within On Protracted War and On 
Guerrilla War. His theory provides an incomplete outline for how insurgencies might 
play out across stages that relate the movement’s overall capability to the enemy’s overall 
capability. This section discusses concepts and attributes that his template contends will 
                                                          
67 “Positional attack will become quite important in the third stage… guerrilla warfare will still provide 
strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in 
the second stage” (ibid., 74). 
68 Ibid., 74.  
69 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 11.  
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be consistent across numerous insurgencies and illustrates where they fall within the 
cumulative theory presented in this dissertation.  
First, insurgency is a political tool that depends upon political and violent 
mechanisms for the creation of a legitimate state regime and executive administration. In 
Mao’s case, the insurgent desires to control the state and to become the legitimate 
governing regime. This includes fostering full territorial integrity through a process that 
builds military and political capability through national mobilization. All military 
operations in his model and each use of violence connect to a political goal or to local 
political affairs. Violent mechanisms are tied to at least one of three ends that correspond 
to messaging efforts: destroying enemy national strength; building insurgent national 
capacity; and gaining external support. 
For Mao, political compromise occurs only for strategic gain that cannot be 
accomplished by violence. This is why information operations become important and 
indoctrination of all people to the violent struggle a necessity. Propaganda through social 
media must be integrated throughout society and supporting organizations. Mao’s 
particular brand focuses on spiritual unification of officers and men within the army as 
well as spiritual unification of the army and the people, both in support of the destruction 
of the unity of the enemy.  
From his perspective, only tight control of the use of violence and insurgent 
behavior could enable the transition across maturity phases because of the coordination 
required for his desired institutional end state – a communist regime. On the one hand, 
Mao’s desired means of collective violence needed high levels of bureaucratization and 
personnel infrastructure to foster a national military. On the other, the communist 
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political template also required extremely high levels of bureaucratization across the state 
landscape.  
The outcome of the Chinese insurgency depended mainly on the transformation of 
the guerrilla force into a regular army. Because the insurgency could not be won without 
mobile warfare, Mao’s regime grew the Chinese national army in stages. The insurgency 
started from a pool of civilians to create self-incentivized local self-defense units for 
eventual national conscription; localized guerrilla units; and localized political 
committees. In this respect, the development or transformation of the insurgent party into 
the state regime also occurred in stages connected to the development of the army. The 
executing arm of the political core subsumed the state’s mechanisms of politics and 
violence. This movement is one of many potential outcomes that can occur across phases 
between components of the relationship framework. (See Figure 3.3) 
 
Figure 3.1. Insurgency Relationship Framework  
Mao’s theory and corresponding changes across the relationship framework 
represents a unique path to achieve Phase 5 of the insurgent movement model introduced 
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in Chapter 2. This final phase characterizes the highest level of state maturity and 
requires the development of a legitimate national army in order to control the state and 
defeat the counterinsurgent. Such a lengthy process is the reason why traditional 
insurgency is protracted and why the mobilization of the people into a national force is 
critical to any Phase 5 end state. Because the insurgent moves from a small guerrilla force 
to a conventional force, discipline and combat efficiency of self-defense units and 
guerrillas builds over time.  
Logistic variables are essential to the successful attainment of growing needs. 
Bigger bureaucracies and armies require funding and the procurement, processing, 
transportation and distribution of food, ammunition, and fuel.70  At the start, base areas of 
support from sympathetic and participatory local populations within enemy-held territory 
are necessary to practice guerrilla warfare, to annihilate and attrite the enemy. Mao 
realized, and the hypothesis remains unchanged at present, that sponsorship is required to 
join the international system of states. External support on some level is a requirement to 
advance through all three stages. While citizens initially are self-armed, this is not 
enough to practice mobile warfare against a conventional force. While less 
institutionalized forms of organization may resupply more easily on the move than when 
stopped, conventional armies find it difficult to fend for themselves and become 
increasingly dependent on supply from base areas that push needed materials from the 
rear.71  This level of infrastructure is difficult for substate regimes to develop because the 
transition phase between clandestine and overt forces yields targetable vulnerabilities. 
                                                          
70 Edward N. Luttwak, “Logistics and the Aristocratic Idea of War,” in Feeding Mars, Logistics in Western 
Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A Lynn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 7. 
71 John A. Lynn, “The History of Logistics and Supplying War” in Feeding Mars, Logistics in Western 
Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A Lynn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 12. 
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Mao’s use of a second front in the KMT, and even a third front with the Allies against the 
Japanese, enabled him to grow. Chapter 7 on Kosovo follows a similar pattern of external 
state involvement. 
While Mao’s work is apparent within the Chapter 2 model, it still only comprises 
a portion of the synthesized framework’s applicability and flexibility for two reasons. 
First, his theory does not accommodate a comparative analysis of insurgencies over time. 
And second, with respect to Mao’s practice, his own model is incomplete. There are 
aspects of Mao’s strategy upon which he did not publicly comment, but which observers 
discuss in further detail. David Galula, one such observer, was a Western student and 
contemporary of Mao. In fact, today’s American counterinsurgency doctrine is based on 
Galula’s counterinsurgency theory.72   
David Galula was a seasoned practitioner of insurgency and his work introduces 
important elements of Mao’s practice. A French officer stationed in China during the 
revolution, Communist forces captured Galula for some time. His observations in China 
during the war and his experiences with the CPC are discussed in his 1964 text. Counter-
Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice describe two complementary forms or paths to 
revolution. The first is the orthodox, or Communist, pattern; the second he considers to 
be a shortcut process that found later use and that achieved a similar end. This he calls the 
                                                          
72 “Galula’s importance to the American military’s understanding of counterinsurgency in the Afghan and 
Iraq campaigns can hardly be overstated; his thinking was the single greatest influence on the U.S. 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2006. Through his book’s impact on that doctrinal 
publication, and through its assignment as required reading at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College and at the U.S. Army center that prepares advisors for Iraqi and Afghan security forces, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare may ultimately be seen as the most important French military writing of the 
past century.” Cohen, Galula, 288  (“Appendix B:  The Preface to Contre-Insurrection: Theorie et 
Pratique,” written by David H. Petraeus and John A Nagl). Interestingly, even though Galula’s impact on 
counterinsurgency is very high, his theory on insurgency is not comprehensive. 
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bourgeois-nationalist pattern. The second model precipitates the growth of an insurgency 
when no standing military capability exists. 
The next two sections discuss both the discrepancies between Galula and Mao, as 
well as Galula’s contributions to the orthodox body of knowledge. Section 3.3 begins 
with general comments on the two parallel frameworks and introduces a side by side 
comparison. Galula’s process is then compared in the order of ascending steps. This 
remains consistent with the cumulative growth of the insurgency as idealized by both 
theorists. For this reason, discrepancies and additional impactful information is presented 
as they arise in chronological order. Section 3.4 then consolidates identified 
discrepancies, additional insights and modifications to the dissertation’s insurgency 
phasing model and prepares for the Chapter 4. 
3.3 Galula’s Contribution to the Communist Model 
 With respect to the orthodox model, Galula observed that “To the Communists, 
revolution consists not merely in overthrowing the existing order but also in carrying out 
afterward a complete Communist transformation of the country.”73  Galula was a military 
man, not a politician. His orthodox model therefore lacks the political depth attained in 
Mao’s writing, the profound connection between politics, violence, and the nation. As a 
result, where Mao’s progression of steps enables the emergence of a new stable state, 
Galula’s might end with a particular organization ascending a throne – claiming a title 
without the capability to hold on to that title and function as a nation state. Galula’s 
orthodox vision is also not as consistent in character as Mao’s. There are at least seven 
                                                          
73 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 33.  
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major discrepancies between the two theories that will be explored to tease these 
political-military concepts out. 
Mao's Stages Mao's Steps Galula's Steps 
1. Strategic Defense  1. Create the party 
 1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Establish a United Front 
  2. Achieve internal unification politically  
 3. Establish bases 3. Execute guerrilla warfare 
2. Strategic 
Stalemate 4. Equip forces “ 
  5. Recover national strength  
3. Strategic 
Counteroffense 6. Destroy the enemy's national strength 4. Execute movement warfare 
  5. Annihilation campaign 
 7. Regain lost territories   
Table 3.3 Mao and Galula Orthodox Step Comparison 
Figure 3.4 reviews the alignment between Mao’s linear steps and stages and 
Galula’s complimentary steps. Immediately we begin to see the correlation to the 
framework introduced in Chapter 2. Galula thought more in terms of finite or 
independent frames of activity, although the united front accomplished in his step two 
must be maintained once established. Mao’s steps are cumulative; once a particular step 
is begun or accomplished, it must mature across the duration of the revolution. For 
example, while the process of establishing bases begins in stage one (step three), the 
majority of the work done to develop occupied or guerrilla areas into guerrilla and regular 
bases occurs in stage two.74    
                                                          
74 Galula’s observations of communist behavior bring this attribute to the fore. “Occupied areas, under the 
counterinsurgent’s political and military control, where the insurgent works only underground. Guerrilla 
areas, where the counterinsurgent forces and governments are constantly contending with the insurgents. 
Guerrilla bases, with active regular troops in addition to the other types, fully organized under the 
insurgent’s political control, with administrative organs devised to function either openly or underground, 
as circumstances dictate. They are subject to more frequent enemy penetrations, but the enemy is generally 
unable to remain in them. Regular bases, areas garrisoned by regular troops (at rest, in training, or in the 
process of being organized) and local troops, with an openly functioning government carrying out 




The critical takeaway from this view is that Mao’s three stages are connected to, 
or are made up of steps that connect insurgent progress in social, political, and 
military/security efforts. The three stages don’t just describe tactics or indicate points in 
time when the counterinsurgent is stronger, when the insurgent and counterinsurgent are 
of equal match, and when the insurgent is stronger. Each stage is connected to the 
maturity of the insurgent movement, the relative strength of the enemy, and the insurgent 
organization’s connection to state viability – meaning its relationship with the people, the 
emerging army, and the capacity to stand up a new regime.  
The framework describing revolutionary or insurgent activity developed in 
Chapter 2 attempts to accommodate for these factors rather than the differences in the 
relative strength of the insurgent and counterinsurgent organizations.75  Additionally, it 
incorporates Galula’s findings into the broader model. For example, Galula’s five-step 
process, in relation to Mao’s seven steps, teaches us something new about the 
requirements and attributes of the Chinese communist practice and theory. Mao’s original 
model skips phases zero through much of phase two. (See Figure 3.5.)  Mao begins 
directly with advanced small unit tactics and guerrilla warfare. It says nothing of the 
origins of the communist party within China that developed that capability and split from 
the larger Nationalist Party of the Kuomintang.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
penetration unless the counterinsurgent mobilizes forces from other parts of the country for a major 
campaign.” Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 41.  
75 Military doctrine accommodates a political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information 
kinds of concepts – PMESII – when it prepares to enter a physical environment. There is, however, no 
template that exists that connects the maturity or nature of an insurgency to particular attributes of these 





Movement Phase Military  Legal 
        
Phase 0 
Perceived inequity / 
injustice 
Existing militant or 
violent culture 
Use of legal 
processes for 
belligerent acts 
        
Phase 1 Violence as a possibility Begin terrorist tactics Illegal political acts 
  




        
Phase 2 Internal Darwinism Strategic terrorism Rebellion 
  Path toward legitimacy Small unit tactics    
        
Phase 3 
Monopoly on limited 
localized violent 
resistance Guerrilla warfare Insurgency 
  Emergent identity     
        
Phase 4 
Violence and regional 
political administration Mobile warfare Insurgency 
        
Phase 5 




Table 3.4 Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements 
Similar to the manner in which Mao’s three stages incorporate his seven steps, 
Galula’s process also attends to many of Mao’s subcategories from a complementary 
perspective. Sections 3.2.1-3.2.4, introduce Galula’s observations and augment and 
broaden the details of Mao’s framework, thereby creating a composite model that then 
serves as a more complete comparison for future insurgency forms in Chapter 4. 
3.3.1 Step One: A New Addition to the Orthodox Model  
The first discrepancy that distinguishes Galula from Mao is that before the 
Strategic Defensive can begin, before the people can be aroused and mobilized in Mao’s 
first step, a small corps of leaders must emerge to provide the intellectual base of the 
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movement and define the grievance or cause of ensuing action.76  Brigadier General 
Samuel Griffith also agreed with Galula on this point in his introduction to the Field 
Manual he developed for the Marine Corps in 1940. “A resistance is characterized by the 
quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla 
movement is organized and then begins.”77  Resistance may take many forms and in the 
preliminary phases are marked by widespread discontent and social ferment.78  Insurgent 
leadership often emerges and organizes as actors coalesce in discussion over shared 
grievances or through shared experiences. This is the key identifier between the Phase 0 
and Phase 1 threshold in the dissertation model. 
A second discrepancy is that while Galula’s framework starts with a tabula rasa 
for the insurgency and his first step predates Mao’s model on the organizational timeline, 
Galula does not accommodate for the fact that guerrilla warfare isn’t the only form of 
warfare an insurgent group can leverage during the strategic defensive stage. Other forms 
of warfare may accompany the beginning of an insurgent movement. Because Mao’s 
model begins in the middle of China’s conflict against the Japanese Army, the 
Communists required a conventional capability at the outset. Reflection on both models 
and subsequent case studies indicates that an insurgent organization may come out of a 
mature political movement with a conventional armed force. It may splinter off from a 
                                                          
76 This concept accords with academic perspectives regarding social movements. Jonathan Christiansen, 
“Four Stages of Social Movements,” EBSCO Research Starters (EBSCO Publishing Inc., 2009); Doowan 
Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 26, no. 3 (July–
September 2013): 27–32; Rex Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process, A Frame of Reference for the Study of 
Revolutionary Movements,” Social Forces 28, no. 3 (1950): 270–79, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2572010. 
77 Griffith’s Introduction to U.S. Marine Corps, Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War, 27. The field manual is 
also called FMRP 12-18.  
78 Donatella De la Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process.” Social movement theory describes the 
process by which discontent moves from a general feeling of grievance to a pinpointed source of grievance 
with a directive leadership. 
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conventional capability and radical political movement. It may grow slowly from a 
grassroots social organization enabled by external support. It may start during a time of 
relative peace or during a time of advanced civil war. It may grow as a result of external 
meddling from the outset. 
Regardless of when an insurgent organization comes into being, however, Galula 
explains that the inner insurgent leadership must be screened, disciplined, tested, and 
weeded out in order to stay pure, strong and elite.79  It must also maintain open and 
clandestine components for two reasons. From a defensive perspective, a clandestine 
capability will protect the elite from suppressive counterinsurgent activity. From an 
offensive perspective, a clandestine capability will enable the insurgency to conduct 
“mass struggles in the enemy’s areas once the party has gone into open rebellion.”80  
Although slow and painstaking, step one, “[b]uilding a strong, reliable 
revolutionary party is certainly the most difficult part in the insurgency.”81  This is one 
reason it is easier to establish a revolutionary network in politically tolerant countries, 
and why resolution can often be accomplished in those states by peaceful means. In open 
societies, resistance movements are often enabled through political processes and 
negotiated settlement. Alternatively stated, Galula’s first and second steps – creating the 
party and establishing the united front, respectively – can often be accomplished in 
tolerant states “within the bounds of legality and nonviolence.”82  Recall according to the 
                                                          
79 “The Red Army itself was notorious for self-purging to instil fear, thus catalyzing the indoctrination of its 
own fighters” (Cohen, Galula, 85). The thought at the time also indicated that the energy needed for 
leadership tasks might be most effectively delivered by students because they are also of fighting age.  
80 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 34.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid., 35. This may be why partial democracies tend to house a greater number of insurgent enterprises 
than harsher totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. 
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definition used across the dissertation, that insurgency does not begin until the execution 
of illegal acts.  
3.3.2 Step 2: New Meaning to the United Front  
The concepts of negotiation, political settlement, and the nature of the united front 
represent the next three differences between Mao and Galula’s models, although their 
dissimilarities are in part a function of placement on the organizational timeline. 
Specifically, the third discrepancy is that Mao’s literature is adamant that violence is a 
requirement. The fourth discrepancy is that Galula is extremely utilitarian about the 
development of the united front because he sees it as a networked organization rather 
than a national movement. (The model developed in Chapter 2 accommodates both.)  
Similarly, the fifth discrepancy is related. For Galula, the civilian population represents a 
tool for particular elite to come to power; for Mao, the civilian population represented the 
host or impetus of the revolution itself.83  These three differences provide diverse 
perspectives of the Chinese Communist revolution – as if Mao and Galula spoke of two 
completely separate revolutions rather than the same phenomenon. They represent varied 
relationships across the insurgency relationship framework.  
To briefly review step two and further explore this variation, Mao’s concept of the 
united front embodies the development of an entity that unifies the national movement; 
here the population is integral to the front itself. Where Mao advocated national 
transformation, Galula advocated that once the elite and ideological core of the party 
develops within step one, a broader network must mature and come together to rally 
around that elite. A clandestine apparatus uses infiltration, agitation, and propaganda to 
                                                          
83 At least according to his rhetoric. 
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manipulate and compel allies to stay aligned with the united front, as well as to leverage 
the masses to support the cause and uphold their struggle against the counterinsurgent; 
the same methods are used to mitigate, prevent and sabotage the counterinsurgent’s 
eventual response.84  
With respect to the third discrepancy, where On Protracted War and On Guerrilla 
War argue for violence as a requirement of the Chinese Communist revolution, Galula 
allows that the Chinese Communist path might have happened differently – at least with 
respect to the KMT. Galula’s theory provides room for an insurgent organization to come 
to power through “political play and subversion” during the first two steps; should that 
fail, then “armed struggle is the logical continuation.”85  For example, would Mao’s 
theory have required a peasant revolution had Chiang Kai-Shek never taken leadership of 
the KMT or expelled the Communists from the party? 
Mao’s model began after the Communists were committed to violence. In line 
with their strategic national narrative, the Chinese Communists asserted that “armed 
struggle is both necessary and indispensable, that victory must be won by force” and not 
granted or gained by compromise.86  Violence was necessary for three reasons. First, the 
Communist narrative was part of a global movement of armed revolution against 
capitalism. Second, it purged internal weakness; if the insurgent is “put into power by 
external intervention, the party’s internal weakness will plague him for years.”  And 
third, once in power, the means of remaining there is guaranteed by the developed 
                                                          
84 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 35. 




military establishment. Without a tested and reliable national army, any extended 
political transformation would be limited or impossible.  
Once a political solution with the KMT was not viable and the CPC became 
strong enough, physical conflict represented a methodology to commit growing support 
within the population and therefore a growing army to the communist cause. Mao’s 
narrative attempted to draw in the nation and secure a preponderance of civil support. 
The interference in this struggle by the Japanese became an opportunity for the 
Communists in their long term goal to take over China; the Japanese threat temporarily 
impacted the united front as the KMT, clearly a competing organization, became part of 
the CPC alliance in order to route a common enemy. Even before the Japanese were fully 
routed from China, however, the CPC turned on that organization and eventually defeated 
it in order to assume control of the state.  
Galula’s comparative perspective of the united front offers a way to distinguish 
the internal elite from temporary alliances that are a necessary part of warfare or even 
other parts of the clandestine movement. The introduction of his step one keeps the 
internal effort pure. Where Mao said nothing about a requirement to work with enemies 
in his rhetorical publications, for obvious reasons, Galula is explicit on this point. 
A large united front will necessarily include dubious allies whose use must 
be curbed short of the point where they can endanger the basic program of 
the insurgent. The solution is “salami tactics”: once the party is firmly in 
power, the allies no longer needed will be rejected one by one.87 
  
Galula stressed that within the orthodox methodology the “party,” or the vanguard, 
should never merge with allies due to resulting impurities. He does not include this strict 
line when discussing the united front.  
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This is a principal reason within the synthesized dissertation model for the Phase 
2 and Phase 3 concepts of Internal Darwinism (nationally) and an Emergent Identity 
(internationally). These thresholds speak to the required iterative weeding out process by 
the vanguard for control of the political and military leadership of the growing insurgent 
movement. They apply regardless of whether the vanguard is a secret isolated group, as 
Galula suggests, or a more open organization amenable to working partnerships. By the 
time an insurgency reaches a full Phase 4 status, the vanguard must align and integrate on 
an institutional level with political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency.  
The bridge between guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, localized resistance and 
regional political administration requires at least the emergent identity of a confederation 
of players that can make decisions on a level that provides for the mobilization and 
sustainment needs of conventional war.88  By using a comparative approach across 
phases – and analyzing the relationships between the vanguard, the public, and the 
political and violent (military and internal security) mechanisms, the choice between a 
networked movement and a public movement is less important. Insurgencies vary 
systemically and the proposed framework enables meaningful comparative analysis of 
how they develop and operate. 
 Because the vanguard connects the clandestine and overt support activities of the 
public, political and military components of an insurgency, Galula argues that negotiation 
and alliances are important tools to achieve desired outcomes – whether or not they are 
facades of the party or temporary conditions to meet the needs of the united front. As 
such, the associated insurgent narrative cannot be monolithic and is crucial to the 
                                                          
88 This assumes that the military capability used during the insurgency is homegrown, rather than provided 
by an external state actor or transnational actor. 
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movement. The four components listed above, for example, comprise many interests and 
motivations to support insurgent activity. For this reason, 
The party’s platform at any given time during the conflict must contain 
something that appeals to each ally and nothing that may be too 
objectionable to them. So the real postwar intentions of the party must be 
kept secret; they need to be disclosed only to the top leadership.89   
 
The rank and file membership (the citizenry) and the networked organizations of the 
extended united front receive only watered down versions of the true party line.  
This is a critical concept because the most important initial criterion for a 
successful insurgency is the attractiveness of its cause. Supporters must be recruited by 
persuasion, attracting the most devotees and repelling the fewest detractors. Except to the 
inner elite, all other members of the united front will be manipulated by a narrative. This 
includes external support. Outside help such as other state governments and organizations 
maintain their own interests in the outcome of insurgencies. They can “destroy or harm 
self reliance in the insurgent ranks” depending on their ability to coopt or influence the 
movement.90   
 This poses a dilemma for the insurgent who is drawn to outside help for economic 
or subsistence reasons. When the time comes “ 
for the insurgent to pass from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of 
operations, to create a regular army, the need for much larger and more 
varied supplies becomes acute. Either he is able to capture it from the 
counterinsurgent, or it must come from the outside. If not, the 
development of the insurgent military establishment is impossible.”91    
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For this reason, an internal ability to finance the threat organization becomes important to 
independent maneuverability. This logistic and economic capacity must be integrated or 
aligned with access to state economic capacity as the insurgency grows. In the 
dissertation relationship framework, the vanguard connects to public funds and value 
chains through its political and violent mechanisms. As the movement grows into a state, 
the state economy is run through the political apparatus.  
 To return to the concept of persuasion, during an insurgency, the vanguard 
maintains a requirement to continually connect components across the relationship 
framework, in part because of the insurgency’s need to control territorial mechanisms of 
violence. Perceived grievances, and a state’s ability or inability to redress discrepancies 
between members of its population, make nations vulnerable to insurgency. The success 
of an insurgency will be based in large part on the insurgent capability to take a grievance 
and make it acute by imbuing it with “psychological value” and “raising the political 
conscious of the masses.”92 
Unless he has found an over-all cause, like anti-colonialism, which is 
sufficient in itself because it combines all the political, social, economic, 
racial, religious, and cultural causes described above, he has much to gain 
by selecting an assortment of causes especially tailored for the various 
groups in the society that he is seeking to attract.93 
 
Galula argued that until war itself forces a population to take sides through acts of 
violence and illegal behavior, the importance of cause is integral because it represents the 
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prime inducement to violence; it is the impetus. Over time, cause becomes progressively 
less essential because the insurgent becomes more conventionally capable.94   
In order to maintain psychological leverage, the insurgent organization needs to 
remain flexible and open to adaptation of the revolutionary narrative. “Nothing obliges 
the insurgent to stick to the same cause if another one looks more profitable.”95 With 
respect to China, for example,    
the Communists initially took the classic Marxist stand in favor of the 
workers (1921–25). Then they actively espoused the national cause of the 
Kuomintang, for the unification of China against the warlords (1925–27). 
After the Kuomintang—Communist split, they largely dropped the 
workers in favor of the poor peasants, advocating land reform by radical 
means (1928–34). Then Japanese aggression became the central issue in 
China, and the Communists advocated a patriotic united front against 
Japan (1927–45), adopting meanwhile a moderate agrarian policy: Land 
redistribution would be ended, but instead, the Communists would impose 
strict control of rents and interest rates. After the Japanese surrender, they 
finally reverted to land reform with the temperate proviso that landlords 
themselves would be entitled to a share of land (1945–49). What the 
Communists actually did after their victory, between 1950 and (18) 1952, 
was to carry out their land reform “through violent struggles” in order to 
conduct a class war among the rural population and thereby definitely to 
commit the activists on their side, if only because these activists had 
shared in the crimes. Once this was achieved, the Party buried land reform 
for good and started collectivizing the land.”96   
 
The additional information provided by Galula regarding his step two (establish a united 
front) better describes China’s Communist insurgency practice regarding the use of 
violence and negotiation at various thresholds of action and across complex levels of 
relationship within the organization. It also further highlights aspects of the overall 
insurgency framework that Mao did not discuss in his work. 
                                                          
94 There is some suggestion here that Galula found the people to be the center of gravity for an insurgency 
until it became strong enough to deter the counterinsurgent on an equal conventional footing. 
95 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 18.  
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Beyond this, Galula’s observations on insurgent behavior further bring into focus 
the fourth and fifth discrepancies between Mao’s work and Galula’s writing. To reiterate, 
the fourth discrepancy regards whether the united front is a networked organization or a 
national movement. The fifth turns on whether the civilian population is a tool rather than 
the impetus or seat of the revolution. Ultimately, Galula did not find that the orthodox 
model required an encompassing national movement; civilian populations represent one 
more instrument to gain power. “If the insurgent has understood his strategic problems 
well, revolutionary war never reverts to a conventional form.”97  Mao, on the other hand, 
committed to a national and rural narrative for China dedicated to full scale revolution 
and the growth of a conventional national army.98  To Galula’s credit, Mao only did so 
once the Soviet liaison’s preferred strategy of urban-led resistance failed miserably.99  
Only after this tactical lesson did Mao suggest that, for China’s revolution to succeed, 
work within the rural populations was particularly critical. Rural areas were to be the 
grounds for initial insurgent military operations. Had China been an industrialized 
country, he might never have abandoned the narrower proletariat appeal of the Soviets.100        
Galula treated the civilian population principally as a tool for active use by the 
elite through the mechanism of the united front. He indicated that actions with respect to 
“the masses” are designed to manipulate the population to support the insurgency. It is 
because of this perspective that Galula’s united front cannot support a national 
movement. Unlike Mao, Galula provided very little discussion or impetus to foster 
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98 Of course one did not exist at all in China at the time so the Communists could not coopt them or turn 
them. 
99 Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice reflects as far back as 1921 upon CPC behavior when the 
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internal unification politically through locally-led or self-led mobilization. This is an 
interesting distinction. All of Galula’s actions are about building the military strength of 
the central insurgent organization and urging populations to violence. He provides little 
focus or attention to the insurgency’s political and economic power. Galula’s 
mechanisms across the relationship framework are coercive, accomplished through 
infiltration, agitation and propaganda directed at a network of supporting entities, a string 
of manipulated partners. Even though Galula offered that political play could be enough 
to gain power without resorting to violence, he never discussed the attraction of soft 
power to move the nation. Although he introduced nonkinetic solutions as potential 
options, he neglected their importance or broader efficacy to the emergent nation state. 
Perhaps they were not important to his target audience – one interested primarily in a 
military response option. Galula appeared to lack faith that political or nonkinetic means 
could bring success once violence began.  
The theoretical argument between Mao and Galula regarding the purpose, 
efficacy and constitution of the elite and the united front mirror certain arguments about 
the Russian revolution between Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg at the beginning of 
the twentieth century – although both Luxemburg and Lenin were extremely interested in 
the development and growth of the political revolutionary apparatus. James Scott, in 
Seeing Like a State, details differences between these two Marxist revolutionary theorists 
who debated “the possibility and desirability of a revolution planned from above by the 
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vanguard party.”101  Similar to Galula’s arguments, Scott explores Lenin’s conviction 
that  
The vanguard party not only is essential to the tactical cohesion of the 
masses but also must literally do their thinking for them, ensuring that the 
otherwise diffuse brute force of the masses was effectively used. The party 
functions as an executive elite whose grasp of history and dialectical 
materialism allows it to devise the correct ‘war aims’ of the class 
struggle... What the party has is the blueprint of the entire new structure… 
The role of the workers is to follow that part of the blueprint allotted to 
them in the confidence that the architects of revolution know what they are 
doing.102 
 
In his 1903 publication What Is to Be Done, Burning Questions of Our Movement, Lenin 
describes the vanguard party as “professional revolutionists” who develop a “machine to 
produce a revolution.”103  His initial intention is to direct the revolution tightly from the 
top. 
As a result, similar to Galula’s operational concept, Lenin supported a secret elite 
cadre removed from the broader united front. In this case, Scott assesses that party 
secrecy was designed to “prevent contamination from below as much as arrest and 
exile.”104  In 1903, Lenin looked upon the larger mass population as necessary to efficient 
factory-like production of the organized revolution.105  His state vision centered on the 
forced attainment of party goals that combined “scientific” knowledge with his version of 
socialist utopian ideals.  
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By 1917, however, Lenin’s concepts linking the vanguard to the movement 
changed – at least until the Bolsheviks could seize state control. In his 1903 text, Lenin 
argued against popular autonomous action – even implying that the working class was 
“incapable of acting on its own without outside leadership;” in his later work, “everything 
depended on destabilizing the (Kerensky) regime, even if the crowds were not at all 
under Bolshevik discipline.”106  Once the 1917 military collapse of the Russian offensive 
in Austria made a revolutionary outcome more likely at home, Lenin communicated that 
“Socialism is not created by orders from above. State bureaucratic automatism is alien to 
its spirit; socialism is alive, creative—the creation of the popular masses themselves.”107  
Lenin realized he needed more than just his organizational united front to sway the tide; 
he recast himself in order to destabilize the situation, biding time until the vanguard could 
take advantage of the revolutionary environment and seize full control of the state 
apparatus. 
Scott argues that the original narrative of executive command and control in 
Lenin’s What Is to Be Done was a “pipe dream, bearing hardly any relation to the facts” 
of the actual revolutionary process.108  The victors, however, weaved the post-
revolutionary story into a packaged account, further enhancing the citizen “confidence in 
the clairvoyance, determination, and power of their revolutionary leaders.”109   
In the case of the Bolshevik Revolution, it was also necessary that the 
official narrative include a genuinely popular mass movement of which 
the Bolsheviks eventually assumed leadership. Marxist historiography 
required a militant, revolutionary proletariat. This was an aspect of the 
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February and October events that did not have to be invented. What had to 
be written out of the account, however, was the ferocious struggle between 
the new state apparatus on one hand and the autonomous soviets and 
peasantry on the other.110   
 
Consistent with his open avowal for “violence after the seizure of power,” one he set 
down within the 1917 text State and Revolution, the years following the Revolution were 
spent going back on the promises made to establish the united front across the state. Scott 
calls it a reconquest – “not simply a civil war against the ‘Whites’; it was also a war 
against the autonomous forces that had seized local power in the revolution.” Take for 
example the Chechens who will be discussed in a later chapter.111 
 Lenin’s actions and words help to better understand the discrepancies between 
Mao and Galula regarding the united front and the requirements or potential efficacy of 
the elite. Revolution is messy and Lenin eventually capitulated to forming alliances and 
supporting autonomous and independent action in order to get the revolution moving. 
Even so, he continued to see the masses as pieces of machinery – somewhat like Galula’s 
description. The comparative story enables one to see a broader scope of potential 
insurgent realities – avenues that lead to insurgent forms and phases. Does a vanguard 
lead a movement from the outset?  Can a mass movement occur against a regime with 
enough perturbation from a manipulative force?  How does a vanguard come back in to 
control the political and violent mechanisms in the movement and gain the public support 
needed to control a state?  By tracking the nature of the relationship framework across 
phases and across insurgencies, the answers to these questions begin to form. 
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Similarly, after synthesizing Mao’s narrative with Galula’s observation of the 
CPC’s behavior, rather than solely relying on the rhetoric Mao used to describe the 
communist revolution, questions emerge regarding the viability of a true national 
movement. What kinds of revolutions are capable of empowering as opposed to 
imprisoning its citizenry?  Did Mao truly believe in the rhetoric of his publications?  Is 
the vanguard always a radical element of a less monolithic political entity?  Can an 
insurgency be led in a manner that might produce inclusive democratic values rather than 
an authoritarian state? 
 Some revolutionary Marxist thinkers and contemporaries of Lenin disagreed with 
his ideas on manipulation. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, “viewed the revolutionary 
process as being far more complex and unpredictable than did Lenin” and looked to 
foster creativity and initiative from below; in three essays written between 1904 and 
1918, she expressed optimism and “relative faith in the autonomous creativity of the 
working class.”  Her first essay, entitled Organizational Questions of Russian Social 
Democracy, responded directly to Lenin’s What Is to Be Done.112  Like Lenin, 
Luxemburg also believed in the necessity of a vanguard; the workers interests needed 
representation by a party intelligentsia.113  Contrary to the authoritarian leader, however, 
Luxemburg insisted that revolution comprised “the wills and knowledge of many human 
agents of which the vanguard party was only one element.”114  An organic series of 
processes of learning and adaptation,  
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A strike or a revolution was not simply an end toward which tactics and 
command ought to be directed; the process leading to it was at the same 
time shaping the character of the proletariat. How the revolution was made 
mattered as much as whether it was made at all, for the process itself had 
heavy consequences.115 
  
Because of this, the role of the vanguard as a mechanism of centralized revolutionary 
control represented an illusion rather than reality.116   
 For Luxemburg, collaboration between the vanguard and the people was 
preferential to control and regimentation. Organic processes do not have hard starts and 
stops like mechanical processes; they grow, move, and persist in patterns that increase 
over time. Large social movements cannot be tied to narrow grievances but build and 
break at varying speeds depending on the conditions. Scott quotes Luxemburg in her 
description of revolution as a natural, living phenomenon that cannot be controlled – a 
metaphor more similar to Mao’s references to nature.  
As the Russian Revolution [1905] shows to us, the mass strike is such a 
changeable phenomenon that it reflects in itself all phases of politics and 
economic struggle, all stages and movements of the revolution. Its 
applicability, its effectiveness, and the moments of its origin change 
continually. It suddenly opens new, broad perspectives of revolution 
where one thought he could reckon on it in full certitude. Now it flows 
like a broad billow over the whole land, now it divides itself into a 
gigantic net of thin streams; now it bubbles forth from under the ground 
like a fresh spring, now it trickles flat along the ground…. All [forms of 
popular struggle] run through one another, next to each other, across one 
another, flow in and over one another; it is an eternal, moving changing 
sea of appearances.117 
 
Luxemburg believed the whole proletariat deserved political freedoms, not just an elite 
group within the central committee. The central committee as a political entity should 
have worked through, with, and by the trade unions as a partner to empower the people 
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and build socialism within the state. Selection of the vanguard and balance within the 
united front are crucial to the outcome of the revolution. Success of a revolution does not 
correlate to a successful state.  
 Luxemburg and Lenin show us a great deal about the nature of the united front 
and the development of the vanguard with respect to potential political outcomes and 
alliances. Both members of the Marxist revolutionary party, their paths illustrate how 
differences between political views and methods make significant impressions upon the 
direction of the revolution. Luxemburg believed the Bolshevik elite and its use of terror 
“blocked up the fountain of political experience and the source of the rising development 
[and attaining of higher stages of socialism] by their suppression of public life.”118  
Levels of relationships overlay actions and processes. A united front across the elite, the 
political, economic, and social components of the insurgency are necessary, but the 
nature of the relationships between them defines the kind of state that emerges. Once the 
phasing model is fully exposed in Chapter 5, the following chapters will explore how 
various relationships between the vanguard, the public, and the political and violent 
mechanisms of insurgencies evolve through phases of maturity. In various cases, it is 
possible for Mao, Galula, Lenin, and Luxemburg to all be right. 
To sum up this section and bring the conversation back to the orthodox composite 
model, although Galula’s second step compares to Mao in at least three ways, their 
differences underpin one unifying theme. Mao’s work clearly paints revolution and war 
as a tool for politics and a national movement in which the population itself organizes 
and grows the heart of the resistance. Luxemburg would agree. Galula’s perspective, 
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more akin to Lenin, is almost opposite – the use of political persuasion is a tool for 
insurgent organizations committed to violence so they may gain enough power to defeat 
competitors and win control of the state. Both realities are possible. Galula’s alternate 
perception of orthodox insurgency foreshadowed the nature of the revolutions he 
experienced after his assignment in China, and is more fully expressed within his shortcut 
model.  
3.3.3 Steps Three Through Five: Building a Military Capacity 
Over time, Galula focused even further on violence as an organizational tool; his 
lack of detail regarding the political nuance needed to foster a cohesive nation carries 
forward through the rest of his orthodox model. For example, one contribution that 
Galula provides regarding his third step of guerrilla warfare, one that Mao does not 
discuss openly, is how to ensure the complicity of the population once the party can 
effectively conduct guerrilla operations. Galula observed that although the Communist 
political organization living among the population might make a contribution to ensure 
locals support the insurgency, the party leadership was backed by the force of a local 
guerrilla gang who eliminated open enemies and intimidated potential ones.119   
Mao's Stages Mao's Steps Galula's Steps 
1. Strategic Defense  1. Create the party 
 1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Establish a United Front 
  2. Achieve internal unification politically  
 3. Establish bases 3. Execute guerrilla warfare 
2. Strategic 
Stalemate 4. Equip forces “ 
  5. Recover national strength  
3. Strategic 
Counteroffense 6. Destroy the enemy's national strength 
4. Execute movement 
warfare 
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  5. Annihilation campaign 
 7. Regain lost territories   
Table 3.5 Mao and Galula Orthodox Step Comparison 
To refine the growing theme from steps one and two, "Persuasion brings a 
minority of supporters—they are indispensable—but force rallies the rest. There is, of 
course, a practical if not ethical limit to the use of force; the basic rule is never to 
antagonize at any one time more people than can handle.”120  If unaffiliated leaders 
within desired areas cannot be won over via persuasion, they must be neutralized.121  By 
the time movement warfare begins in the fourth step, “An additional organization helps to 
keep everybody in line: the party’s secret services, whose members remain unknown to 
the local cadres and answer only to the top hierarchy.”122  In the case of China, and 
Russia to an equal extent, these secret enforcement organizations continued to thrive and 
grow after the revolution. They became part of the state. 
This is not always the case though. When many Americans think of revolution 
against an occupying force, they think about the American Revolution against the British. 
Mao’s works would convince us that the relationship between the emerging political 
institutions and the civilian population within China was akin to an idealized version of 
the American story – where the narrative of the independence movement alone was 
enough to persuade the vast majority of civilians to willingly support the revolution. Even 
in US history, however, there existed significant populations of British support and 
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violence served as a means to coerce those populations; it certainly played a role 
defeating the British Army.  
After the termination of the war, however, the depth of sustained violence within 
China was not part of the American process. The nature of the emergent American 
government and regime – the foundational principles of its constitution – was vastly 
different. For example, the resulting political process within the post-colonial 
confederation of states did not depend on authoritarian elite that used administrative 
mechanisms of tight control and arbitrary violence to control the nation. Provisional 
regional governments were stood up during the war and a national government coalesced 
through representative mechanisms throughout the colonies. What had become the 
national army during the revolution, however, stood down. And so too did the spectrum 
of wartime intelligence functions.123   
The myth or narrative that Mao created regarding the Chinese Communist 
Revolution looks very similar to the narrative that surrounds the American Revolution – 
even though the outcomes and resulting constitutional frameworks differed greatly. From 
Mao’s work, one finds little difference between the American and Chinese processes and 
liberation narrative. This seeming is important for purposes of loyalty to the nation state 
as a socially constructed community. Nation state legitimacy derives in part from its story 
and interconnected system of beliefs. Each transcending narrative must show the 
corruption of the counterinsurgent, the victimization of the population by that force, and 
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the defense of that population by the insurgent – who then with the people overcomes 
injustice to eventually take control of the state.124  
Galula corrected the singularly benevolent image that Mao portrayed but at the 
same time neglected to include political nuance or awareness within his writing regarding 
insurgent requirements. He agreed with Mao that there are limits to what guerrilla 
warfare can accomplish. As Mao advocated previously, so too Galula argued that the 
success against a conventional counterinsurgent depends upon acquiring mature bases 
and armament and transforming guerrilla units into regular units.  
Guerrilla warfare cannot win the decision against a resolute enemy. 
Protracted guerrilla activity, so cheap to carry out and so expensive to 
suppress, may eventually produce a crisis in the counterinsurgent camp, 
but it could just as well alienate the population and disintegrate the united 
front. The enemy must be met on his own ground; an insurgent regular 
army has to be created in order to destroy the counterinsurgent forces”125  
The focus on the need for a conventional force here still centers upon a military 
path for the insurgency. 
It is difficult to tell whether Galula simply did not observe political needs of the 
emerging nation state or if he even believed it to be a requirement of the insurgency 
model. For example, Galula’s model skips the step of political unification in stage one as 
well as the final requirement to align political and military institutions while regaining 
lost territories in Mao’s sixth step. This is the sixth discrepancy between Mao’s theory 
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and Galula’s orthodox pattern.126  Galula stops at the annihilation of the enemy, a concept 
that could be overlooked if the primary goal of the insurgency did not include taking 
control of the state. Where Galula described this goal as a task that could be 
accomplished after the insurgency, Mao argued that state power is not consolidated until 
the new regime is incorporated into the national conscious and has an administrative 
capacity. The capability to run the state is connected to the nation and the people. In 
current terms, think of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the insurgent organization’s path 
to legitimacy followed a very different construct than the orthodox model, its goal to 
integrate with formal political institutions is intertwined with a successful outcome. 
 As an insurgency transitions across Galula’s phases three and four, from 
guerrilla-led warfare to conventional maneuver warfare, its nature changes. “Once the 
insurgent has succeeded in acquiring stable geographical bases… he becomes ipso facto a 
strong promoter of order within his own area, in order to show the difference between the 
effectiveness of his rule and the inadequacy of his opponent’s.”127 This transition is a 
time when the insurgent force is extremely vulnerable, because it gains physical assets 
that can be taken out. Its ability to hide and agilely retreat dissipates as infrastructure 
becomes set and the insurgent forces look and behave more like a regular army.128  
Where Mao suggested that this point would be the time at which the insurgent 
organization would need to act like a state, Galula called only for order and security.  
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Similarly, Galula based the titles of the last three steps of his orthodox model on 
the primary military activities that Mao gave to his model, again leaving out the political 
nuance with which Mao was concerned. This detail comprises a seventh discrepancy: 
none of Mao’s steps reference any form of military warfare. As explained previously, 
Mao described strategic stages by warfare forms but did not use them explicitly to caveat 
actions. He wrote that stage two was defined militarily by guerilla warfare and stage three 
by movement warfare – the very titles of Galula’s steps three, four and five. Full 
annihilation of the enemy was completed cumulatively across the insurgency by all 
operational forms. A slight difference between the two models then is that where Mao 
considered all forms of warfare part of the annihilation task, Galula wrote that, “When 
the balance of forces is reached between the sides, a “series of offensives aiming at the 
complete destruction of the enemy will constitute the last and final step.”129  Again, he 
described annihilation as a separate independent step within the insurgency framework. 
3.4       The Emerging Picture 
While Galula’s contributions to the communist orthodox form of insurgency are 
important to the composite model, Mao’s vision of a political military conception holds 
firm across their visions. This doesn’t mean, however, that Galula lacked other 
contributions to a deeper understanding. Section 3.2 explored the variation that Galula 
contributed to Mao’s communist model. He introduced new phasing elements and 
modified certain points made by Mao. For example, Galula argues that certain initial 
grievances and power transitions may be resolved peacefully, especially in tolerant 
                                                          
129 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 42. Galula does in this instance describe insurgent strength as a 
combination of military assets and the solidity of the insurgent political structure.  
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countries. If this cannot be done, select elite must form and create both clandestine and 
open components of support. This concept forms the basis of the dissertation’s Phase 0 
and Phase 1 concepts. It also underpins variation within the relationship framework 
across phases. 
In addition, Galula argues that the true intention of the elite must remain pure and 
externally watered down, targeted to different audiences. Because of this, indoctrination 
of the public may be limited and must be adaptive. From his vantage, for example, 
Chinese indoctrination programs were limited because the communists did not require a 
full national movement and instead connected only to portions of the population that they 
needed in order to achieve operational goals. Indoctrination was adaptive because the 
targeted populations varied over time as well as the message itself. In general, until 
people are committed to the insurgency through acts of violence, the importance of the 
narrative and the cause is critical.130 
Once violence begins, a balance between force and persuasion to garner support 
must be taken into account. There is a threshold of acceptable internal violence against 
the civilian population and the decision to begin acts of violence and armed resistance 
depends upon four factors. The first factor includes the level of division within the 
population. The second accounts for the growing capability and success of internal 
subversive actions. The third waits for crisis within the counterinsurgent. And the fourth 
requires attainment of external political and military support. 
Political compromise may be made temporarily with a competing organization or 
enemy if their capability helps move the insurgency closer to its goal. If comprise is 
                                                          
130 Mao would argue it is always critical. 
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made, however, or if competitors are temporarily allowed to join the united front, they do 
so until their utility is no longer necessary to the vanguard. All competitors must be 
coopted or purged. For this reason, once mature enough, the insurgent organization 
should begin to use local militant volunteers to eliminate or neutralize opposing internal 
or political civilian leaders. Similarly, once mature enough, the insurgent organization 
should establish a formal secret service known only to the top elite. 
Finally, Galula argues that once the vanguard commits to a path of violence, the 
insurgency cannot be won without mobile warfare. At the same time, however, the 
ultimate objective of the insurgency may be the annihilation of the enemy rather than the 
growth of an administrative or political institutional form capable of behaving like a state. 
Consolidation of state powers may occur after the defeat of the counterinsurgent. 
Through these discrepancies we begin to see ways in which existing insurgency 
models are thus far tied to the particulars of a given insurgency or historic perspective 
than first suspected. It is part of the impetus for looking at various “forms” or “models” 
of insurgency and to determine better ways to understand a more diverse range of 
patterns and behavior. No two insurgencies begin with the same starting conditions. 
Ideas, politics, technologies, grievances, and capabilities change across time and space.  
The next chapter provides additional depth to the composite model presented in 
Chapter 2. It incorporates Galula’s shortcut pattern that addresses insurgencies of the 
1950s and 1960s, as well as SOROs contribution to phasing. The application of these two 
models to the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) identifies an even broader range of 
comparative insurgent pathways and component connections. Chapter 5 then reintroduces 
and deepens the proposed dissertation phasing model and relationship framework, 
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exploring the scope of associated comparative concepts that provide context to assess 




The Algerian Revolution and Integrating Insurgency Models 
4.1 Galula’s Shortcut Pattern: An Evolutionary Process 
Galula observed the Chinese Revolution firsthand and derived his initial thoughts 
on the stages of insurgency from the Chinese Communist revolutionary model. Other 
forms, however, were soon to follow. Even before Mao assumed control of China, similar 
revolutionary movements and charismatic leaders emerged across the globe and drew 
from his theories. These then proliferated over time. For example, Jose Maria Sison 
(1939-?), the leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, outlined three stages of 
revolution that reflected Mao’s ideas.1  North Vietnamese strategist Truong Chinh (1909-
1986) adapted Mao’s thought to the Vietnamese situation.2  Josip Broz Tito developed an 
outgrowth theory from Mao.3  And, Regis Debray and Che Guevara developed a 
complementary thesis that argued “successful guerrilla warfare depends less on local 
leaders exploiting local conditions than on the creation of conditions for a revolution by a 
cadre of dedicated revolutionists.”4 Che was killed and Debray imprisoned when they 
attempted to test their theory of focoism in Bolivia. 
As Mao transformed the insurgency practices of the Russian communists, so too 
did other indigenous leaders adapt to their particular circumstances. In Southeast Asia, 
                                                          
1 Edward O’Dowd, Bibliographic Essay in On Guerrilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan), by Mao Tse-tung. 
Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company 
of America, 1992), 142.  
2 O’Dowd, Bibliographic Essay in On Guerrilla Warfare, 143. 
3 Tito, “the leader of the Yugoslav Communist party, organized an army of guerrilla forces that enabled 
him to harass and pin down German forces while successfully winning legitimacy in the eyes of most 
sectors of Yugoslavia’s diverse population. The military methods of Tito’s strategy were similar to those 
outlined by Mao… the mobilization of the political will of the entire population, a protracted war of 
attrition, and the gradual build-up of the regular forces” (Ibid., 142). 
4 Ibid., 145.  
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for example, although communism played some part in the independence movements of 
Vietnam, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia, its role as a mechanism 
for change “differed considerably from country to country.”5  In Vietnam, as introduced 
above, and in Laos, the Chinese Communist methodology strongly correlated to Mao’s 
exhibited practice.6  In Burma, although the Burmese negotiated a settlement for 
independence with Britain, the Communists and the Karens revolted after independence 
in 1949. And, while communism posed a challenge to the Malayan government, “[t]he 
Communist rebellion in Malaya was not responsible in any way for Malayan 
independence.”7   
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, waves of national movements 
transpired globally as states became containers for competing forces of nationalism, 
colonialism and communism. In addition to the Soviet Union, China and other areas of 
Southeast Asia, regional pockets of insurgencies occurred in Central and South America, 
as well as North Africa – to include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. Like the 
anticolonial environment of Southeast Asia, much of North Africa was held by the 
French, Spanish and Italians. Galula’s second model of insurgency was triggered by his 
                                                          
5 Paul A. Jureidini, Norman A. La Charite, Bert H. Cooper, and William A. Lybrand, Casebook on 
Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume I: 1927–1949 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special 
Operations Command, 2013), 25. 
6 “A strong Vietnamese nationalist movement developed prior to and during World War II, with some 
encouragement from the Chinese Nationalists… a coalition of Vietnamese nationalist groups, dominated by 
Communist leaders, declared Vietnam independent in 1945” (Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, 31). “In 
1943, the Chinese Government forcibly persuaded Ho Chi Minh, after jailing him for 18 months, to 
reorganize the Vietnamese nationalist groups on Chinese soil. A coalition of nationalists called the 
Vietminh was created under the auspices of the Kuomintang, and a provisional government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established. The revolutionary organization that fought the French 
had its origin in these developments.” (Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, 38). 
7 Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I , 25. “The Communist effort in Malaya failed and the events illustrate 
effective 
countermeasures taken by the British Security Forces in combatting Communist guerrillas and the creation 
of an environment which was not conducive to a successful revolutionary effort” (Jureidini et al., Casebook 
Volume I, 29). 
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participation as a French military officer in Algeria. During his assignment there, he 
developed an alternative framework and a corresponding counterinsurgency strategy that 
is used by the United States today.  
The association between the Algerian revolution and Communism is complex. 
Prior to 1954, Communists within the French government both supported and countered 
the Algerian nationalists. Communism and socialism in France were part of the legitimate 
political establishment at the time. By the time the insurgency manifested in violence in 
1954, the Communists once again “denounced” their nationalist counterparts. “Less than 
2 years later, the Algerian Communists sought to join the (Front de Liberation Nationale) 
FLN, while the French Communist Party supported the FLN in the French National 
Assembly.”8  Certain Algerian nationalist parties and movements were led by former 
communist party members and “had structural organizations patterned along Communist 
lines.”9  This includes the organizations founded and run by Communist Party members 
Hadj Abdel Kader and Messali Hadj. Over time, Communism as a cause lost primacy as 
a foothold in the Algerian case and Islamic nationalism came to the fore. The Algerian 
example offers an alternative beginning pathway to insurgency—very different than the 
Chinese Communist case study, but no less relevant to the dissertation model. 
4.2       The Algerian Case and Galula 
The official Algerian Revolution for independence against French sovereignty 
took place between 1954 and 1962. At that time, Europeans comprised almost one 
million of Algeria’s population of ten million.10 
                                                          
8 Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, footnote “d” on p. 301. 
9 Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, footnote “e” on p. 301. 
10 “The official census of 1954 placed the total population of Algeria at 9,528,670 inhabitants, of which 
1,042,426 were Europeans and 8,486,244 were Muslims of Arab-Berber stock. The European inhabitants 
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A divided and ambivalent French authority in World War II and 
subsequent defeat of the French military in Indochina in 1954, only 
months before the onset of revolution in Algeria, promoted the hopes of 
Algerian nationalists but stiffened French resolve not to lose another battle 
or abandon another territory, especially after Tunisia and Morocco 
received their independence in 1956.11  
 
Arab and Berber Algerians were subjects rather than citizens of France and the foreign 
European government controlled policy over the North African state from a settler lobby 
and the national assembly in Paris.12  Over the course of the war, “colonialism lost 
legitimacy in world politics. Views of the rights of colonizers underwent a transformation 
as international values changed. National self-determination became the prevailing moral 
standard after the 1960s.”13  Just as external support and a second front for Japan during 
World War II affected the outcome of the Chinese Communist Revolution, so too did the 
international community affect Charles de Gaulle’s decision to support an independent 
Algeria.  
Also similar to Mao’s practice of targeting Japanese citizenry, elements of the 
Algerian resistance targeted French sentiment and went further to conduct attacks on 
French territory. “Reports of terrorism dominated press headlines in France during the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
included about 450,000 of French stock; 140,000–150,000 Jews of North African, Spanish, and Italian 
origin; 325,000 of Spanish ancestry; 100,000 of Italian descent; 50,000 of Maltese lineage; and a still 
smaller minority from Corsica. Of the Europeans, however, 89 percent were born in Algeria” (Jureidini et 
al., Casebook Volume I, 295). 
11 Martha Crenshaw, “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. 
Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 479. 
12 European settlers comprised a minority political, economic and social elite and denounced indigenous 
rights and Muslim political participation (Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, 292). “[O]f the settler 
population 400,000 were descendants of the original French settlers of the nineteenth century, 400,000 
were of various Mediterranean origins, and 150,000 were Jews. The settlers of Algeria, most of whom were 
from Mediterranean rather than exclusively French backgrounds, were divided between rich landowners, 
colons, and the majority working classes, or pieds-noirs” (Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 477). 
13 Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 481. 
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entire course of the war.”14  Development in communication technology made the tactic 
valuable and it served at least four purposes: 
The revolutionary-nationalist terrorism of the Front de Liberation 
Nationale (FLN) which formed part of a broad political and military 
struggle for independence from French rule, is widely supposed to have 
succeeded in attracting international attention to the cause of Algerian 
national self-determination, mobilizing the Algerian population against 
French rule (in part by provoking indiscriminate repression against 
civilians), spreading insecurity among European settlers in Algeria, and 
making the war unpopular in France.”15 
 
By the time de Gaulle assumed the presidency of France’s Fifth Republic in 1958, the 
French military effectively ruled Algeria rather than the civilian government in Paris.16   
French civilian led institutions failed in North Africa because they were unable to 
stop Algeria’s growing insurgency. Due to the failure of the resident colonial leadership 
and the administration in France, the military took over with a heavy hand. The military’s 
action abroad countered French democratic principles and weakened the legitimacy of the 
government at home. Poor handling of the Algerian crisis caused the failure of the Fourth 
Republic.17  So much so, that when de Gaulle came to power, it was difficult for him to 
regain control of the military leadership in Algeria that ran the country.  
Galula’s “direct participation in the Algerian War, two years after it began, would 
convince him that an offshoot pattern of insurgency had grown out of the ‘orthodox’ 
pattern he attributed to Mao.”18  Based on his observations of the FLN in Algiers, Galula 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 473. 
15 Ibid., 474. 
16 Ibid., 480. 
17 De Gaulle’s rise to power resulted from “an appeal from military commanders in Algiers” (Ibid., 478). 
18 A. A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of 
Counterinsurgency (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 79. “General Jaques Massu had come to head 
the Algiers region because the civilian authorities could not halt terrorism, called in a public speech for de 
Gaulle’s return to office.” Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 478. 
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called this phenomenon the bourgeois-nationalist pattern and considered it to be a 
shortcut process to the same revolutionary end with a significant exception.  
The goal of the insurgent in this case is generally limited to the seizure of 
power; post insurgency problems, as secondary preoccupations, are 
shelved for the time being. The precise and immediate aim of the initial 
core of insurgents, a dedicated but inevitably small group of men with no 
broad organization to back them, is to set up a revolutionary party 
rapidly.19  
 
Galula’s shortcut framework focuses on this perception, even though it grossly 
oversimplifies the insurgent behavior and limits the insurgent context to a military 
perspective.  
The next section reviews Galula’s five-step phasing process in which he abandons 
the first two steps of the orthodox process and introduces a new initiating mechanism. 
The shortcut process also skips Mao’s actions of arousing and organizing the people, 
achieving internal unification politically, recovering national strength, and regaining lost 
territories. Galula’s shortcut steps stick completely to military actions of executing 









                                                          
19 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 




Stages Mao's Steps Galula's Orthodox Steps 
Galula's Shortcut 
Steps 
      1. Blind Terrorism 







  1. Create the party  
1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Establish a United Front  
2. Achieve internal unification 
pol.     
3. Establish bases 3. Execute guerrilla warfare 




4. Equip forces “ “ 







6. Destroy enemy national 
strength      
      
4. Execute movement     
     warfare 
4. Execute 
movement     
     warfare 
 
5. Annihilation campaign 
5. Annihilation 
campaign 
7. Regain lost territories    
Table 4.1 Mao and Galula Orthodox and Shortcut Step Comparison 
 Galula justifies his approach through an argument that, “By terrorism, small 
groups of insurgents have been catapulted overnight to the top of large revolutionary 
movements, and some have won their victory at that very time, without need for further 
action.”20  He does concede that these regimes often disintegrate post-victory. If this is 
the case, then one may argue that the actual insurgency movement is incomplete and 
never matures to a stable state. The relationship framework is one-sided and the vanguard 
is only in relationship with the violent mechanisms of power. Without political 
mechanisms or public support, it remains in a holding pattern of persistent conflict. 
Again, a successful revolutionary movement does not make a successful state. (The 
Chechen case exercises this dynamic in Chapter 6. The Kosovar Albanian case looks 
much like this until its final year of conflict. See Chapter 7.) 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 44. 
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4.2.1 Shortcut Steps – A Shotgun Strategy via Blind Terrorism 
If Galula’s understanding of the FLN were assessed in terms of his standalone 
construct, one could argue that he misinterpreted the relationship of the FLN to Algeria’s 
broader historic and political revolutionary movement. This is because the first step of the 
shortcut pattern is blind terrorism. In his orthodox model, Galula contended that Mao 
missed the critical step of creating the party. In his own shortcut model, however, he 
ignored a similar requirement. Galula argued that the blind terrorism of step one occurs in 
a chaotic fashion to gain publicity and attract like-minded supporters. The model does not 
incorporate a step to connect these coordinated terrorist actions to the development of a 
preceding clandestine organization. Interestingly, while Galula claimed that “no more 
than 400-500 Algerian Nationalists took part in the terrorist actions on D day” other 
sources argue that the “FLN developed from a small band of 2,000-3,000 militant 
nationalists.”21  Although still small in number, coordinated action across cells 
supporting participants of this size requires leadership and resources; in addition to a 
logistic backbone, the military would use the term command and control.  
Furthermore, the acts of violence that Galula – and the French – labeled “blind 
terrorism” were the product of a systemic rise in violence over many years of repression 
and colonialism in Algeria.22  The Algerian insurgency movement and its most notorious 
                                                          
21 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 43. According to SOROs work on Algeria, “In more than 7½ years 
of bitter and bloody fighting, with casualties estimated at over 1,000,000, the FLN developed from a small 
band of 2,000–3,000 militant nationalists to a revolutionary force of about 130,000” (Jureidini et al., 
Casebook Volume I, 291). 
22 Martha Crenshaw explains that the use of violence, and particularly terrorism, in the Algerian war 
became an end in itself rather than a means to a political end. The cycle of engrenage became its own 
involuntary and mechanistic dynamic of “a tit-for-tat cycle of violence and retaliation” (Crenshaw, 
“Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 475). 
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violent organization, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), did not come onto the 
scene out of nowhere in 1954 as one might expect from Galula’s construct.23   
The motivations behind the formation of a nationalist organization driven to seek 
separation through armed struggle (in contrast to citizenship and equality within 
some ‘integrated French system) were deeply rooted in Algerian history. The 
initiation of conflict was gradual, not abrupt, despite French perceptions of its 
unexpectedness. It began as a political process in the years after the First World 
War. The beginning of the war is recognized as 1 November 1954, the Toussaint, 
or All Saints’ Day, the date on which the newly formed FLN, through its leaders 
in the Comite Revolutionnaire d’Unite et D’Action, symbolically threw down the 
gauntlet by organizing a series of small-scale bombings, raids, and shootings 
directed against French security forces throughout Algeria. However shocked the 
French may have been, and this shock seems to be more retrospective than 
contemporaneous, the outbreak did not mark a sudden transition from passive 
acceptance of French rule to open rebellion. The FLN did not spring up over the 
night of the Toussaint.” (Crenshaw, 478). 
 
Rather, the FLN formed after a small group of radicals separated from Algeria’s broader 
political movement, again – an underground that traced its lineage to World War I.  
In fact, even prior to World War I, Algeria maintained a tradition of resistance to 
French colonialism. After the first French military expedition to Algeria in 1830 and its 
subsequent limited occupation of coastal Algeria, France spent 50 years pacifying 
Algeria. Although uprisings took place in 1864, 1871, 1872, and 1881, “[b]y the 
beginning of the 20th century, the settlers had acquired all of Algeria’s most fertile 
lands.”24  French rule relied almost exclusively on force and never successfully 
penetrated into the Algeria’s mountainous interior.25 
                                                          
23 More specifically, “The FLN bombings that initiated the Battle of Algiers in 1956, for example, were 
responses to French executions of FLN prisoners and to civilian extremist violence, particularly the 
bombing of a house in the Algiers Casbah” (Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 483). 
24 Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, 291. “The economy of Algeria is primarily and predominantly 
agricultural. In 1954, 32 million acres of land were considered to be arable, although only 17.5 million 
acres were actually fit for modern-type cultivation due to irrigation problems. Of the last, 5–7 million acres 
of the most fertile land belonged to some 22,000 European settlers—an average holding of 250 acres per 
settler—while 6,300,000 Muslim peasants, 
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Whereas the French conceived of themselves as the defenders of an 
essential outpost of Western civilization reacting to an unexpected 
outburst of violence that could only be comprehended as primitive or 
subversive, Algerian nationalists regarded French oppression and 
coercion… as a catalyst—even perhaps an opportunity—for building an 
Algerian identity through counterviolence.26   
 
Algerian resistance continued throughout French expansion and forceful repression 
across the state and saw a renewed opportunity for independence after World War II.  
 In terms of its heritage along the political component, in 1907 the first Algerian 
political group called the Young Algerians (Jeunesse Algérienne) called for the same 
rights as French citizens and over time gained limited voting accessions. When Muslim 
soldiers who served in the French Army returned from World War I, they and a small 
number of French educated Muslims demanded political and economic equality.27  
Formal movements and organizations then followed, initially led by intellectuals looking 
for parity within the existing system and then expanding toward complete separation 
from France based upon religious and nationalist separatist platforms.  
 Specifically, three nationalist movements formed between World War I and 
World War II. The first continued the integrative Young Algerian platform for political 
equality and assimilation. Ferhat Abbas, a French-educated intellectual, founded the 
Young Algeria Movement in the early 1920s, calling for social and electoral reform, 
equal pay and the removal of travel restrictions. After World War II, Abbas reconstituted 
the movement in 1946 as the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). The 
UDMA held little popular support and called for a free Algeria that was with France.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
practicing subsistence-type farming, lived on the rest of the land, broken up into 600,000 holdings of about 
10–12½ acres each” (Jureidini et al., Casebook Volume I, 297). 
25 Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 479, 481. 
26 Ibid., 479. 
27 173,000 Algerians served in the French Army during World War I. “Nationalism and Resistance in 




The second strain of organizations moved from a communist to a more nationalist 
platform. The Star of North Africa, or Étoile Norde Africaine (ENA), was founded in 
1925 by Hadj Abdel Kader and then led by Messali Ahmed ben Hadj after 1927. The 
ENA called for total independence and originally began as a French solidarity 
organization in France, part of the French communist and labor party calling for suffrage, 
freedom of the press and association, as well as social reform. The ENA was banned in 
1929 and operated underground until 1934. In 1937, Hadj reconstituted the ENA as the 
Party of the Algerian People, or the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA). Hadj turned away 
from communism and moved to a nationalist agenda that fused socialist and Islamic 
values. It called for direct action in the countryside and was quickly outlawed.  
Hadj again reconstituted the PPA in 1946 as the Mouvement Pour Le Triomphe 
des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD). The MLTD was a legal party and held its first 
congress in 1947, voting to maintain political action. It formed into cells and territorial 
units like a template Communist organization – complete with a Central Committee and a 
Political Bureau. In 1948, however, Hadj developed an armed organization from this 
party called the Organization Secrète (OS). Although the French quickly stifled designs 
to foster armed insurrection and arrested its membership, “the OS became a model for the 
FLN in terms of organization, membership, and strategy. Many early FLN militants 
gained experience in the OS (or, like Ben Bella, in the French military during World War 
II.”28   Nine members of the MLTD again reconstituted a new armed organization in 
1954 called the Comité Révolutionnaire Pour L’Unité et L’Action (CRUA). CRUA is the 
organization that planned the All Saints Day Algerian uprising in 1954. On the morning 
of the uprising, they renamed themselves the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). 
                                                          
28 Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 478–79. 
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 The third strain of nationalist organizations focused on an Islamic agenda and 
narrative and accompanied the ENA. Founded upon orthodox Islamic principles in 1931 
by Sheik Abdel Hamid ben Badis, the Association of Ulemas (the Association des Uléma 
Musulmans Algériens or AUMA) began with the intent to modernize Islamic religious 
practice in Algeria. Over time, it became more political and Wahabi. Although the group 
was constrained in practice beginning in 1933, the Saudi and Egyptian influence helped 
the AUMA to pursue independence and an Arabic identity in opposition to French culture 
and control.  
 Given the FLN pedigree and the increase in resistance movements within Algeria 
over time, it is obvious that the culture of violence and resistance in Algeria negates the 
concept of blind terrorism as a starting point for insurgency. For example, the French 
responded to acts of Muslim violence harshly and immediately. French actions were also 
immensely disproportionate and indiscriminate, contributing to feelings of revenge and 
desired recompense throughout the state.29  For example, in 1945, the Muslim riots in  
the area of Setif caused approximately a hundred European casualties. The 
French authorities answered with bombardments of Algerian villages, 
mass arrests, and summary executions. European settlers formed vigilante 
squads to comb the countryside. Estimates of Algerian deaths range from 
fifteen thousand to a high of forty-five thousand. The terrible memory of 
Setif was a compelling motive for violent nationalism in the 1950s. It 
found an echo in similar circumstances at Philippeville in 1955, when 
Europeans were attacked by Algerian mobs. These deep historical 
grievances provided each side with justification for seeking revenge.30 
 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 482. “Leaders of the FLN were indignant that bombs they delivered by hand to cafes and 
restaurants were condemned as ‘blind terrorism,’ whereas French bombs dropped from the air were not, 
despite their disproportionate destructiveness and indiscriminacy with regard to combatants and 
noncombatants” (ibid., 480). 
30 Ibid., 479. 
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And to make the matter more complicated, the noted process of revenge seeking and 
power seeking across the Algerian state was not simply divided into two components: 
those for or against the French government and the Algerian resistance.  
The French camp itself was deeply divided. Violence occurred both in France and 
in Algeria. And the FLN was involved in its own civil war among native Algerians – 
“between FLN and MNA, Arabs and Kabyles, among factions, tribes, and clans, and 
social classes.”31  Galula’s framework, which focuses on military mechanisms of 
terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and movement warfare, misses the struggles across 
numerous nationalist and colonial camps. Ultimate governance over Algeria from the 
outset was “not just about independence or colonialism but who was to govern on either 
side…. Each side was divided within itself over questions of legitimacy, and those 
divisions stimulated violence.”32  This is a key distinction between phases two and three 
of the proposed framework in Chapter 2 – between “Internal Darwinism / Path toward 
legitimacy” and “Monopoly on violent resistance / Emergent Identity.” 
 “This internal Algerian struggle led not only to clashes between armed militants 
of the two movements but also to a battle between them to gain the support of the 
uncommitted population.”33  Given this background and century long build of Algerian 
resistance to French dominance, blind terrorism does not seem an appropriate caveat. It 
could be that the clandestine nature of the planning and approach made the acts of 
terrorism seem chaotic. But the use of terror in this case represented a strategic method to 
initiate protracted conflict and required a motivated and coordinated vanguard.  
                                                          
31 Ibid., 483. “According to Mohammed Harbi, political rivalries often degenerated into uncontrollable 
personal or tribal vendettas” (ibid., 483). 
32 Ibid., 476. 
33 Ibid., 477. 
130 
 
4.2.2 Shortcut Steps – Selective Terrorism 
Step two of Galula’s shortcut construct is selective terrorism and quickly follows 
step one. The goal is to “isolate the counterinsurgent from the masses, to involve the 
population in the struggle, and to obtain as a minimum its passive complicity.”34  It is 
interesting to note that the use of selective terrorism as a strategic messaging tactic aimed 
at specified internal and external audiences is not defined as a component of Mao or 
Galula’s orthodox approach. This could be because the proliferation of the message was 
limited due to technology and therefore less effective in the absence of a culture of mass 
media. Mao did say that guerrilla activity is used in all stages, but he did not use 
terrorism as a method of mass propaganda, perhaps because it drives a wedge between 
the insurgency and the civilian population.35  Civilians, after all, are frequently the 
victims of targeted violence.  
Galula’s form of selective terrorism reflected his observations regarding how the 
FLN forced key components of a social movement repertoire, including displays of 
worthiness, unity, and commitment, onto the population. For example, 
The FLN’s efforts to dominate the resistance also included measures to 
control both metropolitan and Algerian Muslim populations by enforcing 
bans on smoking and drinking (in part a boycott of French products but 
also an expression of Islamic puritanism) and punishing the disobedient as 
‘traitors.’ Such boycotts also served to separate the Muslim population 
from the French government. In 1957 this policy led to the massacre of the 
inhabitants of a small hamlet who had transferred their allegiance to the 
French (in part because of the taxes and the punishments such as physical 
mutilations that the FLN imposed). The ‘Melouza affair’ (known by the 
name of the nearest town) caused consternation in France, where the 
Communist party accepted the FLN claim that French troops had 
perpetrated the atrocity. Such violence by the FLN against Muslim 
populations was extensive.36 
                                                          
34 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 43. 
35 The Communists’ use of terrorism in China occurred but on a less spectacular scale.  




This is the type of FLN activity that Galula referenced in his second step of Selective 
Terrorism. Through analysis based on the Chapter 2 relationship framework and 
associated insurgent movement phases, the Algerian case becomes much clearer across 
transitions, actions, and levels of political and armed maturity. 
As a follow on concept to the transition between Galula’s phases, however, there 
is no guide to better understand how insurgencies that use terrorism as an integral 
component of warfare from the outset continue to use the tactic as the movement 
progresses toward an established guerrilla capability and then a conventional military 
capability. Martha Crenshaw argues that even 
specific government practices can qualify as terrorism. In this sense, the 
use of torture or the resort to the guillotine, a particularly dreadful form of 
execution, may be considered terrorism when they are intended to create 
fear in the population and to discourage potential resistance, rather than 
simply to acquire information or to punish. Similarly, if terrorism is 
defined as violence that society regards as unacceptable, whether 
according to the rules of war or the standards of peace, then violence that 
is unusually cruel or arbitrary in the view of the targeted audience, and 
that the perpetrator knows to be such, can reasonably be considered 
terrorism.37 
 
Given Crenshaw’s observations, does the insurgent regime that relies on terrorism 
become a government that relies on terror as well?  Or, if terrorism is a commonly used 
tactic of an insurgency, how does the leadership of the insurgency break the cycle of 
terrorism as applied to its citizens once it becomes legitimate?  So far, no existing model 
provides an alternative mechanism of violence as an alternative to terrorism in early 
phasing stages. 
 Lenin and Mao considered terrorism and guerrilla operations to be tactical 
options, “methods of struggle that could be adopted by the revolutionary party and the 
                                                          
37 Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 481. 
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revolutionary classes.”38  Any class could be taught effective forms of violence – or 
combat methods – as the capacity and capability to enact damage against the 
counterinsurgent matured. The Maoists “made full use of terrorism in China” as have 
numerous revolutionary movements dating back across recorded history.39  While 
terrorism could be used to take out specific small targets, steal money, and transmit 
strategic messaging, “Lenin emphasized that these actions were to be tightly controlled 
by the revolutionary party and not to replace political mobilization and agitation.”40  
Galula’s first step ignores requirements of political control or even the need of a political 
party.  
Galula’s shortcut framework uses terrorism as an actuating phenomenon in the 
context of the development and maturation of a revolutionary movement. His subsequent 
steps focus specifically on the growth of militant activity rather than required change in 
the corresponding political, social or economic contexts. As such, the selective terrorism 
of step two becomes a transitional or hybrid form of violence to bridge the capability gap 
between steps two and three, or to meet requirements calling for the use of both terrorism 
and guerrilla warfare. In the case of Algeria specifically, the rebellion “manifested in 
rural insurgency and in urban terrorism that took its most spectacular form in the 1956-
1957 Battle of Algiers.”41  Blind terrorism did not occur throughout the country and 
would not have been appropriately used in all environmental settings.  
Galula’s shortcut pattern of insurgency provides no thought to the orthodox 
concept concerning balance and the use of force among and upon civilian populations. 
                                                          
38 O’Dowd, Bibliographic essay in On Guerrilla Warfare, 138. 
39 Cohen, Galula, 79. 
40 O’Dowd, Bibliographic essay in On Guerrilla Warfare, 138. 
41 Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 480. 
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The methodology introduces terrorism as a distinctly separate series of acts that occur 
prior to guerrilla warfare – prior to Mao’s first steps of Strategic Defense. Terrorism 
purposefully kills people working closely with the population so that they serve as public 
examples. In addition, insurgents collect money from the people to implicate the masses 
and kill some of those unwilling to contribute. They violently set up an immediate 
counterculture where counter-cultural laws result in death if broken - as described by the 
previous examples of drinking and smoking boycotts.42  These activities depend upon 
violence to quickly destroy “all bridges linking the population with the counterinsurgent 
and his potential allies.”43   Such actions do not connect the community as a whole to the 
insurgent group and instead play on fear as the ultimate vehicle to power from the outset. 
It induces the counterinsurgent to overreact with its own violent solutions. 
Recall how different this path is from Mao’s proposed communist methodology 
that more slowly raises levels of violence. Galula’s shortcut steps bypass the crucial 
political activities of the orthodox methodology that Mao argued the most important task 
of stage two was to unify and mobilize the people to create their own self defense 
capability and to recover national strength. It was not to equip the force during Strategic 
Stalemate. Galula does not provide any account for these kinds of requirements and 
appears to be part of a broader change in thinking regarding the Maoist doctrine. 
For example, Chalmers Johnson pointed out that the Maoist tradition was 
“Military Power Through Political Means” while certain movements that followed, such 
                                                          
42 Conditioning a population toward obedience is utilized frequently and occurred in China, Vietnam as 
well as Algeria. People may be “conditioned for obedience through the imposition of small and seemingly 
benign tasks and restrictions in their daily lives, as could be common in organized religion (which 
revolutionary communism unarguable took the form of in practice.” Cohen, Galula, 86. 
43 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 44. 
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as the Viet Cong’s synthesis, focused on “Political Power Through Military Means.44  
Prior to the Viet Cong, the Viet Minh began to move away from a population-centric 
approach – possibly because they were a much smaller country and did not need the mass 
movement to gain territorial control – and possibly because they were expelling an 
outside colonizer rather than facing both an independent nationalist movement and an 
occupying force. Compared to the Chinese Communists, the Viet Minh Communists 
focused more on using guerrilla tactics to gain operational advantage and military 
victory. 
The Viet Minh did some of these things, although less thoroughly than had 
the Chinese, and they did other things that the Chinese thought risky and 
in violation of theory. The Viet Minh cut short the protracted war (when 
the French withdrew without being annihilated) and thereby set their own 
successor generation to rethinking the problems of overall revolutionary 
strategy and to experimenting with a new definition of revolutionary 
‘victory’”45 
 
 In a similar vein to Galula’s first two steps, the Viet Cong actively utilized selective 
terrorism to keep the political struggle alive. In the absence of a broader political 
leadership, a smaller organization can use terrorism to maintain particular grievances on 
the political agenda. 
Organizations that would use Galula’s shortcut path ignore the advice of former 
orthodox movement leaders: “Guerrillas must never forget that primitive weapons alone, 
without political work, will never suffice to gain victory over a stronger enemy. Every 
guerrilla fighter must engage in political work, becoming an armed agitator and organizer 
                                                          
44 Chalmers Johnson, “The Third Generation of Guerrilla Warfare,” in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: 
Theories, Doctrines, and Contexts, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1975), 357 
and 386, respectively. 
45 Ibid., 368. 
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in the war of resistance.”46  If the bourgeois-nationalist movements, as Galula calls them, 
advance through later military steps, they do so under a tenuous social and political 
framework because the resulting regime is not cohesive or well thought out. Without an 
actuating spiritual focus or an identifiable popular political movement— without 
associated political activities that lead to an ability to administer to the state, revolution 
yields vulnerable or fragile political outcomes. Action may attract active supporters 
hoping to route the counterinsurgent. But the guerrilla force may look more like the 
vigilante banditry described by Mao and enact a form of rule based on arbitrary decision-
making rather than on uniform rule of law. 
For this reason, Galula’s shortcut methodology is more appropriate to deter or 
route outside invaders than to set up a new stable national regime.47  It is also more 
appropriate to propagate an unstable environment in order for an insurgency to maintain 
its existence without assuming the mantle of political responsibility. With respect to 
achieving statehood as a desired political end,  
terrorism is more likely to be effective than successful, because the 
political changes to which terrorism can plausibly be linked diverge from 
those its users seek. As a method of achieving radical political change, 
terrorism has no inherent efficacy. Indeed, from a strategic perspective it 
is often counterproductive.48 
 
As such, Galula’s shortcut process does accommodate insurgent movements that start out 
with random and unorganized violence and are in search of limited political goals. It may 
not work as well to accommodate those that also intend to mature into a stable state 
                                                          
46 On p. 86 of Galula, Cohen quotes Chu Te’s 1938 essay “Problems in Guerrilla Warfare.” It may be 
found in Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics, ed. Gene Z. Hanrahan (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1974), 
67. 
47 Granted, Galula did not come up with this as an ideal path. His model is based on his observations of 
actual revolutionary activity more concerned with the seizure of power rather than post insurgency political 
transition. He is not making recommendations on behavior. 
48 Martha Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 509.  
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ruling entity at some unspecified future date; this is what Galula “advertises” regarding 
his shortcut process.  
Galula’s framework does not present a viable path to a stable form of government. 
It doesn’t really even connect the maturing forms of the militant organization. The 
Algerian insurgency against the French, whose origins began within a complex social and 
political movement, certainly did not happen according to Galula’s bourgeois-nationalist 
pattern, particularly at the outset. As Mao stated, revolution and insurgency is inherently 
political and Galula’s shortcut process only provides a militaristic focused lens from 
which to view the full scope of the movement.  
It is unclear whether and how an insurgent organization that focuses on terrorism 
in the absence of political, economic and administrative growth and development could 
run a nation state – or even mature into a viable national guerrilla movement. Terrorism 
is a kind of tactical tool, a form of violence directed at various targets, and can be used by 
any organization – including states. But it isn’t an agent of order or stability that is 
needed to foster the rule of law. Maturation of an insurgency along other lines of 
operation must also occur while violence ensues. These lines hold together the 
relationship framework described in Chapter 2 across the phases of an insurgent 
movement. Galula’s shortcut process could likely hold portions of territory ungoverned 
by the state or deter counterinsurgent control in narrowly defined areas – as the FLN did 
in areas of Algiers. Many insurgent organizations today are in fact content with this 
outcome.  
Alternatively stated, when considering a phasing construct that indicates a path to 
viable statehood or more advanced military capability, Galula’s shortcut path does not 
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contain the substantive underpinning of an executable theory or executing organization. 
Although Galula claims that his shortcut model moves directly from selective terrorism to 
guerrilla warfare, he does not provide insight into movement leadership or administrative 
mechanisms that advance the insurgent capability. Compare this to Mao’s integrated 
conception of guerrilla and political warfare. Galula misses the political and social 
connections between terrorist activity and the development of a military capability 
connected to the people. Therefore, if we are to better understand the shortcut path we 
need another pairing – similar to the Galula/Mao combination of the orthodox case. 
4.3 The Special Operations Research Office  
Besides Galula’s work on insurgency at the time, a second insurgency phasing 
theory was published in 1963, a year prior to Galula’s publication of Counterinsurgency 
Warfare Theory and Practice in 1964. The ideas within the Special Operations Research 
Office (SORO) phasing construct overlap with Galula’s shortcut pattern. They also 
provide a stronger connection to how the insurgency played out within Algeria. The 
SORO work uses the phrase “Evolutionary Dynamics of Revolutionary Movements” 
when discussing a five-phased approach to describe emerging insurgencies at the time:   
1. The Clandestine Organization Phase, 
2. The Psychological Offensive Phase, 
3. The Expansion Phase, 
4. The Militarization Phase, and 
5. The Consolidation Phase.49 
 
Table 4.2 correlates Galula’s shortcut process and SORO’s lines of effort.  
                                                          
49 Andrew R. Molnar, William A. Lybrand, Lorna Hahn, James L. Kirkman, and Peter B. Riddleberger, 
Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, DC: Special Operations 
Research Office, The American University, 1963), 37–39. The entire discussion of insurgency phases 
occurs within three pages of text and in a small way represents both a cliff note interpretation and variation 
of Galula’s observations. 
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Galula's Shortcut Steps SORO Phases 
 
1. Clandestine Organization Phase 
1. Blind Terrorism 2. Psychological Offensive 
2. Selective Terrorism “ 
 
3. Expansion Phase 
3. Execute guerrilla warfare 4. Militarization Phase 
4. Execute movement warfare                                       “ 
5. Annihilation campaign “ 
 
5. Consolidation Phase 
Table 4.2 Galula and SORO Comparison 
Although the SORO work suggests a linear pattern to the phases, it also indicates 
that no phase is “completely separate from the others;” there is no minimum or maximum 
time associated with any phase; and the predominant activity in each phase overlap into 
others.50  For example, even though the consolidation phase is listed as fifth, it references 
political and economic tasks that must be accomplished in the fourth phase of 
militarization.51  Similarly, phase one clandestine operations must expand throughout the 
insurgency.  
Because SORO observations indicate further variation within revolutionary 
practice, their work contributes to the understanding of insurgent requirements as 
manifested through the early 1960s. It is worth introducing its value added to the phasing 
discussion as an addendum to the concepts already introduced by Galula and Mao. If the 
insurgent goal is to push out another regime, Galula’s shortcut theory may be enough. If 
the insurgent goal is to use the shortcut method but to also create a nation state, then the 
SORO work is critical. 
                                                          
50 Molnar et al., Undergrounds, 37. 
51 It is unclear why SORO didn’t point out that political and economic actions were key to all aspects of the 
developing insurgency.  
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4.3.1 The SORO Contribution Regarding Evolving Insurgent Behavior 
 The first phase that SORO focuses on is the establishment of the insurgency’s 
Clandestine Organization. It is similar to Galula’s first step in the orthodox model of 
create the party, though no political entity is required. SORO supposes that terrorism 
doesn’t just happen; there is some organizational preparation and development behind it. 
As such, during this phase, “clandestine cells typically are established in heavily 
populated areas, organizations and industries are infiltrated, and cadres are recruited, 
trained, and tested.”52  Additionally, according to the updated ARIS Undergrounds work 
published in 2013,  
During the early stages of an insurgency, leaders seek to carefully select, 
investigate, and approach potential fellow insurgents. The theme of early 
recruiting is the mitigation of security risks. Typically, insurgent leaders 
establish a revolutionary movement in league with a few close friends who 
share their ideology and become trusted allies. From these modest 
beginnings, insurgent leaders will seek out individuals or groups that share 
their fundamental (if not identical) beliefs.53  
 
In order to build the insurgency over time, bases within safe-areas and sanctuaries are 
established “to develop the necessary training schools, create a supply and logistics 
system, and try out various political and organizational appeals upon the local 
inhabitants.”54  For SORO, this accomplishes the recruitment and development of the 
insurgency’s executing arm, the “skeletal framework” of the organization that is prepared 
to take action. It also sets up escape mechanisms for the group in case subversive 
activities are discovered.  
                                                          
52 Molnar et al., Undergrounds, 37.  
53 Robert Leonhard, ed., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Fort Bragg, 
NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 23. 
54 Molnar et al., Undergrounds, 37. 
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 According to SORO, external support may come during this or any phase. It could 
take the form of resources, such as training, funding, manpower and equipment. Or it 
could increase international legitimacy of the movement and isolate the enemy. Unlike 
Mao, who saw external support to the internal elite as a liability and desirable only at 
designated points in time for specific purposes, SORO introduces external support as a 
potentiality from the outset. It found that external activity may play an essential role to an 
insurgency at any time – regardless if Mao’s warnings about the dilution of internal 
purity are right or wrong. With respect to the shortcut method, because of the lack of 
political focus to mobilize the people against the counterinsurgent, external support may 
be heavily relied upon to make up for the capability gap.  
 Again, this is a distinctly different kind of first phase than the communist model 
in four respects. At the start, SORO and Galula’s lack any requirement for the insurgency 
to establish a guiding internal political vision or to establish a politically solidified 
clandestine or overt political component. According to the orthodox methodology, stages 
one and two, arousing and organizing the people as well as achieving internal unification 
politically, begin before bases are established and the army is equipped. While all 
methodologies agree that exploration of usable causes and narratives are essential, for the 
orthodox path, the purity of the elite political regime comes before the creation and 
expansion of the broader insurgent organization.  
 Second, because SORO and Galula do not require political constitutive 
mechanisms from the outset, they target only illicit activity and membership within three 
quarters of the relationship framework. Specifically, SORO’s model targets the 
emergence of the vanguard and the growth and support of destructive mechanisms from 
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limited public support. Its first phase looks to build the clandestine united front and is 
little concerned with the possibility that the unified front might already have a 
conventional capability or a political machine to leverage, unless that capability comes 
from external support beyond the state.  
Similarly, or third, the consolidated orthodox model identifies nuances among all 
four of the relationship components at the beginning of stage one and explains how they 
blend, grow and change over time. The shortcut process models advocate that violence 
may be seen as a faster way to spark revolution, but ignores the development of the 
networked enterprise. For example, Mao’s doctrine directed the CPCs political 
membership to promote national “internal unification” and spur the development of 
guerrilla units, local self-defense units, and corresponding political committees that 
would lead political and military decision-making at local levels.55   
There is a nuance here that bears further description. Because the SORO work 
states that phases may overlap, and because SOROs second phase includes terrorism, 
there is nothing to prevent the first two steps in the SORO construct from happening 
concurrently. There is no mention of how mature the clandestine organization needs to be 
before indiscriminate and selective terrorism begin. In this case, a linear temporal 
framework begins to get murky. (It will get more undecided in comparison to the 
orthodox model as the SORO phases progress.) 
Finally, the context of SOROs first phase is decidedly urban, with no mention of 
the rural component that is so integral to Mao’s work. Clandestine cells are established in 
heavily populated areas and infiltrate industry as well as other targeted organizations. 
                                                          
55 U.S. Marine Corps FMRP 12-18, Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla War (Yu Chi Chan). Translation and 
introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Headquarters, U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1989), 63. 
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Prescribed violence in both Galula and SORO target populated areas that get the most 
media attention. Now that the first SORO phase has been added to the shortcut 
insurgency path, we can move to the second phase. 
SORO’s second phase on the insurgency timeline is called the Psychological 
Offensive Phase in which the insurgent objective is to “bring about the loss of 
effectiveness of the social and governmental institutions of the country and to create 
unrest and disorder.”56  With the exception of its inclusion of critical external support, 
this phase looks similar to steps one and two of Galula’s shortcut phase.57  It uses 
agitators to take advantage of social grievances, spread discontent and propaganda about 
regime corruption and oppression, “lead demonstrations, start riots and organize strikes;” 
it employs selective terrorism against officials at all levels of government to threaten, 
intimidate, and conduct assassinations.58   
For the SORO methodology, terrorism is used as a psychological operation in the 
same way that propaganda is used. While Mao speaks to messaging that builds 
relationships and provides unity among the people and the army, the type of insurgency 
that SORO describes initially does not. There is little if any spiritual identification of the 
broader local population with the movement because terrorism attracts a different kind of 
participant who is outside of the mainstream population. 
 Where Mao’s phases are designed to build a political landscape with violence as a 
means, SORO phases at this point – as well as in Galula’s shortcut process - include 
                                                          
56 Molnar et al., Undergrounds, 37. 
57 Technically, SORO never prescribes blind terrorism. It actually uses the term selective terrorism. But 
because it was printed before Galula’s work came out, and there is not significant detail to explain phasing, 
it is difficult to completely exclude acts of blind terrorism within the psychological offensive phase. The 
objectives of blind terrorism fall within the purpose of the phase. 
58 Molnar et al., Undergrounds, 37. 
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activities that are more appropriate to supporting a militant group. Clandestine networks 
and psychological operations sustain violent organizations in general – criminal, terrorist, 
or insurgent – and will occur in perpetuity as long as those organizations survive. 
Without a requirement to grow formal institutional mechanisms for the state, and without 
the responsibility to create order, the manipulation of social movements enable illicit 
activities and destabilize highly populated environments without committing to any 
political follow through.  
 For this reason, SOROs first and third phases, the third being the Expansion 
Phase, connect Galula’s selective terrorism step to the insurgency’s follow-on capability 
to conduct guerrilla warfare. SORO’s model assumes a continued maturity in the phase 
one task of growing the clandestine organization and begins work in the third phase to 
gain popular support and to eliminate other competing nationalist opposition groups. The 
insurgent organization must destroy all other alternatives so that only one solution is left 
after the chaos within the state dies down. (Again, this is the crucial political 
development that distinguishes Phase 2 Internal Darwinism requirements in the proposed 
phases from Chapter 2 of this dissertation.)  Every model notes this requirement to some 
degree.  
During the expansion phase, the insurgency connects a growing body of 
supporters to a training and political indoctrination system. SORO’s lexicon introduces 
political concepts directly from Mao’s terminology regarding the establishment of a 
“united front,” directing widespread recruitment “through mass organizations.”59   
The revolutionary group must demonstrate continually that it exists and 
that it is determined to gain control of the government in the name of the 
people or a large majority of the people… To prove their determination to 
                                                          
59 Ibid.,, 38. 
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rule the country, the insurgents often seek as soon as possible to establish 
a provisional government. Formal ‘committees’ are set up in other 
countries to lobby on behalf of the revolutionary movement.60 
 
The expansion phase, without any noted work on a political foundation, seeks to draw the 
government’s heavy hand upon the populace in order to more efficiently build the public 
component. During this time the insurgency moves out of urban areas and interacts more 
broadly across the country. Terrorism continues because it “exaggerates the movement’s 
strength,” making it appear larger and more popular that it actually is.61  The armed 
component remains immature, but should be able to conduct guerrilla warfare by the end 
of the expansion phase. 
 During SORO’s fourth phase, the Militarization Phase, the insurgency robustly 
increases political and economic activity in parallel with military professionalization and 
capability. As provisional governments begin to stand up and international recognition 
becomes part of the externally oriented political process, “when the existing government 
begins to lose popular support and the revolutionary ranks begin to fill, the movement 
enters the militarization phase.”62  Full guerrilla warfare ensues and is designed “to 
overcome the government’s military forces;” to “wear down the government troops while 
the guerrillas” organize; and to build their insurgent conventional army.63  Interestingly, 
SORO places the entirety of Mao’s stages within the militarization phase. This is a 
crucial point. 
SOROs addition of Mao’s three stages to the shortcut process greatly impacts the 
depth and relevance of the combined shortcut model. At the same time, the change 
                                                          
60 Ibid., 38. 
61 Ibid., 38. 
62 Ibid., 38. 
63 Ibid., 38–39. 
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dramatically alters the framework; it is no longer a shortcut. By adding these 
components, we can begin to see the emergence of a meta-structure regarding a more 
complete insurgent playbook. Instead of interpreting the various models as independently 
right or wrong approaches to all insurgencies, view them instead as options along a tooth 
to tail path toward insurgent control of a nation state. The orthodox path implies a 
political beginning. The shortcut path offers a faster track to force action through 
violence and is available to organizations that do not have the capacity to think about 
nation building from the outset.64  This is illustrated in the table below where the blacked 
out areas of Galula’s shortcut process are accounted for when combined with the SORO 












                                                          
64 The broader phasing framework suggested in the following chapter builds upon this concept. The 
common theme among the variables and concepts used across Mao, Galula, and SORO all center upon the 
final objective of who is to govern and rule the state. Today’s insurgencies do not always focus on this. So 








Shortcut Steps SORO Phases 
        1. Clandestine Organization  
      1. Blind Terrorism 
2. Psychological 
Offensive 
      2. Selective Terrorism 
3. Selective 
Terrorism 
Strategic    1. Create the party   4. Militarization 
Defense 1. Arouse and organize the people 
2. Establish a United 
Front    
  2. Achieve internal unification pol.       
  3. Establish bases 3. Execute guerrilla warfare 
3. Execute 
guerrilla warfare  
Strategic  4. Equip forces “ “  
Stalemate 5. Recover national strength      
Strategic  6. Destroy enemy national strength      
4. Execute movement 
warfare    
4. Execute 
movement  
warfare   
 





 offense 7. Regain lost territories     5. Consolidation 
Table 4.3 Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison 
In addition to Mao’s full range of steps, SORO, adds a final fifth phase onto 
Mao’s theory called the Consolidation Phase. A close inspection of Mao would suggest 
that most of SOROs consolidation activities are actually covered by the compiled 
orthodox model. For example, “Once in control, revolutionaries frequently use 
instruments of force to eliminate opposition, create new mass organizations, and establish 
surveillance systems to prevent a counterrevolution.”65  SORO also mentions the 
importance of political and economic actions during the consolidation phase. “If the 
guerrilla force cannot decisively defeat the government’s military forces, the drain on the 
economy and the effect of political pressure by the insurgents are often enough to ensure 
success.”66  There is no discussion, however, of what success means to the state when the 
                                                          
65 Molnar et al., Undergrounds, 39. 
66 Ibid., 39. 
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revolutionary party takes control of a broken population with little ability to support itself 
or sustain anything other than the revolutionary regime. 
On the whole, Mao does a much better job of tying political efforts and the 
development of necessary administrative and security institutions to the orthodox theory. 
He also does a better job at explaining the impacts of economic forces on the 
counterinsurgent. The largest gap in theory across Mao, Galula and SORO regards the 
transition of running the financial responsibilities of the insurgency to running the 
economy of the state. None provide a large amount of detail on the economics of 
insurgency or how financial strategies could more seriously be used. Economic 
requirements are considered political constitutive mechanisms within this dissertation and 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
4.4 Do the Available Models Measure Up? 
 Chapters 2 through 4 introduce the complexity of insurgency in an organized 
approach that builds upon existing literatures, operational perspectives, and existing 
models of phasing applied to two case studies. The current models, however, are limited 
and lack the power of an analytic framework from which to better understand the growth, 
development, and evolution of insurgency over time. They tell the story of or provide 
explanatory power to the two cases at the time, but do not hold for the broad range of 
insurgencies described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Mao, Galula and SORO offer 
overarching themes that fall across a metanarrative for insurgent practice. But their 
specifics encompass historic artifacts and require synthesis to enable comparison of 
similar components and processes concurrently.  
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Given the prolific number of insurgencies across the political landscape, the 
absence of a comparative framework or substantive political theory that develops the 
constituting requirements and needs of emerging regimes is puzzling, particularly 
because effective policy implementation relies on data driven analysis. In order to fill this 
void in theory, the next chapter draws on the broad range of accumulated knowledge 
gathered in previous chapters and lays out a theoretical framework regarding the politics 
of insurgency. If Lockhart and Ghani are correct and quantifiable state functions exist, 
then an insurgent movement maintains corresponding categories of operation that must 
scale up and transition from support of the organization to penetration of the components 
across a state. If “the particular framing of nation-ness is malleable,”67  then an emerging 
regime must sustain itself in a way that keeps those within it cohesive and unified across 
its imagining.  
 
                                                          
67 Mark Ashley, “It Takes a Victim: The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National 




A Framework for Insurgency Analysis 
5.1 Insurgency Theory 
Chapter 1 defines insurgency as a condition of formalized resistance or revolt 
against a governing authority in which the perpetrating parties are not initially recognized 
legally as belligerents. Depending on associated political goals, an insurgency may 
renounce allegiance or subjection to a government or may attempt to end the rule of one 
government and start a new one by means of subversion or interpersonal violence. 
Although insurgencies may also participate in legal forms of resistance, attempts to 
modify the standing political system fundamentally include the unconstitutional or illegal 
use of force or protest. Some insurgents are concerned with breaking down an existing 
political regime with the intent to develop a political alternative in the future. Others find 
little reason to become the territorial regime and thus cohabitate in parallel with the 
existing government, preventing the state from attaining a monopoly on violence or 
control over apportioned areas. The promise of Chapter 1 is that the dissertation will 
introduce a comparative framework capable of assessing the anatomy of varied forms of 
insurgent practice as well as their maturity as potential state regimes. 
Chapter 2 presents academic, military, and legal perspectives of insurgency as a 
political and military phenomenon. It explores the seldom defined transition from 
resistance organization – through the vehicle of insurgency – to state regime. While 
academic literature looks systemically at the international system of states and interstate 
relationships in a comparative way, its approach to the making of states and the internal 
dissolution of states is absent. For this reason, Chapter 2 synthesizes existing 
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compartmented literature and pieces together a cumulative approach toward insurgency 
that can be used to build a common anatomy and enable comparative analytics. It 
introduces 6 phases of insurgency and a relationship framework with four component 
parts. The power of explanation within the dissertation comes from the relationship 
assessment, both psychological and physical, of the vanguard, public support, political 
constitutive mechanisms, and violent destructive mechanisms across phases.  
Because no existing work presents insurgency dynamics across component lines 
of effort so they may be compared or assessed along a baseline standard, the next two 
Chapters look closely at well-respected phasing constructs, synthesizing their findings 
with the work of Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 explore how the dissertation’s phasing 
actions are further derived by reviewing four insurgency models within the context of 
two historic case studies. They present interrelated concepts and requirements that enable 
insurgent organizations to grow and develop into viable state regimes. Chapter 4 
concludes that existing insurgency models are insufficient to provide a meta-framework 
for comparison across insurgencies. Historic models do, however, provide limited 
analytic tools and metrics for those insurgencies about which they were written. They 
also introduce extremely important themes and ideas that cross insurgencies.  
This Chapter returns to the phasing construct and relationship framework 
introduced in Chapter 2. It incorporates the lessons of Mao, Galula, and SORO and more 
fully presents the proposed phases of insurgent movements. Each of the phasing 
thresholds explored below and in Chapters 6 and 7 utilizes themes and lessons that trace 
back to the cumulative literature. For example, they include concepts regarding the 
strength of the vanguard to leverage both political and violent mechanisms; the maturity 
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and penetration of an insurgency’s political administration and constituency; its military 
and security administration and constituency; the psychological cohesion of the 
insurgency internally and internationally; as well as the level of persistent control (both in 
size and duration) of territory within the state.  
5.2 A Deeper Discussion of Insurgency Phasing and the Relationship Framework 
Chapters 3 and 4 presented important information regarding the requirements of 
insurgent movements. Mao’s theory, for example, illustrates both political and military 
components of a national movement. Galula’s work adds a more informed understanding 
of open and clandestine support that underpins insurgent activities. And SORO discusses 
explicit logistical requirements, explaining that organizations that rely solely on terrorism 
cannot mature to statehood. See Table 5.1. Only Mao and SORO focus on the 
development of a state while Galula looks at destruction of an enemy. All three theories 
play with variables regarding control of territory, movement leadership, politics, 
violence, and public support.  
With respect to the increasing maturity of an insurgency movement, however, 
insurgent tasks in Table 5.1 are jumbled across steps and stages. For example, arousing 
and organizing the people is a component of public support and must be coordinated 
across every phase. Public support feeds political mechanisms such as creating a party 
and vanguard responsibilities such as establishing a united front. Similarly, it also feeds 
mechanisms of violence such as processing and developing new recruits into effective 
local militias. The attributes and penetration of political parties, local militias, or the 
united front, when associated with an insurgent movement, indicate the level of strength 
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and maturity between an insurgency’s political institutions, violent mechanisms, and the 
public. 
Mao’s Steps Galula’s Orthodox Steps 
Galula’s Shortcut 
Steps SORO Phases 
      1. Clandestine Organization  
    1. Blind Terrorism 2. Psychological Offensive 
    2. Selective Terrorism 3. Selective Terrorism 
  1. Create the party   4. Militarization 
1. Arouse and organize the 
people 
2. Establish a United 
Front    
2. Achieve internal 
unification pol.       
3. Establish bases 3. Execute guerrilla warfare 
3. Execute guerrilla 
warfare  
4. Equip forces “ “  
5. Recover national 
strength   
   
6. Destroy enemy national 
strength      
4. Execute movement 
warfare    
4. Execute movement  






7. Regain lost territories     5. Consolidation 
Table 5.1 Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison 
Therefore, as an insurgency matures toward increasing levels of resistance, the 
characteristics of component relationships change. For example, establishing local 
political leaders, equipping forces, establishing bases, and conducting certain kinds of 
warfare speak to improving levels of relationship between them. Relationships and 
organizational structures that began from a horizontal architecture must eventually 
become hierarchical in order to establish functional command and control of increasingly 
complex operations. The key to scaling lies in the way the vanguard leadership 
interoperates and develops with the military, the political institutions, and the public. The 
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vanguard must be able to cross thresholds of scale associated with political and military 
functions, all the while growing sufficient public support. 
Phase  Generic Descriptor Public Support Territory Legal 
Phase 0 Perceived inequity and injustice 
Perceived inequity 
and injustice and 
social ferment 
None 




          
Phase 1 
Violence as a 





































          
Phase 4 






regional control Insurgency 
          
Phase 5 




success State territory Belligerency 
Table 5.2 Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements 
Table 5.2 depicts the original phasing construct introduced at the end of Chapter 2 
and takes the first step to organize the actions and concepts presented in Table 5.1. These 
phases are neither dependent nor independent variables of the proposed framework. 
Rather, they comprise a heuristic overlay from which to address varying thresholds of 
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regime maturity during an insurgency. Each phase represents meta-categories and does 
not differentiate or separate vanguard, political, violent, or social movement lines of 
effort. Instead they speak to the nominal relationship across components. This simple 
form of the dissertation model captures increasing levels of maturity over time, even 
though it does not independently address the components of the relationship framework. 
It is very similar to the generic steps presented by the theoretic models in Table 5.1 with 
four exceptions. First, the focus of each generic descriptor speaks to the necessary effects 
of vanguard development – what political and violent milestones must be achieved and 
coordinated in order to reach that phase.  
Second, Table 5.2 corresponds to the thresholds of the social movement phases 
explored in Chapter 2 and incorporates an agnostic yet integral psychological component 
around which to build the movement narrative and ideology. In order to come fully into 
the capability defined by each generic phase descriptor, an insurgency requires the 
associated level of public support for both political and violent mechanisms. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, governance is not accomplished through formal regime-led participation 
channels alone; civilian organizations align their behavior and goals bureaucratically and 
legally to support or counter a desired endstate. The insurgency leadership must develop 
a unifying constitutive vision that will yield political legitimacy to the broader 
constituency as the movement scales. If it cannot, then legitimacy will have to come 
solely through violent mechanisms that coopt and repress the public. 
Third, the culmination of the phasing construct ends with the insurgency’s ability 
to control the territory and population of the movement’s defined nation – both politically 
and through violence. Specifically, insurgency mechanisms either incorporate into a 
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modified political order or become the foundation of a new state regime. The last three 
phases move from a monopoly on localized violence, to regional violence, to violence 
across the state. Similarly the political system moves from local forms and acceptance to 
stronger regional and national forms. Although these later phases create stronger states, 
an insurgency may still acquire the mantle of statehood without attaining advanced 
capabilities given external support. If this is the case, tasks may still occur during a 
transition period. Ultimately, the composite model will enable analysis to determine 
whether an insurgency has the potential to reach these more advanced forms. 
And finally, the model does not focus on defeating the enemy. It is independent of 
the tactical interplay between insurgent and counterinsurgent as well as the context of the 
actuating cleavage. It does not predict whether the insurgency will win or be defeated by 
the opposing force. Instead, it indicates whether counterinsurgent political and violent 
mechanisms are being replaced by the insurgency within a contextually defined area of 
interest. It does not speak to the content of the ideational motivation but rather to its 
strength, reinforcing the concept that the vanguard and political narrative cannot solely 
rely upon a destructive goal as the movement progresses. 
The absence of a win-lose mentality through violent mechanisms is purposeful. 
This is not to say that who wins or who loses the fight is incidental. Rather, it is a 
byproduct of the insurgency as it scales and is affected by external actors and actions 
within the international system. Winning or losing against an armed enemy is just one 
component of becoming a nation-state. War is a political tool, not the end but one mean. 
Those organizations that lose sight of this either do not want to progress across all phases 
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or cannot. Creating a phasing construct focused on scaling may better inform decision-
makers interested in breaking down insurgent movements or in building stronger states. 
Although the phasing construct of Table 5.2 makes significant improvements to 
existing models, it still requires input from Chapters 3 and 4 lessons learned. If the 
dissertation proposition is that an insurgent organization needs to make strides and build 
relationships across and between the four relationship components, then those 
components need to factor directly into the model. Because public support is already 
accounted for, this leaves the vanguard, political constitutive mechanisms, and violent 
destructive mechanisms. 
And yet it is possible to provide so much detail across each line of effort that the 
model becomes too cumbersome. Take Table 5.3, for example. This list incorporates the 
activities discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 between the vanguard and the insurgency’s 
mechanisms of violence. Some actions, such as narrative development, execution, and 
analysis also play into political mechanisms as well. Although each component may not 
enlist the same narrative, over time, component activities should nest together as the 
formal bureaucracy begins to coalesce. 
Violent mechanisms in Coordination with the Vanguard 
Phase 0 
Existing militant/violent culture 
 
Phase 1 
Identify broader network 
Build united front 
Spiritual unification / passive complicity 
Recruit / train cadre 
Establish sanctuaries for: 
     supplies and logistics / training schools 
Begin to stockpile  
Establish escape mechanisms 
Infiltrate/coopt organizations and industries 
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Elicit repressive behavior by the counterinsurgent 
Fund the effort 
Begin terrorist tactics 
 
Phase 2 
Destabilize targeted areas 
Expand united front 
Gain public awareness 
Isolate counterinsurgent from masses 
Incite counterinsurgent oppression of people 
Professionalize/ indoctrinate/ increase cadre 
Neutralize dissent / eliminate opposition 
Spiritual unification of officers/men with army 
Recruit/ train local militia/self-defense units 
Increase discipline 
Expand funding/supply/logistic network 
Develop support areas 
Involve population in the struggle 
Obtain population passive complicity (at minimum) 
Introduce countercultural laws with violation penalties 
Threaten, intimidate, conduct assassinations 
Kill people working closely with population as examples 
Solidify external support mechanisms 
Strategic terrorism/some small unit engagements 
Exterminate small forces, harass and weaken counterinsurgency 
Increase destructive capacity 
Attrite enemy forces - increase target scope 
Annihilate enemy capabilities 




Expand tasks in Phase 2 
Move toward professional security forces 




Expand tasks in Phase 3 
Attrite the enemy 
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Professionalize local/regional militias 
Establish secret service 




Expand tasks in Phase 4 
Control national security forces 
Full conventional capability 
Maintain unconventional elite 
National conscription 
  
Table 5.3. Violent Mechanisms in Coordination with the Vanguard  
If the purpose of the dissertation sought to develop a detailed Indications and 
Warning framework to be used to track insurgent capabilities and potential, then Table 
5.3 would require even further operationalization and detailed metrics across each phase. 
But doing so would be premature. The proposed conceptual model still requires 
substantial vetting and verification before this process might start. For this reason, Table 
5.4 represents the first attempt to combine critical activities for each component across 
phases. In addition to the four components, legal and territorial conditions from Chapter 2 
are still included.  
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Use of legal 
processes None 
Identify elite 
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Table 5.4 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model 
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 The legal status in the left column of the phasing model is appropriate when 
capability thresholds are achieved horizontally across the other columns. For example, a 
belligerency is achieved when the insurgent movement controls the majority of the state 
territory; when the vanguard assimilates into formal political and violent mechanisms; 
when the insurgency establishes a national administration, a constitution, a budget, and a 
method of conscription; when the military incorporates insurgent organizations and 
becomes a national force; and when the public successfully assimilates into the state or is 
repressed.  
Variation across insurgency phases, however, will be frequently observed and 
occurs when violent mechanisms are in a higher phase than public support or political 
mechanisms – and vice versa. This is often the case with insurgency starting conditions 
that almost always fluctuate across phases. Additionally, some organizations do not have 
the will or capacity to progress through increasingly complex functions. The ways in 
which the components of the framework align in relationship will define their maximum 
phasing capacity and create a range or typology of insurgent movements. 
By highlighting the interworking thresholds of the relationship framework, the 
proposed framework helps to illustrate whether or not an insurgency may successfully 
scale. For example, if we think of each column as a pathway for insurgency comprised of 
associated tasks, it becomes apparent that certain insurgencies may begin where the level 
of maturity along a given pathway is more advanced than another. One insurgent 
movement may top out in phase two or three. Another may reach advanced stages in one 
component but lack capability in others. The quality of the relationships across 
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framework components and the actions taken within each phase speak to the nature of the 
emergent state.  
This comparative methodology provides greater insight than current doctrinal 
models presented in Chapter 2, especially when each box within the phasing construct is 
operationalized. In isolation, each column is interesting but less impactful. However, 
when one begins to understand how armed components across insurgencies 
operationalize to control violence, or how different vanguards leverage the public, then 
the framework becomes a tool for assessment. Awareness arises regarding how insurgent 
movements build as connections between columns strengthen over time—or conversely 
degrade as these relationships or capabilities deteriorate.  
Chapters 6 and 7 unpack the relationship framework and composite phasing 
construct, assessing strengths and weaknesses in light of two comparable cases. The 
Chechen and Kosovar Albanian insurgencies provide insight and specific examples of the 
activities that occur within each phase. They also present pathway combinations of 
strength and coordination between the vanguard, the political and violent mechanisms, as 
well as public support. Chapter 8 then consolidates the findings and analysis from the 
case studies and assesses the viability of the phasing model as a usable tool to better 





The Politics of Insurgency Case Study 1: The Chechen 
Revolution1 
6.1        The Case of Chechnya 
 The Republic of Chechnya declared independence from the Russian Federation 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and for three years maintained autonomy 
with little interference. By December 1994, however, Moscow attempted to recapture the 
breakaway republic and Russian troops advanced on the Chechen capital of Grozny to 
end the Chechen insurgency. The next two years proved disastrous for the Chechen 
people as approximately 100,000 civilians died during the Russian siege. When the First 
Chechen War ended with a cease-fire agreement signed in 1996, violent resistance did 
not end. Rather, it transformed over the next five years from a broadly based nationalist 
movement to a less politically engaged network led by radical Islamic elements. When 
the Second Chechen War commenced in 1999, the insurgency would never gain the 
momentum it acquired at the outset of the first war. The organization that persists today 
in Chechnya is primarily limited to small unit tactics and terrorist activities.2  
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship framework across the 
phasing model introduced in Chapter 5. The development of the Chechen insurgency 
supports the arguments advanced in the previous chapter and illustrates the dynamics of 
scaling necessary to progress across phases. See Figure 6.1. Each of the five sections 
                                                          
1 Much of the research and groundwork for this chapter comes from a previously published work. Maegen 
Nix and Shana Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002,” in Casebook on Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army 
Special Operations Command, 2012), 489–524.  
2 Many members of the Chechen organization are involved in direct support to the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). They continue to counter Russia interests. 
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describes a different period across the conflict. For example, the first section explores the 
context of the revolution’s origin and the associated phasing variation across the 
relationship framework at its start. It breaks out the phasing analysis separately to provide 
a foundation from which to build the subsequent narrative across the chapter. All 
additional sections merge the discussion of events with phasing analysis. 
 
Figure 6.1 Insurgency Relationship Framework 
The second section examines the initial period of Chechen independence and the 
preliminary efforts of the insurgency to consolidate power. The third section assesses the 
First Chechen War and the actions and behaviors of the evolving vanguard, the public, 
and the movement’s political and military mechanisms during its aftermath. The fourth 
section explains the diminishing impact of the insurgency during and after the Second 
Chechen War and relates these changes to associated variation across components. 
External support and actions taken by the Russians will also be discussed in terms of their 
impact on the movement. Finally, I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the analysis of 
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the insurgency and the arguments made in Chapter 5. This section also describes the state 
of Chechnya’s insurgent framework today.  
Ultimately the Russians targeted the Chechen civilian population to such an 
extent that they could not emotionally or physically support insurgency growth. They 
eliminated and restricted the base from which to draw. In addition, the vanguard 
leadership became alienated from the public over time. Although the predominant 
Chechen characteristics of independence and competition became assets in maintaining 
clan identity and growing a substate economy, the political apparatus could not scale to 
build a state economy or develop constitutive political mechanisms across the nation.  
Table 6.1 serves as a heuristic reference across the build of the chapter. Each 
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Table 6.1 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model 
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6.2 Insurgency Origins in Chechnya 
 Chechnya sits in a geographic region known as the Caucasus. See Figure 6.2. 
Covering an expanse of territory between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the 
Caucasus ranges as far south as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and as far north as 
numerous republics in the Russian Federation. By the eleventh century, the area hosted a 
predominantly Muslim population that today is home to more than seventy-five different 
ethnicities. Although Chechnya itself is roughly the size of New Jersey, historically, it is 
one of the most ethnically homogenous societies in the region. Even in 1998, 70 percent 
of the population remained ethnically Chechen, while less than 2 percent identified 
Russian as their national language.3  
 
Figure 6.2 Political Map of the Caucasus Region (2008)4 
                                                          
3 Gail W. Lapidus, “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya,” International Security 23, no. 1 




 When Russian troops first entered Chechen territory during the reign of Ivan the 
Terrible in 1552, Chechen resistance to Russia began. At the time, Chechnya’s northern 
neighbor represented one of many outside invaders within the region, including Arabs, 
Persians, and the Ottomans. More persistent efforts by Russia to subdue Chechnya began 
during the reign of Catherine the Great in the late eighteenth century. As early as 1816, 
records indicate that Russian treatment of Chechnya included “means of punitive raids on 
mountain villages, collective punishment, razing of houses and crops, deforestation, 
forced mass deportation, and settlement of Cossacks on lands vacated by the Chechens.”5  
Resistance against tsarist Russia fluctuated over time. Between 1830 and 1859, 
Chechen Shaykh Shamil established a Sufi Naqshbandi Islamic Imamate across both 
Chechnya and Dagestan.6 The Imamate originated a localized and culturally specific 
system of taxation that became integral to North Caucasian self-identity. Although the 
Naqshbandi were eventually defeated,  
the Sufi brotherhoods never ceased to wield influence and formed an 
alternative system of administration. This system permeated all levels of 
social, religious, and political life in Chechnya and Dagestan and, based as 
it was on a clandestine network of Murid (students of Sufism) 
organizations, remained largely outside Russian reach.7 
 
                                                          
5 Tony Wood, Chechnya, The Case for Independence (New York: New Left Books/Verso, 2007), 21. Also 
see Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan 
(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1994). Gammer’s full book analyzes the Russian conquest of Chechnya 
and Daghestan. 
6 The Chechen Sufi tradition derives from Arab/Sunni origins rather than Shia/Persian origins. Many 
scholars would call Chechens Sunni. The purpose of the distinction here is differentiating Sufi practice 
from radical Sunni Wahhabi practice in future sections. 
7 Anna Zelkina, “Jihad in the Name of God: Shaykh Shamil as the Religious Leader of the Caucasus,” 
Central Asian Survey 21, no. 3 (2002): 260. 
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In accordance with the Sufi mystical tradition of tariqa that included shari’a law, 
ghazavat (holy war), and jihad, the Imamate collected funds to support pensions for 
widows, invalids, and military hospitals.8  
Chechnya’s stance toward Russia became a tenacious struggle across clans that 
fostered a collective desire for Chechen autonomy from the Russian state. The Chechen 
insurgency of the late twentieth century would draw from socio-cultural institutions and 
practices of violent resistance that developed over centuries. At the same time, however, 
the resistance never constituted political institutions or social practices needed to build a 
modern nation state. Little interest existed to unify politically outside of independent clan 
identities or to develop a unified governmental structure across the region. 
In 1917, Vladimir Lenin made false promises to the Chechen clans and 
manipulated their desire for autonomy from Russia. The broader region proclaimed itself 
to be the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus and included a 27,000-square-
mile footprint covering the areas that now comprise Chechnya, Ingushetia, North 
Ossetia–Alania, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan. In order to recruit fighters to support 
the Russian revolution, Lenin declared the Chechen people free and inviolable. Once the 
Communists came into power, however, the Red Army moved into the region as 
occupiers and Chechen resistance to Russia, then the Soviet Union, reemerged.  
Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets collectivized agriculture within the 
republic. Resistance to such practices  
forced the predominantly peasant population to turn inwards in an attempt 
to resist communism and Russian rule. This process led to the increased 
influence of religious brotherhoods and the preservation of traditional 
village and clan structures as well as customs and traditions.9 
                                                          
8 Wood, Chechnya, 24. 




The Chechen people developed a parallel way of life underneath the Russian political 
system to maintain their identity and access subsistence resources. Numerous uprisings 
continued between 1922 and 1942 after Stalin first “sliced away and incorporated” 
components of the Mountainous Republic into Russia. 10  
Interestingly, during World War II, roughly 20,000 Chechens joined the Soviet 
Army against Hitler. When Chechen territory briefly came under German occupation 
during the war, Stalin believed the Chechens collaborated toward this end with the 
Germans.11 He subsequently recalled all soldiers and officers of Caucasian origin from 
the German front and sent them to work in Siberian Gulags.12 Then, in 1944, Stalin 
deported the entire Chechen population to Central Asia where 30 percent of its men, 
women, and children died. “Even by the most conservative estimate, the Chechen and 
Ingush people lost, across the years of exile, over a third of their total number.”13 
Although Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated the Chechens in 1957, the Soviet Union did 
little to ameliorate Chechen political marginalization or displacement. For many, upon 
return, their homes and land stood occupied by Russian settlers and government officials.  
Anti-Russian sentiment among the Chechen population coalesced further during 
exile and solidified the base of a national consciousness; it also strengthened traditional 
networks and certain cultural norms within the succeeding generation. For example, 
                                                          
10 Wood, Chechnya, 31. “The Soviet period of the history of Chechnia is punctuated by a succession of 
popular uprisings against Moscow rule: 1924, 1928, 1937, 1940 and 1942” (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 231). 
11 David R. Stone, “Chechnya Wars (1990s–present),” in The Encyclopedia of War, ed. Gordon Martel 
(Online: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011), 1. Comparative accounts suggest that the Germans never 
reached the territory and the reason for the annihilation of the people was entirely fabricated by the Soviet 
propaganda machine (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 232). 
12 “Remembering Stalin’s Deportation,” BBC News, February 23, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3509933.stm. 




“[t]he mass deportation of the Chechens in 1944 far from destroying the Sufi 
brotherhoods, actually promoted their expansion” and reinforced the importance of clan 
structures.14 In 1992, when Chechnya declared national independence and adopted its 
first constitution, one in three Chechens was a 1944 deportation survivor, including both 
of the first two Chechen presidents.15 Dzhokhar Dudayev, for example, was born in 
Chechnya in 1944 and then spent thirteen years living with his family in exile in 
Kazakhstan.16 
 During the Chechen period of exile in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the Soviet 
Union continued to collectivize the arable land within Chechnya and brought some 
industry to Grozny. In particular, the region became central to the Soviet capacity to 
refine oil and move gas from the Caspian basin.17 After rehabilitation, Chechens 
continued to maintain an agrarian lifestyle and depended on livestock and poultry 
production for sustainment.18 Although farming provided clan subsistence, wealth 
generation derived from raising livestock.19 The prominence of a shadow economy, or an 
alternative method of transferring wealth and value other than through formal state 
institutions or licit mechanisms, benefited the future Chechen resistance. Even during 
exile, the shadow economy served as “one of few means of generating income free of 
state scrutiny and official discrimination… transforming the nature of its national 
                                                          
14 Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 231.  
15 Wood, Chechnya, 38.  
16 Andrew Higgins, “Profile: Dzhokhar Dudayev: Lone Wolf of Grozny,” The Independent, January 22, 
1995, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/profile-dzhokhar-dudayev-lone-wolf-of-grozny-
1569145.html. 
17 By the early 1990s, two large refineries and a petro-chemical complex stood outside Grozny. “Chechnia 
has 25% of Russia’s oil refining capacity” (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 234). 
18 Technical Cooperation Department, The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), The FAO Component of the Inter-agency Consolidated Appeals 2005 (Rome: Emergency 
Operations and Rehabilitation Division, 2004), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5805e/y5805e06.htm#TopOfPage. 
19 Moshe Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 4. 
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movement.”20 The parallel economy became its own social mechanism and grew after 
rehabilitation to include smuggling, criminal gangs, and migrant work; by the late 1980s, 
“an estimated 40,000 Chechen and Ingush men were taking part each year in the 
unofficial labour migrations” and often spent time in prison for their violations.21 Prison 
time solidified criminal ties and also forged emergent Islamic connections outside of the 
Sufi network to begin weakening traditional social structures.  
As indicated previously, low levels of industrialization came to Grozny over time. 
All of it, however, was run by the Soviet government and primarily employed Russian 
workers; 95 percent of profits from resource extraction and industry fed the central Soviet 
budget.22 Benefits from land resources never made their way to the Chechen 
infrastructure or the population. Furthermore, because Chechens tried to regain their 
numbers after deportation without a backbone for growth and development, the nation 
could not support its growing population based on agricultural output. Unemployment 
and poverty became pervasive and the “labor surplus reached perhaps 100,000 to 
200,000, or 20-30% of the able-bodied population” by the First Chechen War.23 
After Chechen rehabilitation, a small minority of the population entered into the 
Soviet bureaucracy. The federal Soviet system allowed privileges to certain ethnic elites 
in return for public and military service. This enabled the Soviet Union to develop ethnic 
enclave networks across its competitive construct of ethno-territorial federalism. 
Institutionally, the Soviet Union maintained a hierarchy of ethnicities that gained 
different rights and benefits based on their status within the system. Certain ethnic 
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territories reached the level of an ASSR, an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, but 
not an SSR, a Union Republic or Soviet Socialist Republic. According to practice, one’s 
status was not absolutely static.  
[T]he borderline between the status of a ‘Union’ republic, which had the 
right ‘to leave’ the Union and that of an ‘autonomous’ republic, which had 
no such right, was never impassable. Kazakhstan was at first an autonomy 
within the Russian Federation; Moldova was once also an autonomy 
within Ukraine.24  
 
When infighting between the Soviet and Russian leadership began in the early 1990s and 
the Soviet state began to disintegrate, Chechnya had yet to attain the status of a Union 
Republic with the right to leave. At the time, President Mikhail Gorbachev led the Soviet 
Union while Boris Yeltsin led the Russian Republic within it.25  
Chechnya was of course part of the Russian SSR, also called the Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic or SFSR. As the Soviet Union fell apart, the regions that began to 
declare independence included the republics of Lithuania in March 1990 and Armenia in 
August. These two initial declarations were shortly followed by Georgia in April 1991; 
Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that 
August; Tajikistan in September; Turkmenistan in October; and Kazakhstan in 
December. Chechen political moves toward independence coincided with this timeline 
and hinged upon the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev, who became the first Chechen 
president.26 His leadership and that of other key Chechens within the Soviet system, in 
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conjunction with the Yeltsin–Gorbachev rivalry, “paralyzed the operations of government 
in Moscow and” contributed to Chechen separatism.27  
 Dudayev entered the political scene in Chechnya after a distinguished career in 
the Soviet Air Force; he was the first Chechen to make the rank of general officer.28 
Russian President Yeltsin hoped to gain Dudayev’s advocacy in order to secure Chechen 
support for his broader political campaign. Perhaps not so unlike his predecessors during 
the Russian Revolution, Yeltsin hoped to accrue the allegiance of various ethnic leaders 
within the Chechen administrative system for his own political goals. Consequently, 
Yeltsin initially supported Dudayev’s leadership progression within the Executive 
Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP), hoping to 
outmaneuver regional elites loyal to Gorbachev.  
A handful of Moscow-based Chechens within the emergent Vainakh Democratic 
Party led by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev formed the ANCCP in late November 1990. These 
individuals included aggressive nationalists, some with very little political experience, 
who split away from their membership within the region’s moderate and Soviet-
supported Popular Front, the Checheno-Ingushskii Narodnyi Front Sodeistviia 
Perestroike (ChINFSP). The ChINFSP had formed in the late 1980s to align with 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika and comprised intelligentsia and local 
Russians working on initiatives to protect Chechen religious freedom and culture, 
improve its political status within the Soviet system, and block future plans to establish a 
local biochemical plant.29  
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When the ANCCP first came together, it declared that the legitimacy of its 
representatives derived from local surveys distributed across Chechnya.30 Other sources 
suggest that delegates were “elected at village assemblies throughout Chechnya and from 
the Chechen diaspora in other parts of the Soviet Union.”31 From those efforts, 
approximately 1,000 delegates, including Dudayev as an invited guest, convened during 
the first congress meeting to publish a political agenda similar to that of the ChINFSP.32 
For example, the ANCCP approved measures to support “the Chechen language and 
culture, the Muslim religion, and restitution of their losses for those previously 
deported.”33 The ANCCP narrative, however,  
was more nationalist and radical than the ChINFSP, at least on two counts: 
first, it demanded that the Chechen-Ingush ASSR become an SSR (that is, 
a fully-fledged Union republic equal to and not part of the RSFSR). 
Second—and more important—it did not recognize the existing Soviet 
authorities of the republic.34 
 
In addition to defining political goals and a future agenda during the first ANCCP 
meeting, the founding leadership asked Dudayev to play a larger role in the future of the 
organization.35 
Therefore, after being elected as Chairman of the ANCCP in 1990, and with 
Yeltsin’s initial support, Dudayev spearheaded the Chechen national movement to 
dissolve the Chechen Supreme Soviet leadership and to derail Gorbachev’s parallel 
political efforts in the region. When the second national congress took place in July 1991, 
the ANCCP declared itself to be the sole legal organ of power in the new republic and 
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negated ties to the former soviet political structure. In August, while Yeltsin made his 
own moves against Gorbachev in Moscow, Dudayev further countered the legitimacy of 
existing Soviet political institutions locally.  
The ANCCP called for new elections, a general strike, and a mass-miting or “non-
stop demonstration in the central square of Groznyi which went on for several weeks.”36 
According to some interpretations, “leaders in Grozny began engineering demonstrations 
against the acting authorities… Participants in the Sheik Mansur Square demonstrations, 
for example, received up to 100 rubles a day” for participation.37 Organizers served food 
and supporters participated in traditional dances. In order to protect these activities from 
Soviet retaliation or response, Yeltsin and other Chechens within the Russian 
administration and police prevented the use of force against protestors.38 
By late August 1991, some demonstrators began to carry weapons and armed 
supporters seized government buildings, radio stations, and television stations. In 
September, Dudayev demanded the resignation of the regional Soviet elite and the 
establishment of a new provisional government.39 On September 2, the ANCCP declared 
from Grozny that the Supreme Soviet was overthrown and “handed over powers” to its 
executive committee.40 On September 6, the Grozny Supreme Soviet chairman was 
thrown from a window and killed after “the National Guard (whose ranks had swelled 
with released criminals) stormed the Supreme Soviet headquarters.”41 Dudayev 
commanded the National Guard during these activities; the ANCCP executive committee 
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had created the armed National Guard and made Dudayev its leader in 1990 when he 
became the executive committee chairman.42 “Later, when circumstances changed, 
Yeltsin would accuse Dudayev of seizing power by an ‘illegal coup d’état’; however, at 
the time he put pressure on the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR to 
dissolve.”43 By September 15, surrounded by the National Guard, the Soviet-led chamber 
conducted its last session and then dissolved.44  
The relationship between Yeltsin and Dudayev quickly soured when the Chechens 
disbanded the provisional council that was established to replace the Soviet system. 
Again, Dudayev used the National Guard to suspend the organization and occupy its 
building on October 5.45 On October 27, 1991, Chechnya held presidential and 
parliamentary elections. As the Russian Federation contested the election and declared it 
illegal, Chechen separatist rhetoric increased.46 Dudayev became the first president of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) on November 2 and proclaimed Chechen 
independence less than two months before the official breakup of the Soviet Union.47 
When Yeltsin declared a state of emergency on November 8, “Dudayev reciprocated by 
declaring martial law” and used the National Guard to take over the roads, 
communications, and the airport.48  
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Trenin and Malashenko offer an explanation of the declining relationship between 
the Russian and Chechen leadership. They describe that Dudayev supported Yeltsin’s 
August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev in Moscow. The initial ANCCP campaign 
against the “local apparatchiks” in Grozny should be considered in this light; the Chechen 
leader, however, became surprised and offended when “the victorious Yeltsinites 
continued ungratefully, to treat the NCCP with suspicion, regarding it as a stronghold of 
separatism. The Russian parliament refused to recognize the congress and supported 
instead” a provisional council composed of individuals they “considered to be old-guard 
nomenklatura” rather than leadership that would take Chechnya in a new direction.49 
“[T]he Chechen congress described this lack of support as a provocation ‘fraught with 
unpredictable consequences and fratricidal bloodshed.’”50 It impacted the unfolding of 
events that compelled the new Chechen government to fully separate from the Soviet 
Union and from Russia. 
According to Valery Tishkov, a member of the Russian governmental committee 
who worked to define a peace plan between Russia and Chechnya in 1995,  
The post-Soviet collective manifestation is an interesting anthropological 
phenomenon: it was not a political outpouring in the usual sense; rather, it 
was a demonstration of group solidarity, a liberated spirit, and a 
provocative militancy, all of it mobilized and directed by a small circle of 
activists.51  
 
Tishkov noted that the Chechen resistance within Grozny lacked an underlying 
“agreement on power-sharing” at the beginning of the insurgency throughout 
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participatory parties and the clans.52 Rather, it relied on the funding and leadership of the 
Muskovite Chechen elite to interfere with Soviet decision making and to support 
mobilization.  
Although Yeltsin began to deploy troops and threatened invasion, he was forced 
to rescind these units when the Russian parliament declined to support his actions and 
instead required a political approach. For example, on November 10, “600 Interior 
Ministry troops landed at the airport of Groznyi, where they were surrounded by vastly 
larger numbers of the National Guard and armed civilians.”53 Yeltsin remained limited to 
the Interior Ministry troops in November because he did not yet hold the authority to 
command the state Army, which still fell under Gorbachev’s jurisdiction.  
As previously mentioned, once the Soviet Union fell apart on December 26, 1991, 
a number of other autonomous republics rejected participation in the new Commonwealth 
of Independent States. Because the losses of the Baltic States and other territories were 
perceived to pose a greater security risk than Chechnya, and because of serious internal 
domestic challenges within Russia, Chechnya was able to act independently of Russia 
between 1991 and 1994. It adopted a new constitution in March 1992 that embraced 
religious freedom within a secular framework and for a short time appeared to move 
toward democratic political reform. Unfortunately for Chechnya, however, its territorial 
placement within the Caucasus represented a strategic crossroads along the Russian 
pipeline system and therefore would not be indefinitely overlooked.54 Knowledgeable of 
                                                          
52 Tishkov, Chechnya, 60. 
53 Gammer, The Lone Wolf, 203. 
54 There are additional explanations for why Russia moved to retake Chechnya. For example, some contend 
Yeltsin’s pride depended on it or that he needed to boost his popularity. Others suggest fear of a kind of 
domino theory that would set a bad precedent for other regions hoping to gain autonomy.  
179 
 
this situation, and because of Yeltsin’s subsequent behavior, Dudayev very quickly 
looked to consolidate a military capability.  
6.2.1 Relationships and Phasing of the Initial Chechen Resistance 
 With respect to the level of public support for Chechnya’s insurgency, clearly its 
people coalesced around the inequity and injustice done to them by Russia and the Soviet 
Union. Opposition to Russian rule became part of the Chechen social and psychological 
fabric over the course of three centuries. Even so, by the early 1990s and according to the 
phasing construct, public support for the insurgency only matured to levels between 
Phases 2 and 3. While fully assimilated to the idea of opposition to Russian rule, 
Chechens experienced limited opportunities to exercise acceptance and build institutional 
support for the new government. The nation still needed to develop community-
embedded coalitions at localized levels to support political and armed mobilization. 
Although hope existed that the new government and an emergent civil society would gain 
the opportunity to build these relationships, an agreement regarding the makeup and 
administration of a Chechen state between the clans, emergent political parties, and new 
state institutions never materialized.  
Much of the insurgency’s resistance activity through 1991 revolved around 
limited interdependent and competitive underground mechanisms rather than the 
development of unified constitutive forces or social institutions needed to support a 
state.55 As previously mentioned, 
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[t]o start with, the Chechens’ definition of independence (this included 
members of the [ANCCP] leadership) was a ‘negative’ one. In other 
words, to them, independence meant being left alone, living no more 
under the… Soviet authorities. None of them had a ‘positive’ definition of 
the independence they had declared. When asked how they envisioned 
their future relations with Russia, the answer was always ‘as they used to 
be’. No one thought in terms of border control, visas, a separate currency 
etc.56 
 
There are some indicators, however, that provide evidence of limited instances of higher 
levels of collective socio-political mobilization. 
For example, mobilization of the public in Grozny began in the late 1980s. Prior 
to the mass-miting called for by the ANCCP and other political parties such as the Greens 
and Islamists in August 1991, isolated citizen demonstrations occurred after glasnost 
brought broader freedom of expression to the media. In one case, a controversial article 
revealed that Russian practices within Chechen biochemical plants produced and 
disseminated lysine, posing a health hazard. “This information sparked revolt in the 
republic,” and mass demonstrations then demanded a “ban on the production of lysine.”57 
P. L. Dash suggests that, “[t]his was the genesis of confrontation between the Communist 
authorities and the democratic public.”58 Mass meetings in Grozny brought out leaders 
who eventually helped to form the ANCCP. Yandarbiev, a Chechen scholar and poet who 
became involved in the demonstration leadership, represents the quintessential example. 
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He founded the Vainakh Democratic Party and became the deputy chairman of the 
ANCCP in 1990.59 
A second example of higher levels of collective public organization came in the 
form of emerging political parties within Chechnya.  
By early 1992 more than 50 associations, movements, organized groups, 
and political parties were in existence in the erstwhile Chechen-Ingushh 
ASSR… At least twelve were exclusively Chechen… Only six of the total 
had a specifically Islamic character… At least eight other groups in 
addition to the Islamic Path Party called themselves parties or had 
characteristics of nascent political parties. These include: the Vainakh 
Democratic Party, the Daimokkh (Fatherland) Movement, the Movement 
for Democratic Reform, the Green Movement, the Popular Front, the 
Republican Party, the Justice Party, and the Chechen National Congress 
and its Executive Committee. The last-named organization, Dudaev’s 
governing group, functioned as a coalition which included several of the 
others (as well as the Islamic Path).60  
 
The majority of Chechen political parties became active around the same period after 
perestroika. Even so, public affinity for these organizations and the birth of a multiparty 
system supported by participatory interest groups proved nascent and ineffective as a 
mechanism to bind the public to the political system and create institutional ties to the 
intended constitutional government.  
In light of these limited steps toward state-like behavior, public participation 
within the emergent national political system remained immature. The layering between 
the clan system, local laws and customs, and the state remained ill-defined from a civic 
and political context and did not improve. With respect to public support for violent 
resistance on the other hand, hatred of the Russians and existing cultural institutions soon 
enabled the bureaucratization and organizational development of Chechen mechanisms to 
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drive increasing levels of collective violence. Local residents, for example, independently 
attacked various military installations to obtain access to weapons. This trend increased 
significantly over time and moved toward a combination of government and clan-led 
collective action.  
As early as 1992, Chechen forces began to capture former Soviet 
stockpiles in order to gain weapons and materiel. They also established 
relationships with Russian service members who were open to bribes and 
payment for weapons. In 1994, when Russian troops first entered 
Chechnya, mass demonstrations by civilians effectively delayed the 
advance of the tanks on their way to Grozny.61 
 
While the Chechen government focused on building units centered about Grozny, field 
commanders within the clan structures ran their own limited security capabilities in order 
to build locally based militias.  
With respect to the maturity of formal political mechanisms within the state, the 
Chechen insurgency quickly reached an apparent Phase 4 by 1991, except within the 
Northern Clans who resisted the new government from the outset. The appearance of 
enduring regional control, however, is misleading. Because the nature of the political 
takeover of Chechnya occurred more along the lines of a coup than a slow-growing 
political movement, and because existing Soviet institutional support for needed 
infrastructure very quickly vanished, the funding, processes, services, and organizations 
required to uphold and execute regional political administration did not exist.62 Similarly,  
[i]t is not surprising that the Soviet system did not produce large numbers 
of men with the political skills necessary to lead open societies, set 
rational priorities, bargain with interest groups and work to persuade 
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competing constituencies to recognize the necessity to compromise for the 
common good.63 
 
The Soviet system conditioned administration officials to obey and implement priorities 
from the centralized organization. 
So although on the surface the political system appeared to reach a regional level 
of control, its capability tended to the Phase 1 and Phase 2 levels of state maturity. Phase 
1 activity in terms of a political and administrative infrastructure remained in its infancy. 
More substantive Phase 2 activity would require further interconnectivity between local, 
regional, and national level jurisdictions that could eventually introduce a consistent rule 
of law and collect funding needed to drive the government in subsequent phases.64 For 
example, even though much of the Chechen economy existed in a realm parallel to the 
state, the consolidation of these activities within a licit system was absent from any 
political agenda at the time. A future Chechen state would need to further develop its 
political capacity to implement a system of taxation to get a handle on the economy—
both licit and illicit.  
With respect to the maturation of a military capability, Chechnya’s institutional 
forces remained in a Phase 2 and Phase 3 level of development at the time of 
independence. After the founding of the National Guard, Dudayev very quickly called for 
the establishment of the Chechen armed forces on November 10, 1991. By December 24, 
in order to develop an institutional defense capability, he 
introduced a law for the ‘Defence of the Chechen Republic.’ This law 
introduced mandatory military service for all male citizens of the republic 
aged 19-26… [It] placed under the disposal of the Chechen leadership the 
following units to carry out military missions: the president’s personal 
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guard of 30 to 50 men, two special purpose platoons of 50 men each, a 
detachment of the Islamic Path Party of 200 men, a headquarter defence 
platoon of 50 men, the border custom service regiment of 1,200 men, the 
mountain people’s quick response force of 100-150 men, and the Chechen 
national guard of 10,000 to 15,000 men.65  
 
Although the National Guard and mass demonstrations constituted a large enough force 
in 1991 to push out limited counterinsurgent forces, without funding mechanisms to pay 
state institutional elements of violence, the development of a state-led armed force would 
prove impossible. State forces would be kept to the defense of Grozny. 
So this begs the question, where did the vanguard exist with respect to the broader 
insurgency? If public support, political capability, and military capability all remained 
limited to attributes across Phases 1 through 3, what level of control and maturity did the 
vanguard wield to connect the actions and behaviors of these components? I argue that by 
the time Chechnya was able to declare independence in 1991, Dudayev’s vanguard still 
operated on a Phase 1 to Phase 2 level of maturity. For example, the core of the elite 
network had yet to come together and Dudayev had only just begun to define key 
selection and placement of the vanguard leadership—to gather the reigns of influence 
over Chechen political parties, the National Guard, the new legislature, and regional 
alliances.  
This status soon evolved. As Dudayev’s command base grew between December 
1991 and June 1992, he violated the new constitutional division of power across 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches and delegitimized the tripartite system. When 
the parliament attempted to hold a June 1992 referendum to limit Dudayev’s violations, 
the president directed armed soldiers to raid the “parliament building, killing several 
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opposition deputies and arresting others.”66 Dudayev took over the government and 
established full presidential control. Like Yeltsin in Russia, Dudayev “used tanks to 
disperse a defiant parliament.”67 He suppressed the emerging representative political 
system and drove political power away from moderate and secular state institutions 
within Grozny. He did so, however, without strengthening or solidifying the essence of 
his base. 
In terms of other phasing activities, Dudayev successfully directed small unit 
tactics executed by the National Guard and initiated a weeding out process regarding 
competition within the movement. Here he began primarily with the Popular Front 
reformists and then moved to the parties and leaders within the new Chechen 
government. Chechnya’s insurgent vanguard had yet to be tested since the insurgency 
exhibited such strong political origins.68 Many Phase 2 activities still sat on the horizon 
in terms of capturing the leadership of potential illicit networks, further identifying and 
weeding out emergent political competition, and securing international support.  
In order to strengthen the coordination between political and violent capabilities 
of a state, Dudayev needed to consolidate power and develop formal mechanisms of 
institutional control. Onsite international observers suggested in October 1992 that he 
lacked any visible inclination toward Islamic militancy and held Islamic fundamentalism 
did not pose a danger to Chechnya; given this assessment at the time, however, Dudayev 
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also indicated that Russian actions could change Chechnya’s path toward Islamic 
extremism.69 
6.3      Chechnya’s Insurgency Autonomy  
Once Chechnya declared independence in 1991, Yeltsin and the Russian 
legislature—even the Russian judicial system—acted in contradiction to one another until 
the large-scale Russian invasion of Chechnya began in 1994. For example, the Russian 
Federation legislature made several conciliatory overtures to bring Chechnya to the 
negotiating table. And after successful dialogue on legal, economic, and security issues in 
March 1992, Russian and Chechen representatives signed protocols recognizing Chechen 
political independence and state sovereignty.70 Yeltsin, on the other hand, never accepted 
the Chechen claim of independence and worked against Dudayev in many ways.  
First, in 1991, the Russian president severed financial and economic ties and 
imposed a blockade on Chechnya, arguing that their new political and economic 
infrastructure would fail. In response, the Chechen government formed its own currency 
that Russian banks quickly rejected. Second, Yeltsin sent Russian forces into Chechnya 
to expel the new government at least five times. Each coup traced directly to Yeltsin’s 
office and the Russian Intelligence Service that leveraged conventional troops to conduct 
direct action missions.71 Third, Yeltsin dissolved the Russian Constitutional Court that 
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ruled his actions against Chechnya were criminal and illegal. And finally, he also worked 
to implement a new constitution, eventually signed in December 1993, which negated 
any previously negotiated rights of constituent republics like Chechnya. 
Chechnya’s limited and rudimentary political and economic institutions and 
bureaucracy deteriorated without funding. “Formal institutions were replaced by informal 
family and clan ties, the only instrument available to ensure socially enforceable 
commitments, safety and the sharing of resources.”72 The traditional substate economy 
based on informal networks within the region rapidly expanded to further encompass 
criminal networks often sponsored by Russian elites who benefited from the unregulated 
economy.73 “The expansion of the black market put legal governance and the 
development of the rule of law in direct competition with the interests of local power 
brokers who divided control over political authority and resource flows.”74 The Russian 
blockade and subsequent black market activities polarized clan interests while Yeltsin 
bred both infighting and opposition to Dudayev by targeting specific clans for Russian 
support as early as 1991.75  
                                                          
72 Glinkina and Rosenberg, “Socioeconomic Roots,” 519. 
73 Activity requiring partnerships across and outside Chechen territory included “racketeering, money 
laundering, smuggling, criminal privatization, intentional bankruptcy, fraudulent securities, counterfeiting, 
unfair competition, illegal trade, tax crimes, etc” (Glinkina and Rosenberg, “Socioeconomic Roots,” 517–
20). Three of the largest gangs in Russia came from Chechnya: the Tsentralnaya, Avtomobilnaya, and one 
based in Ostankino; “[t]he number of members in these gangs was estimated at over two thousand, and they 
were feared both for their cruelty and their sophistication. They had intelligence as well as legal 
departments, they bribed officials on a massive scaled, and they maintained international connections with 
many countries” in support of the Chechen war effort and to expand their businesses. Walter Laqueur, The 
New Terrorism, Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
220–21. 
74 Glinkina and Rosenberg, “Socioeconomic Roots,” quoted in Nix and Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 
1991–2002,” 494. 
75 In “Chechnia” (footnote 16, p. 236), Szajkowski cites a Guardian article (Andrew Harding, “Chechens 
Run Out of Time and Money,” The Guardian, September 15, 1994, 12) that discusses a leader and former 
Red Army officer in the northern Terkh-hu clan who claimed to have received around 10 billion rubles 
from the Russian government. Szajkowski writes: “Russia has supplied technical expertise and advice, but 
not, Avturkhanov insisted direct military aid.” 
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To reiterate themes introduced in the last section, although the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union enabled the potential for self-determination and democratic governance in 
Chechnya, Chechen political leadership lacked experienced elites and the infrastructure 
to mobilize its constituency for state institutional reform. Even though the first Chechen 
Constitution called for democracy and a liberal rule of law, when Russian state services 
disappeared and the Chechen economy crumbled, “Dudayev disbanded the state’s formal 
political opposition, empowered new corrupt elites who appropriated the republic’s 
natural resources for personal gain, and turned to narrow religious appeals in order to 
garner domestic support and attract financial resources from abroad.”76 In a very short 
time, Chechnya lost its window of opportunity for meaningful state building. Dudayev 
fundamentally altered the initial relationship framework that started the early insurgency 
and directly impacted phasing maturity. 
For example, Dudayev’s break with the Chechen constitutional construct spurred 
internal resistance to his leadership within the movement and contributed to some 
Russian success. Leaders such as Ruslan Labazanov, Yaragi Mamodayev, and Beslan 
Labazanov, who had originally joined Dudayev’s movement in 1992, switched sides to 
unite with a pro-Moscow opposition when Dudayev dismissed parliament in the spring of 
1993.77 As a result of this defection, Yeltsin supported a small northern coalition of 
Chechen warlords who might serve as proxies to overthrow Dudayev. These leaders 
“demanded a referendum on independence, accusing Dudayev of having usurped power 
and of violating the Chechen constitution.”78 Russia contributed financially and through 
military aid to the development of their “pro-Moscow” provisional committee headed by 
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(Umar) Avturkhanov, an elected mayor within the northern Nadterechny district; for 
example, in June 1994, Yeltsin supplied Avturkhanov “40 billion rubles in cash, besides a 
fleet of 70 tanks and combat gunships with crew.”79 Russian support to the resistance at 
this time, however, did not deter Dudayev’s forces, who defeated the opposition at 
Argun, just East of Grozny, in November 1994.80 
Fighting on this scale required a significant increase in Chechen military 
capabilities. Between 1991 and 1994, except for within those northern regions that 
aligned with Russia, Dudayev officially divided the Chechen security apparatus into areas 
of command based on clan structure as ground units began to emerge there anyway. This 
represents an additional major change to the framework. Dudayev repeatedly appeared to 
turn toward expedient options to consolidate a united front focused principally on 
building the Chechen capacity for violent resistance and empower clan independence at 
the expense of a central insurgent authority.  
Where others might have turned toward international political and military 
support for independence, Dudayev would not find international validation of secession 
because it countered Russian interests as a United Nations Security Council member.81 
The conflict occurred too close to Russia for the West to intervene as it did in places such 
as Kosovo, stressing already the new relationship between Russia and the West. 
Therefore, while the dissolution of legislative and judicial institutions prevented the 
establishment of an effective central government, moving both political and military 
authority to regional field commanders pushed the country toward decentralized 
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warlordism.82 At the same time, however, it also strengthened the Chechen capacity for 
military resistance to Russian forces.  
In a related effort to gain military capability, by 1993 Dudayev began to make 
direct appeals to Islamic organizations—both to support the insurgency and to serve in 
his political administration.83 Unable to secure the development of a conventionally 
aligned national army through internal assets and public support, he turned to external 
donors in the realm of funding and training. At the outset, the psychological narrative of 
Sunni extremism did not threaten or detract from public support to Russian resistance. 
Over time, however, it intertwined with portions of the armed resistance, particularly 
outside of Grozny, and became central to the armed component’s psychological narrative.  
It is unclear whether Dudayev understood the future implications of his decisions 
in this respect. The official transformation of insurgent goals and motivations to align 
with Sunni extremism proved polarizing and yielded two very different violent 
mechanisms within the broader Chechen movement—both among the elite and between 
the vanguard and the population. When Russian troops focused on the destruction of 
Chechnya’s moderately aligned national forces that defended Grozny, it left the strength 
of the political and military mechanisms within Chechnya to increasingly radical 
warlords—or to those warlords dependent on external resources provided by the radical 
transnational network and organized crime. 
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Radical extremism carried a higher payoff to Dudayev’s resistance than did the 
regional Sufi ideology, so much so that it entered a place within the vanguard and the 
new formal mechanisms of politics and violence within Chechnya. Recall this violates 
Mao’s principal rule regarding the purity of the vanguard and its subsequent ability to 
control the movement. Because the vanguard started at such low levels of capability 
regarding initial phasing requirements, its elite network remained in flux without a 
positive agenda or sense of constitutive identity. By adding a new psychologically based 
element into the infrastructure, the Sunni agenda began to dominate the mindset and 
patterns of behavior of the Chechen insurgent leadership. 
The initial introduction of Sunni extremism into the region began closely before 
Chechen independence as a result of conflict just outside of Chechnya. Although it 
fragmented when the Soviet Union collapsed, the first fundamental Sunni (as opposed to 
Sufi) political party emerged within the North Caucasus in 1990.84 The Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP) aligned ideologically with the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Pakistani Jama’at-I Islami. The IRP established connections between the resistance and 
Islamist groups in the Middle East and began to advocate for the establishment of a 
Northern Caucasus caliphate to unify regional Islamic populations under fundamental 
Salafi and Wahhabi principles.85  
The localized Chechen practice of Islam conflicted with Wahhabism because the 
Caucasus traditions merged pre-Islamic cultural tradition with a more mystical form of 
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Sufism. Chechen Sufi leadership at the time also eschewed overt political power. When 
two Chechen Sufi leaders declined to participate in Dudayev’s administration and Sufi 
orders refrained from supporting Dudayev’s policies, they were labeled traitors and 
infidels by the state apparatus. Soon after, Islamic organizations outside Chechnya began 
to answer Dudayev’s calls and a network of Arab financiers and facilitators connected the 
insurgency to transnational opportunities for support. “Initial alliances between emerging 
indigenous Salafists and their Middle Eastern counterparts at this critical historical 
juncture were one of the key enablers that opened up the region to foreign fighters.”86 
Because Chechen society rejected large numbers of outside fighters, those foreign 
militants who did participate often held strategic positions within the movement.  
In addition, Chechens returning from the diaspora to fight for an independent 
homeland provided an important connection between the insurgency and Sunni 
radicalization. Throughout the nineteenth century, thousands of Chechens moved to 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan and participated in Arab struggles against Russia as 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo.87 For example, Khabib Ali 
Fathi, a long-standing member of the Muslim Brotherhood who fought in Afghanistan, 
returned to Chechnya in 1993.  
In conjunction with local Islamists, [Fathi] established a Salafi Islamic 
jamaat known in Islamist circles as al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya. Capitalizing 
on his Chechen ancestry, Fathi organized his group and began da’wa 
(literally “the call,” but more accurately proselytizing) among the Chechen 
population in alliance with a small number of Jordanian-Chechens, 
quickly creating a following numbering around ninety.88 
 
                                                          





Fathi provided Dudayev access to funding channels and recruitment. During the first 
Chechen War, Dudayev appointed him principal Chechen religious adviser. “By 1995, 
approximately fifty hand-selected Arab fighters with Wahhabi allegiances were paired 
with Chechen field commanders under the leadership of Omar Ibn al-Khattab.”89 Khattab 
was Fathi’s foremost recruit from Saudi Arabia, arriving in Chechnya in 1995. He trained 
Chechen forces in guerrilla warfare and would later impact the movement’s transition to 
terrorism. At the outset of the First Chechen War, Khattab’s units sat subordinate to the 
Chechen Armed Forces.90 
Besides Fathi, Khattab, and Yandarbiev, other key leaders became prominent 
within the vanguard movement after 1991. For example, Aslan Maskhadov, a retired 
Soviet Army colonel, joined the Chechen resistance in 1992 and became Dudayev’s 
military deputy, leading the Chechen defense forces as well as the defense of Grozny 
during the First Chechen War.91 Maskhadov represented a moderate force within the 
insurgency and resisted radicalization of the national movement.92 Shamil Basayev, on 
the other hand, became a force toward Sunni radicalization and served in Dudayev’s 
administration and as a field commander. Also a former Russian military member, 
Basayev held extensive special operations and intelligence experience in Russian 
conflicts against Georgia and Moldova.93 The specific pairing of Basayev and Khattab 
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became of great import to the direction of the Chechen vanguard after the Dudayev’s 
death in 1996.94  
All in all, the three-year lull between the declaration of Chechen independence 
and the invasion of Russian troops saw a consolidation of power from the vanguard 
through the growth of violent mechanisms. Interlinked armed clans and emerging state-
run forces exhibited increasing levels of phasing maturity in this area and will be 
explored in the following section. Dudayev supported expansive regional security 
interests and accomplished inconsistent Phase 2 and Phase 3 activities required of the 
vanguard. For example, he attracted international support from Sunni Islam and directed 
the development of insurgent guerilla and mobile units. On the other hand, Dudayev 
skipped essential components needed to handle and maintain leadership of the 
insurgency’s growing mechanisms of violence. He could not control the momentum of 
compounding illicit networks or establish purity within the core of the vanguard. His 
actions instead began to breed internal competition among the vanguard leadership.  
Additionally, any thought of an independent state political institution 
disintegrated in subordination to Chechnya’s preparations for combat. Thus the Chechen 
political institutional maturity fell to Phase 0 levels. While much of the public mobilized 
to fight, political and economic institutions fell into further disarray. In this way, the 
relationship framework proved uneven between constitutive and destructive mechanisms. 
Public support to political mobilization shifted toward a Phase 0 status while support to 
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military mobilization moved across Phases 1 through 4 depending on the geographic 
area.  
Yeltsin’s own actions and coup attempts spurred Dudayev to consolidate military 
power at the expense of other requirements for state building, both politically and across 
the civil sector. Some sources describe Dudayev’s building paranoia of attack from 
Yeltsin. Others reference a military-oriented vice politically focused background and 
capability.  
Dudayev has done little to consolidate Chechen statehood and has been 
very slow to implement economic reform. His military background has not 
equipped him to develop a clear concept of political leadership or an 
understanding of the complexities of forging a democratic government. He 
has gathered a small clique of followers around him and governs 
arbitrarily and secretively. As a result he has fallen increasingly under the 
influence of corrupt “mafia” types and political adventurers.95 
 
Not only did the lack of resources hinder constitutive decision making, but the vanguard 
influenced and limited political growth and the development of state-level institutions. It 
simply couldn’t scale.  
6.4      The First Chechen War and Its Aftermath 
One hypothesis for Russia’s invasion in 1994 argues that Yeltsin initiated a large-
scale attack in order to “forestall any parliamentary investigation of the previous five 
failed coups undertaken by the government.”96 The last of these occurred in late 
November 1994 when a small contingent of troops attempted to capture Grozny. After 
the fiasco, the Kremlin was presented with a choice between another “ignominious retreat 
and a decisive military intervention”; consequently, on December 11, Russian federal 
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forces commenced the war’s first air campaign followed by the commitment of ground 
troops.97  
The First Chechen War thus began with an attempt to take Grozny and included 
indiscriminate “air and ground strikes on villages, targeting civilian infrastructure such as 
residences and hospitals, not allowing civilians to leave, shooting at fleeing civilians, 
establishing filtration centers, and taking hostages.”98 Between Dudayev’s control of 
military assets around the capital and the armed mobilization established across the clans, 
the insurgency exhibited Phase 3 and limited Phase 4 capabilities of violent resistance. 
Both guerrilla warfare and low-level conventional tactics focused on traditional military 
targets at the outset. Chechens used former Soviet stockpiles and weaponry against 
Russian forces, shooting down air platforms with surface-to-air missiles and conducting 
low-level assaults and frequent night raids.99 “In addition to small arms, the rebel arsenal 
included truck-mounted multibarrel Grad rocket launchers, a handful of T-72 and T-62 
tanks, BTR-70s, some self-propelled assault guns as well as anti-tank cannon, and some 
portable anti-aircraft missiles.”100 More knowledgeable than the Russians on local 
avenues of approach and transportation infrastructure, Chechens ambushed these routes 
and frequently employed snipers on Russian targets. Some accounts indicate that the 
number of well-armed Chechen forces “did not exceed three or four thousand.”101 
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Eventually, however, Russian forces adapted to urban tactical requirements and 
the number of troops in Chechnya increased to “30,000 by February of 1995, with 
significant concentration near Grozny.”102 By late April, when Russian forces pushed 
Chechen fighters out of Grozny and into traditional southern mountain strongholds, 
Chechen capabilities degraded to Phase 2 and Phase 3 levels.103 Many descriptions 
compare the boyeviki, or guerrilla-style forces that replaced the rank-and-file troops. 
Chechens from Grozny, for example, referred to the highland forces as scoundrels and 
criminals, or “renegades, idlers, and parasites” who often had as little compunction as 
Russian forces for killing city civilians.104 Distinctions between the regular city forces 
and the methods of the field commanders are pronounced and highlight cultural 
distinctions between highland and lowland Chechens. The lowland Chechens represented 
the urban population while the highland Chechens conformed to isolated clan identities 
and evolving affinities. 
Once Russia compromised the integrity of Grozny’s national defense force and 
drove the resistance into the highlands, Chechen tactics changed dramatically and 
incorporated the use of terrorism against Russians within Chechnya and across the 
border. First, on June 14, 1995, Chechen troops led by Basayev killed 150 civilians when 
they seized two bank buildings, a local hospital, and an administrative center in the 
border town of Budennovsk. Insurgents captured over 1,500 hostages and “promised that 
the hostages would be released if the Russians agreed to cease hostilities in Chechnya and 
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withdraw their forces from the region.”105 Ultimately, after a standoff with Russian forces 
and rounds of failed negotiations, Basayev’s forces returned to Chechnya, building some 
momentum for the resistance and a case for the efficacy of future terrorist tactics. 
By the end of 1995, a small group of Chechen fighters assaulted Gudernes, 
Chechnya’s second largest city, through control of transportation nodes and attacks on 
key command points. The Gudernes attack reached a stalemate after two weeks of 
fighting. Then in March 1996, Basayev’s guerrilla forces made a similar trial run on 
Grozny that lasted five days. Finally that August, Chechens made coordinated attacks on  
Grozny, Argun and Gudermes while Russian and Chechen officials 
negotiated to end the conflict. In Grozny, rebel troops began infiltrating 
the city a few days in advance. On the morning of August 6, two 50- to 
60-man units captured the railroad station and other facilities and began 
moving toward the center of town. Estimates of the Basaev-led force were 
on the order of 600 guerrillas… The rebels succeeded in doing what the 
Russians had failed to do a year and a half before: they sealed off the three 
main avenues of approach into Grozny, restricting Russia’s ability to 
reinforce.106 
 
Russian troops were unprepared and responded both slowly and poorly for numerous 
reasons.107  
Following two weeks of fighting, roughly 2,000 Russian soldiers were dead, 
missing, or wounded; “[w]hen the battle finally ended, it was not with a military victory, 
but a cease-fire agreement finalized by negotiators Aleksandr Lebed and Maskhadov on 
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August 22.”108 (Dudayev died in April from a Russian air-to-ground missile and was 
temporarily succeeded by Yandarbiyev.) After two years of hostilities, both Chechens 
and Russians stood stunned at the emergent result.109 Although the Chechens did not win, 
they also did not lose. The question would become whether or not the insurgency could 
recover from the devastating toll of the war to build constitutive mechanisms of a state. 
Chechnya had lost roughly 10 percent of its population to death and 30–40 percent as 
refugees; this means the region went from hosting 1,000,000 residents before the war to 
500,000 to 600,000 after the cease-fire.110 The counterinsurgents decimated the Chechen 
population. On the Russian side, figures indicated “more than 25,000 [were] killed, 
wounded and missing in action.”111 The Russian government needed to reframe the war 
in the minds of its own population and redirect its capabilities in the future to better 
handle the Chechen problem. The cease-fire agreements gave both sides an opportunity 
to make new moves regarding the conflict. 
Specifically, the August 1996 Khasav Yurt agreement and the Moscow peace 
accord of May 1997 left the status of Chechnya open to future negotiation for the next 
five years and established some expectation of aid from Russia to help rebuild the 
infrastructure and agriculture it destroyed. According to Khasav Yurt, by October 1996, 
the Russian government would work toward “the reconstruction of currency, fiscal and 
budgetary mutual relations,” as well as initiate programs “for the rebuilding of the socio-
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economic infrastructure of the Chechen Republic.”112 Similarly, according to the 
Moscow peace accord, both sides agreed to “reject forever the use of force or threat of 
force in resolving all matters of dispute” between them.113  
Contrary to written agreements, however, what followed after the cease-fire 
included further efforts by Russia to hasten the failure of the Chechen resistance. First, 
Moscow immediately reorganized its military doctrine and began to train and exercise 
troops for a follow-on military engagement within a Chechen operating environment.114 
Second, it continued to identify future proxy leadership that would support a pro-Moscow 
agenda. And third, aid to the recovering territory never came. Instead, subversive black 
market activity continued to thrive and grow. For example, local warlords associated with 
criminal Islamic networks supported narcotic production in many highland and foothill 
districts. A culture of hostage-taking also greatly intensified. Although the practice 
started to build during the first war, it “developed into a branch of Chechnya’s economy” 
during the interwar period and generated “tens of millions of dollars” to purchase modern 
arms for the insurgency.115  
 Although the cessation of hostilities opened up a window for state building, by 
August 1996, Grozny and the other former city centers in Chechnya sat decimated and 
incapable of self-sustainment. “Unwilling to relinquish their power,” independent field 
commanders controlled the highlands and divided Chechnya’s territory between 
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themselves.116 And the relationship between the Chechen people, the vanguard, and the 
insurgency’s political and violent mechanisms continued to decline. Observers note that  
[t]he end of the war was followed by apathy and internal division, rather 
than the expected enthusiasm and solidarity. The split could be seen in 
several directions: between the commanders and the rank and file, the war 
veterans and the new recruits, the highland (red-haired) and lowland (city) 
Chechens.117  
 
The manifestation of decline escalated across the relationship framework and the phasing 
construct.  
For example, the political organization and associated public mobilization in 
support of a Chechen state that had begun to fail before the war degraded even further 
after the cease-fire. During the fighting, Grozny underwent months of heavy shelling and 
bombardment.  
The “national revolution” also shattered the foundations of the civic 
system and its former political frameworks. Many new political parties 
and assorted public organizations emerged, few with real influence and 
few with outstanding leaders. During the three years following the war, 
Chechnya had few civil institutions. Many of their enterprises and 
organizations had disintegrated, leaving the military and religious-political 
groupings as the dominant actors. Various internal Chechen conflicts, 
including clan tensions and clashes between mafia groups, emerged or 
were revived. The new society, so thoroughly dominated by the armed 
segment of the population, amazed even many Chechen observers.118 
 
For example, when Maskhadov won the January 1997 elections, defeating both Basayev 
and acting President Yandarbiev, the vanguard of the insurgency split between moderate 
nationalists and leaders espousing radical Sunni rhetoric. Basayev initially became 
Maskhadov’s prime minister but resigned by June 1998 and separately united the field 
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commanders against the president. The substantive political mechanisms fell to Phase 0-1 
even though elections occurred.  
Warlords coerced and threated the administration in Grozny in order to control the 
evolving political process. Basayev and Khattab, for example, held Maskhadov at 
gunpoint to gain seats on the State Defense Council.119 Basayev also formed separate 
regional political and military organizations with an agenda to unite Dagestan and 
Chechnya under an Imamate like Shaykh Shamil.120  
Basayev, for his part, established and led the ‘Congress of the Peoples of 
Daghestan and Ichkeria’, the declared goal of which was to unite ‘the 
Muslim peoples of Daghestan and Chechnya in one free state’ and by that 
achieve ‘peace and stability in the region’ (ITAR-TASS, 26 April; 
Kommersant-Daily, 28 April 1998). For that purpose the Congress 
established a ‘Peacekeeping Brigade’, which in July 1998 conducted 
maneuvers near the Daghestani border (Interfax, 6 July 1998).121 
 
Maskhadov couldn’t control his own decision-making body let alone the actions of the 
field commanders. But because he needed their resources to run the government and 
rebuild a national defense force, he vacillated between cracking down on them and 
including them in decision making. This behavior led to retaliation against him to include 
assassination attempts and an offensive campaign.122  
Therefore, even though Maskhadov won Chechnya’s presidential elections, a 
unified insurgent leadership became untenable without an imminent Russian threat. 
Maskhadov lost legitimacy in the eyes of the independent field commanders. He also lost 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian government because he could not manage the 
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warlords and failed to “comply with stipulations of the 1996 cease fire agreement.”123 
Maskhadov had no mechanism through which he could funnel public support, “solve 
economic problems, rebuild a state structure and maintain order.”124 The relationship 
framework stood broken in terms of its ability to constitute a functioning state. Moreover, 
a new competing insurgent organization now existed in the form of a radical regional 
Sunni network capable of conducting Phase 2 and Phase 3 violent operations. The 
disparate and competing command structure drove the activity that spurred the Second 
Chechen War and continued through Maskhadov’s death in 2005.125 
6.5     The Second Chechen War and Beyond 
In August 1999, Basayev and Khattab led an armed incursion into Dagestan to 
support their new movement against Russian authorities there. At the time, Vladimir 
Putin came to power within Moscow and fully replaced Yeltsin that December. 
“Moscow, with a new leader now in the Kremlin, reacted with a full-scale military 
operation, with the intention of taking control of the country, deposing the Maskhadov 
regime and re-annexing it to the Russian Federation.”126 From the Russian perspective, 
the engagement in Chechnya served to oust a radical Islamist network and afforded an 
increase in terror and brutality to the Russian response.  
At the beginning of the second war, Putin mobilized 93,000 troops in comparison 
to the 40,000 that Yeltsin employed during the First Chechen War. Although Russia still 
                                                          
123 Miriam Lanskoy, “Daghestan and Chechnya: The Wahhabi Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the 
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could not defeat the terrorist and guerrilla networks hiding within the population and 
within the highlands, it mobilized a force large enough that the Chechens could not 
further their military capability. Putin’s overwhelming commitment of forces against the 
Chechen mechanisms of violence led to the capture of Grozny by February 2000.127 Full-
scale operations after that moved systematically through the periphery to subdue the 
remainder of Chechnya’s towns and villages. Similar to the First Chechen War, Russia 
and Chechnya entered into a kind of stasis.  
By 2002, Grozny was described as a “lunar landscape” where Russian forces 
ruled the day and guerrilla resistance forces worked best at night from bases within the 
highlands.128 The insurgent military capability hovered between Phase 2 and Phase 3 
levels. While terrorism and guerrilla activity from the highlands remained steady, 
terrorist systems became more instantiated. For example, Basayev’s organization 
systematically incorporated the use of women suicide bombers by the end of the interwar 
period. It recruited “Black Widows” into local terrorist camps from an immense 
population of women who had lost husbands and family members.129 The psychological 
rhetoric of terrorism became more pervasive within Chechnya overall. “Many Chechen 
widows have been convinced by separatists that they have become burdens and that the 
loss of their husband was a punishment for their sins.”130 Accounts discuss methods of 
brainwashing and coercion, possibly even drugging of female recruits.  
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In terms of counterinsurgent options regarding targetable areas of an insurgency, 
the relationship framework provides clarity on the effects of Russian behavior and the 
insurgency’s ability to advance toward a mature national regime. In order to scale, an 
insurgency must be able to constitute a viable political mechanism that gains support of 
its public through fear or free will. Because any growth of a Chechen military force 
would come from the population, and because Russian forces did not differentiate 
between civilians and guerrillas, Putin devastated its civilian population and focused 
heavily on the suppression of noncombatants.131 “Russian planes bombed dams, bridges 
and oil wells, and it rapidly became clear that the civilian population was the real target 
of the ‘anti-terrorist’ operation.”132 Filtration camps systematically tortured civilians, and 
firebombing tactics against villages killed numerous men, women, and children. For the 
majority of the nation, Phase 1 support to the insurgency became the standard through 
harsh violence and fear.  
Putin then selected Akhmad Kadyrov as Russia’s proxy and empowered him to 
take control of legitimate political institutions. Activity in Chechnya to support this effort 
coincided with Putin’s takeover of media outlets and a “clampdown on dissent and civil 
liberties in Russia.”133 His transformation of Russia back into an autocratic regime 
included Chechnya under the same umbrella. He chose Kadyrov because the religious 
leader had been the Chief Mufti of the Chechen revolution during the 1990s. Putin 
needed an Islamic center of power to counter the Wahhabi allure and reinvigorate cultural 
lines of power.  
                                                          
131 Unlike Syria, where numerous foreign fighters participate both in the Syrian Civil War and in ISIL/ISIS, 
Chechnya hosts a different operating environment.  
132 Wood, Chechnya, 99.  
133 Ibid., 111. 
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Once counterinsurgent forces achieved a stalemate in 2002, Russia began to build 
a political institutional footprint within Chechnya and to subvert the insurgency’s broken 
political mechanism. The activity crippled Chechnya’s relationship framework 
dependencies by negating and replacing its capability to administer or control a 
substantive formal political line of effort connected to its citizenry. It of course used 
violence to back up the proxy political apparatus. Beginning in 2003, Chechens officially 
began to vote through elections and referenda.134 This drove a wedge between the 
population and the insurgency’s constitutive capability.  
Through these actions, Moscow delegitimized Maskhadov’s political status. For 
example, 
In March 2003, a referendum was held on a new made-in-Moscow 
constitution that declared Chechnya to be part of the Russian Federation. It 
was duly approved by a thunderous 96 per cent, though the vast majority 
of ordinary Chechens stayed away from the polls. In another rigged ballot 
in October 2003 – in which 30,000 occupying troops were eligible to vote 
– Kadyrov was elected president with a supposed 83 per cent of the vote. 
In practical terms, operations were increasingly put into the hands of 
Kadyrov’s private army, run by his son Ramzan, who rapidly acquired a 
reputation for psychotic brutality. Now it would be the Chechens 
themselves who would be tasked with crushing pro-independence 
forces.135  
 
Ramzan became head of the Chechen Republic when his father died in May 2004 and his 
forces “incorporated into the Russian Interior Ministry’s structures,” thereby legitimizing 
their violent behavior within the formal state mechanism.136 Following this, a fully pro-
                                                          
134 Ibid., 161. John Dunlop indicates that any support for the Russian-designed constitution sent a message 
to Russia to leave Chechnya in peace. Ninety percent of Chechens did not even know the content of the 
document. 
135 Wood, Chechnya, 104. Wood references Tanya Lokshina, ed., Imposition of a Fake Political Settlement 
in the Northern Caucasus: The 2003 Chechen Presidential Election (Stuttgart, Germany: ibidem-Verlag, 
2005), 16, 36–37.  
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Russian parliament came to power under conditions of very low voter turnout in the 
November 2005 elections.137  
 Besides using violence, Russia and Kadyrov tried to attract support as well. 
Citizens and field commanders who agreed to support Russian interests received perks 
and benefits. For example, certain former separatists who switched allegiances also 
incorporated into the formal force structure. By 2005, the new United Russia party 
provided card-carrying members with career and education benefits as well as “health 
benefits and salaries unavailable to the general populace.”138 Card holders were also 
promised safe passage and immunity from abduction.139 The major motivation behind 
Chechen compliance, even given some small positive incentives, remained violence and 
fear. Kadyrov’s regime continued corrupt practices of torture and abduction without 
impunity; enforced a practice of tribute to his clan; and set up a parallel penal system.140 
 Without a political rudder, the Chechen vanguard continued to grow further apart 
from the mainstream public. Its leadership could no longer turn to the broader population 
to mobilize or arm a force for mass violent resistance. Although inefficient and poorly 
executed, Russian conventional operations reduced the Chechen vanguard to Phase 1 to 
Phase 3 activities solely focused on destructive mechanisms. After the second Russian 
invasion, Maskhadov rejoined Basayev to lead guerrilla forces and direct the war as he 
had done between 1994 and 1996. Although he called for cease-fires and negotiations, 
open video indicated his participation in terrorist activities that marred his moderate 
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identity. During the war, the schism between him and the field commanders became 
subordinate to the need to survive. Throughout the second war and beyond, Russian 
targeting of the elite continued to impact the growth and operations of the vanguard 
leadership. “Aping the Israelis’ approach to Hamas, Russia has repeatedly resorted to 
targeted assassination, notably with the killing of former president Yandarbiev in Qatar 
by car bomb in February 2004”; they also killed Maskhadov in March 2005.141  
6.6 Chechnya Today and Concluding Thoughts 
 Unable to reacquire legitimacy, the insurgency’s state-level political apparatus 
never regained support from what remained of the broader population. Even in 2006, 
Russia continued “to maintain an enormous military and police presence in Chechnya: 
the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) [had] 80,000 troops 
stationed there, while the FSB [had] a force numbering up to 20,000.”142 After 2006, 
Putin continued to funnel resources for the development of political and military 
infrastructure to his proxy Ramzan Kadyrov. As Kadyrov further consolidated power, 
Putin transitioned counterterrorism efforts to him so that by 2009, operational leadership 
fully transferred from Russia to Chechen-led administrators.  
From the insurgent perspective, after the Second Chechen War, terrorism 
continued to thrive with the support of criminal and Wahhabi financing. “The succession 
of leaders from Dudaev onwards – Yandarbiev, Maskhadov, Sadulaev, Umarov – reveals 
an oscillation between the rhetorical poles of nationalism and Islam that” uncovered deep 
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persistent cleavages within the movement.143 In October 2007, the insurgency 
transitioned its goals to the exportation of radical Islam rather than solely Chechen 
independence; the change elicited a backlash within the wider Chechen resistance 
movement and effectively signaled “the end of the independence project under the banner 
of the Chechen Republic.”144 Today’s Chechen insurgents still claim to represent the 
Chechen population and that of others within the Caucasus, but they have become part of 
a broader transnational movement that uses the region as a home base to keep up their 
capability to attack Russian interests.  
Today, routine counterterrorism purges from regional bases across Chechnya 
continue, sometimes led by Kadyrov personally. Larger pushes that include greater 
Russian involvement support security for high-visibility events like the Sochi 
Olympics.145 Kadyrov’s administration is described by its similarities to “life under Stalin 
in the 1930s”; his forces frequently abduct and murder with impunity.146 The difference 
is that he has attempted to take on the mantel of religious legitimacy as way to appeal to 
cultural and clan law. For example, in order to resist the Wahhabi attraction, Kadyrov 
built a $20 billion mosque in the center of Grozny. And although transnational organized 
crime runs throughout the territory, much of it is led by Putin and Kadyrov supporters. 
Ultimately, public support continues at Phase 0 and Phase 1 levels. Political mechanisms 
remain at Phase 0 levels; and both vanguard and violent mechanisms sit between Phase 0 
and Phase 2. But the increase in capability here is due to the presence of external support. 
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Table 6.2 illustrates the macro changes across the relationship framework within 
the Chechen insurgency by phase. It accompanies the narrative provided by the chapter 
and begins to illustrate the limitations of scale based on the relational dependencies. 
Although the insurgency briefly reached certain attributes within the Phase 4 category 
regarding violence,  
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Table 6.2 Chechen Insurgency Maturity by Phase 
because it could never build momentum within the other categories, it degraded back to 
lower levels of capability. Conversely, once Putin entered the scene, Russian behavior 
directly countered the very same levers of the relationship framework. It successfully 
countered the movement by uniting political and violent mechanisms tied to networks of 
cultural and religious power in Chechnya. 
The next chapter will illustrate a comparative case study to further explore the 
framework’s dynamics in Kosovo. It effectively illustrates how the decisions made by the 
Kosovar Albanian insurgency ultimately worked along relational lines of effort to capture 
Western support, both politically and militarily, to gain a seat at the international 
negotiating table. It did this without ever needing to become a full conventional military. 
Although not native to the insurgent movement, it coordinated effectively enough 
through the advent of a weak united front, to align with the ethnic nation’s political 
movement – holding out until NATO and the United Nations could ensure stability and 





The Politics of Insurgency Case Study 2: The Kosovar 
Albanian Revolution1 
7.1   The Case of Kosovo 
 The Kosovar Albanian insurgency shares numerous attributes with its Chechen 
equivalent, even though the comparative efforts concluded in significantly different outcomes. 
Like the Chechens, Albanians within Kosovo inherited a legacy of social and violent resistance 
dating back hundreds of years. Both populations mixed Islamic practice with clan-based law and 
social norms. And both insurgency vanguards initially attempted to build a broadly based 
national movement in order to gain further political autonomy within the existing state, only to 
press for full independence after violent repression by the state.    
Although the international community officially incorporated Kosovo into Yugoslavia 
after World War II, the insurgency did not begin to gain nation-wide momentum until 1989 when 
Slobodan Milosevic negated Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia’s political system. Even 
after political marginalization, mechanisms of violence developed slowly. With respect to 
political mechanisms of the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians established a parallel internal government 
led by pacifist Ibrahim Rugova who espoused equality for Kosovo within the Yugoslav 
Federation. When the Dayton Accords of 1995 failed to improve Kosovo’s standing within 
Yugoslavia, it fueled militant arguments that the use of violence could offer the only mechanism 
to protect Kosovo’s Albanian population from Serbian injustices and attract international 
interest. 
                                                          
1 Pockets of the research and groundwork for this chapter comes from a previously published work. 
Maegen Nix and Dru Daubon, “Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 1996–1999,” in Casebook on Insurgency 
and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 
Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 343–378.  
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 By 1993, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to conduct limited violent 
operations within Kosovo. When it went public in 1996 without a discernible leadership, 
members primarily attacked Serbian police, state security forces, and suspected Serbian 
collaborators.2  The kinetic practice prompted counterinsurgent action that heavily 
suppressed and displaced civilians, thereby feeding the resistance organization new 
recruits. When the neighboring Albanian regime collapsed in 1997, supply routes to 
Kosovo provided access to arms and ammunition that supported the growth of the 
insurgency’s armed component. Then, in 1998 and 1999, Milosevic began to cleanse 
Kosovo of all Albanians; as a result, over 1.3 million citizens fled to neighboring states or 
into the mountains. Many of those who sought the mountains also sought KLA 
membership.  
As the humanitarian crisis intensified, the international community interceded in 
the engagement – first as an international monitoring force under the auspices of the 
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and then as a military force led by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When diplomatic efforts failed between 
Milosevic, the international community, the KLA, and associated Kosovar Albanian 
interests, NATO forces worked with the insurgency to eject Serbian forces from Kosovo. 
Once cleared of Milosevic’s rule in June of 1999, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 established an interim government under UNMIK, the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. KLA acceptance of UNMIKs terms 
became an integral component of regional stabilization.  
                                                          
2 "I saw an accused collaborator tried before a revolutionary court and then tied to the back of a car in 
Glodjane and dragged through the streets until he died," said a former KLA officer in Albania, who asked 
not to be identified. Chris Hedges, “Kosovo’s Rebels Accused of Executions in the Ranks,” New York 




Overall, Kosovo’s insurgency, unlike that in Chechnya, gained international 
backing and sponsorship that enabled the vanguard, the political mechanisms and violent 
mechanisms of state, and the population to scale and mature. In return for aid against the 
Serbians, the KLA helped their state sponsors to control the level of violence within 
Kosovo. Slow to transition power to an indigenous political regime over the next five 
years, however, mass Kosovar Albanian demonstrations in 2004 turned into riots across 
the nation. And a subsequent UN-led initiative between 2005 and 2007 to negotiate 
Kosovo’s final status between Belgrade and Pristina failed. Although Serbia continued to 
insist that Kosovo stay part of Serbia, Kosovo’s Albanian political leadership, now fully 
integrated with the former KLA components, declared independence in February of 2008 
with the help of key state sponsors. The International Court of Justice declared the action 
to be lawful in July 2010.3 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship framework across the 
phasing model introduced in Chapter 5. See Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1. The development 
of the Kosovar Albanian insurgency accentuates different aspects of the phasing model 
than the Chechen case, while still advancing the concepts of scaling necessary to progress 
across phases. Also, the Kosovo study is significantly longer than the Chechnya case. 
This is because of the expansive literature available on the topic and the extensive 
information regarding the complexity of the actions across lines of effort and 
relationships. Kosovo had no Putin-like figure quelling the press. Additionally, the 
positive outcome for the Kosovar Albanians means their stories and narrative continue to 
be captured by academia and publications such as memoirs. 
                                                          
3 After the ICJ ruling, 192 UN member countries, to include the United States, recognized Kosovo’s 
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Figure 7.1 Insurgency Relationship Framework  
The rest of this chapter is divided into eight sections, paralleling the format of the 
Chechen study and illustrating advancements across each phase of the composite 
insurgency phasing model. For example, the next section examines the insurgency’s 
origins within Kosovo and sets up the historic foundation for resistance through World 
War II and the birth of Yugoslavia in 1945. Section 7.3 assesses the development of 
Kosovo’s political mechanism and the growth of its rural-based resistance through 1980. 
It addresses the proliferation of underground movements and the emergence of a 
symbolic internationally-known figurehead of the resistance. Section 7.4 covers the 
period between 1980 and 1987, explaining how the vanguard developed a persistent and 
organized presence, as well as how the public awakened to embrace the idea of Kosovar 
Albanian autonomy.  
Section 7.5 examines how Kosovar Albanians throughout Kosovo constituted, 
funded and established a parallel government between 1987 and 1993. It also explores 
actions taken by the insurgent leadership to bureaucratize and grow more capable 
mechanisms of violence. Section 7.6 provides insights into the culmination of those 
mechanisms through the founding and advancement of the KLA between 1993 and 1995. 
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And Section 7.7 addresses three significant events that brought the KLA into mainstream 
acceptance, making violence more accessible to those interested in taking up arms. It also 
describes ways in which the insurgency improved upon its business practices to the point 
of successfully accommodating initial public mobilization for war. Section 7.8 details 
phasing modulation across the relationship framework throughout the war, as well as the 
impacts on the insurgency that resulted from Serbian-led ethnic cleansing and resulting 
western intervention. Finally, I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the applicability of 
my analysis to the phasing construct presented in Chapter 5. 
7.2  Insurgency Origins in Kosovo 
Kosovo, once a province of the former Yugoslavia, is a landlocked country in the 
Western Balkans slightly larger than Delaware.4  Covered by mountain ranges and plains, 
rivers crisscross the state to feed its lakes, gorges, and falls. Serbia lies to the north and 
northeast of Kosovo while Macedonia sits on the southeast; Albania lies to the southwest 
and Montenegro the west. See Figure 7.2. Kosovo’s shared border with Albania falls 
across the Sar Mountains that contain its highest peak at 8,000 feet; this area supported 
numerous logistics trails during the Kosovar Albanian insurgency against Serbian-led 
Yugoslavia and enabled resistance members access to training and weapons in Albania 
itself. 
 
                                                          




Figure 7.2 Political Map of Kosovo (2015)5 
Albanians trace their historic connection to Kosovo back to the Illyrian and 
Dardanian tribes who inhabited the region during the fourth century BC. 
Demographically speaking, Kosovo is surrounded by related Albanian populations who 
collectively think in terms of a broader ethnic nation. While Kosovo hosts roughly 1.75 
million Albanians who comprise 95 percent of its population, Albania holds roughly 2.5 
million Albanians, Macedonia half a million, and Montenegro another 32,000.6 Outside 
of the region, many Kosovar Albanian diaspora communities remain connected and 
supportive of their homeland. For example, Kosovar Albanian communities integral to 
the insurgency during the 1980s and 90s hailed from Switzerland, Germany, the United 
States, Austria, Italy, Scandinavia, Greece, and Great Britain.  
                                                          
5 Central Intelligence Agency, “Kosovo,” The World Factbook, accessed Oct 10, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html. 
6 See “The CIA World Factbook: Kosovo,” accessed October 11, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html. Also, The International Crisis 
Group, “Religion in Kosovo,” Balkans Report no. 105, January 31, 2005 claims 100,000 in Montenegro.  
219 
 
Non-Albanian ethnicities in Kosovo include Serbian, Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, 
Turk, Ashkali, and Egyptian. With respect to this case study, the Kosovar Albanian 
relationship with the Serbian population became the principal rivalry involved in the 
struggle for independence. Serbians began to successfully dominate Yugoslavia and 
Kosovo after World War II even though competition between the two ethnicities began 
much earlier. According to the Slavic Serbian narrative, Serbians arrived in the region 
during the sixth century and became the dominant demographic during the twelfth 
century Nemanjic Dynasty. During the thirteenth century, Serbians founded their own 
Orthodox Church whose religious center became tied to Kosovo. The Serbian account 
argues that Albanians did not become the prevailing ethnicity in Kosovo until after the 
arrival of the Ottomans in the fourteenth century. They disregard the chronological 
significance to the initial Albanian presence and focus instead on the spiritual and 
cultural significance of the region to the Orthodox Church. 
Interestingly, Serbians and Albanians fought together on both sides of the Battle 
of Kosovo in 1389 when Serbian Prince Lazar made a final stand against the Ottoman 
sultan.7 The Ottoman Empire dominated the Kosovo region by 1459 when “the Serbian 
and Orthodox population gradually shifted northward, to Hungary, to what is today 
Vojvodina, and to Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia.”8 Serbia never existed as a geopolitical 
entity within the Ottoman Empire. And, between the fifteenth and the nineteenth 
centuries, regional Albanian clans gained autonomy under the hegemony of 
Constantinople. In 1878, Albanian clan leaders established the League of Prizren to form 
an administratively autonomous Ottoman Albanian province.  
                                                          
7 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), xxix. 
8 Tim Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 32. 
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While Albanians worked within the Ottoman system, Serbians and Montenegrins 
fought to establish independence from the waning empire and expand their dominion in 
the region. Because of this expansion, the League of Prizren also served to deter Serbian 
movement into Kosovo.9 Serbian practices expelled Muslims from conquered territories 
and romanticized newfound sovereignty as a spiritual experience.10 In October 1912, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia attacked the Ottoman Empire and began the 
first Balkan War.11 When Serbian and Montenegrin forces gained control over the region, 
much of the local population fled.12  Serbia and Montenegro annexed Kosovo, although 
the Montenegrin territory remained confined to the Metohija region. Even as the Ottoman 
Empire waned, the League of Prizren continued to represent Albanian interests and 
advocated autonomy from both the Ottoman Empire and Christian control.13 
During World War I, Kosovo changed hands numerous times. At its end, the 
Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes unofficially called the region “The Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia” and began a campaign to colonize Kosovo with Serbians. The Institute of 
History in Pristina provides an account of the Serbian colonization from an Albanian 
perspective and estimates that 13,938 Serbian families settled into Kosovo during the 
                                                          
9 One argument suggests that, “[t]he specter of the rise of Christian states in the Balkans made those for 
whom an Albanian nation remained an alien concept receptive to new ideas. They were now ready to 
contemplate the unification of the four Albanian vilayets and demands for territorial autonomy within the 
Empire.” Felix Kuntzsch, “The Violent Politics of Nationalism, Identity and Legitimacy in Palestine, 
Kosovo and Quebec,” Ph.D. thesis. (Quebec: Universite Laval, 2014) 282. 
10 Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, xxx. 
11 In this year, future revolutionary leader Adem Demaci’s mother witnessed the execution of four of her 
uncles by Serbian forces. Shkëlzen Gashi, Adem Demaçi Biography: a Century of Kosova’s History 
through One Man’s Life. Translated by Elizabeth Gowing. (Prishtina: Rrokulia Publishing House, 2010) 
240. 
12 Katariina Simonen, “Operation Allied Force: A Case of Humanitarian Intervention?” (Athena Papers 
Series, Partnership for Peace, Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2004), 93, 
fn 78. 
13 The tradition of resistance continued after the defeat of the League of Prizren which was first replaced by 
the League of Peja and then the Young Turk revolution.  The Albanian population did not stand in 
monolithic support of any of these movements.  Kuntzsch, Violent Politics, 285. 
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campaign, often taking the land and homes of Albanian residents.14 Albanians 
subsequently began a rural clan-based resistance of poorly armed rebels and farmers 
conducting small unit tactics and guerrilla attacks.15 Known as the Albanian kacak 
tradition, commitment to resistance remained part of family lines across generations 
throughout the twentieth century.16 The Jashari family, who will play a prominent role in 
future sections, became well known community leaders of the kacak tradition.       
 Mussolini occupied Albania in 1939 and divided the Balkan region between 
Germany, Bulgaria and Italy. Because the Serbians fought for the Allies during World 
War I, the Axis forces sent many Serbians to local labor camps and to concentration 
camps, causing a significant Serbian migration out of Kosovo. The Nazis then fostered 
Albanian autonomy and enabled self-government, to include the allowance of Muslim 
religious courts and access to education.17  The Albanian National Front, also called the 
Balli Kombetar, formed in 1942 to support Albanian nationalist interests and combat both 
Serbian-led communist and monarchist movements in Kosovo.18 Familiarly called 
Ballists, the front supported conservative Islamic goals and worked with the Nazi 
                                                          
14 See The Institute of History, Prishtina, Kosovo Information Center, “Expulsion of Albanians and 
Colonisation of Kosova,” http://www.kosova.com/arkivi1997/expuls/chap2.htm#n6. 
15 James Pettifer goes back even further.  “The Kosova Albanian rebel or outlaw was often from the family 
that resisted displacement from their land first by Ottoman ciflik landlords and then Serbian and 
Montenegrin colonization.” James Pettifer, The Kosovo Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan 
Insurgency, 1948-2001, (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2012) 12. 
16 The heart of the kacak region stood along the border with Albania and tie back to the hayduk rebels who 
resisted the Ottoman Empire.  Pettifer, The KLA, 19.   
17 “The near medieval conditions of village life were a shock to the German and Italian soldiers who 
encountered them without modern military briefings or prior indoctrination.  The rigid dictates of the 
Kanun and Muslim social tradition towards outsiders discouraged fraternization and sexual relationships, 
and a wall of mutual incomprehension divided the rural Albanian majority from their new masters.” 
Pettifer, The KLA, 17. 
18 Interestingly, two resistance forces emerged from the Serbian demographic against the Nazi’s.  The 
Chetniks hoped to ethnically cleanse the region of non-Serbians and supported the return of the Yugoslav 
monarch.  The Partisans were led by communist Josip Broz (“Tito”) who claimed to support a diverse 
ethnic state.      
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leadership against Serbian control. The Ballists never convinced the Axis powers to unify 
Kosovar Albanian with greater Albania.  
Similar to the time of the Ottomans, Kosovar Albanians supported differing 
political interests during the war. For example, many Albanians in Kosovo resisted the 
Axis powers and joined the communist Partisans led by Josip Tito. When the Axis 
powers began to capitulate toward the end of the war, fighting among the region’s 
different ethnic, religious and political factions intensified.19 As the Partisans moved into 
Drenica, the central Partisan leadership commanded the persecution of local Albanians on 
the grounds of collaboration with the Axis forces. 
A prominent Albanian Partisan commander, Shaban Polluzha, refused to 
accept these orders and within a short time his force of perhaps 5,000 
Albanian militants had attacked the Trepca mine complex and other 
centres of importance. They were joined by up to 20,000 irregulars, drawn 
from Drenica. Fighting soon spread all over northern and central Kosova20 
and included an attack on Partisan-controlled Ferizaj. It took Tito five 
divisions to put down the rebellion.21 
 
In this case, the Balli Kometar joined the leadership of the revolt but could not beat 
hardened guerrilla Partisans enabled by the communists’ interconnected political and 
military organizational frameworks. The communists, for example, maintained a superior 
logistics train, to include communications equipment, ammunition and weapons, and 
medical supplies.  
                                                          
19 “[F]ighting on a serious scale continued till 1949.” James Pettifer, Kosova Express: A Journey in 
Wartime, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 93. 
20 Albanians call Kosovo by the name Kosova, with the emphasis on the second syllable.  Many other 
location name differences also exist.  For example Pristina, the capital, is called Prishtina. I use the former 
versions but keep the latter when referencing Albanian-centric sources. Hasan Prishtina was one of the first 
Albanian nationalists who stood up against Turkish rule and orchestrated a revolt in the early 20th century.  
His gains for Albania were reversed after the first Balkan War. President Wilson supported the 
establishment of an Albanian state after World War I though Kosovo remained with the Serbs. Prishtina 
continued to fight for unification through the kacak movement. 
21 Pettifer, The KLA, 25 
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The Kosovar Albanian drive for autonomy during and after World War II 
embodied “the Ottoman and pre-Ottoman traditions of clan based rural resistance. A 
great weakness of the ceta system was that it deeply inhibited the capacity to concentrate 
overwhelming force.”22 In addition, similar to the Chechen communities from the last 
chapter, the clans preferred to be left alone rather than to align with a centralized political 
organization focused on statehood.23 Albanians in Kosovo did not ideologically align 
with the concept of a state-led government construct. Many clans held fierce rivalries 
with their neighbors.  
[M]inor conflicts over such matters as grazing rights were endemic and 
were regulated by the ancient rules of the Kanun. This was a law code 
based on local custom and a code of revenge dating back to the Middle 
Ages, and embodied a deeply patriarchal and reactionary ideology, but it 
was all the Albanian majority had in the absence of a respected or 
democratic state.”24 
 
The dominance of rural culture at the time kept combatants disorganized though ready to 
defend their autonomy and fight foreign occupation.  
Therefore, in terms of the phasing model, Albanian self-government in Kosovo 
remained extremely premature and lacked a state-level organizational capacity – 
constitutive or destructive. Like the Chechens, Kosovar Albanians did not define 
collective political goals or set an agenda that could unify clans into a state 
                                                          
22 Pettifer argues that the “central problem of strategic focus on the Albanian side” recurred “time and time 
again until 1999 in attempts to build a successful Kosova insurgency” (Pettifer, The KLA, 25). 
23 Pettifer describes it similarly. “The habits and local resistance traditions were very strong and there was 
an almost infinite supply of fighters who were prepared to risk their lives against Slavic supremacy.  But 
they emerged from family structures and inward-looking village environments where community defence 
was paramount and where the forces of production and the level of daily (27) life were archaic.  The types 
of military skill and organization needed to challenge a modern army were not merely non-existent in 
practice, they were hardly even understood.  Yet the violent tragedy of these years also enabled the 
generation of the 1990s to understand the forces they had to overcome.  A formal army would be needed 
that would be capable of confronting the Yugoslav army, not a motley collection of local fighters. It would 
need a clear and focused political leadership.” (Pettifer, The KLA, 27-28).    
24 Pettifer, The KLA, 23. 
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administration. The decentralized concept of the league construct implied a loose 
confederation of interested parties interacting in parallel spheres, with little to no 
coordinating vanguard. Additionally, the Kosovar Albanian hold of territory oscillated 
between Phases 0 and 2 – moving between no hold on territory to control of local 
territory for limited duration. An organized vanguard did not exist and public support 
oscillated between Phase 0 and Phase 2 levels. Without a political framework for 
example, the public lacked any national political party or parallel social institution like a 
worker’s union. Collective excitement and the formation of local clan coalitions, 
however, supported Phase 0 through Phase 3 mechanisms of violence – to include 
terrorist tactics, small unit tactics, and pockets of guerrilla warfare. Over the next forty 
years, however, each of these areas would experience growth and development that 
would enable the foundation of a new state regime.  
7.3   The Birth of Kosovo’s Political Mechanism and Continued Rural Resistance 
(1945-1980) 
In November 1945, Josip Broz (“Tito”) declared Yugoslavia to be a communist 
state and fellow communist Enver Hoxha took control of neighboring Albania. “Despite 
Tito’s promise that Kosovo citizens would decide by referendum whether to remain part 
of Yugoslavia or join Albania, he divided Yugoslavia into six republics and incorporated 
Kosovo into Serbia as an autonomous region.”25 This is similar to the status that 
Chechnya endured within Russia. Serbians took control of all government and 
Communist positions within Kosovo and utilized heavy-handed security tactics against 
                                                          
25 Nix and Daubon, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 1996-1999, 351.  “Declaring that self-determination 
up to secession remained open to debate it pledged that the territorial question would be settled after the 
war” (Kuntzsch, Violent Politics, 293). The 1946 constitution combined Kosovo and Metohija as the 
Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija.   
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the Albanian population in order to maintain control. Former Serbian Partisan leader 
Alexsander Rankovic became minister of the interior and chief of the military 
intelligence agency for Yugoslavia; Rankovic installed a military regime within Kosovo 
and imposed martial law.26 He closed Muslim religious institutions, outlawed the 
education of the Albanian language, and stifled economic development.  
Kosovar Albanians continued to resist Tito after the communists rose to power. 
Opposition came from the Ballists as well as from family lines in rural areas and small 
villages, particularly in Drenica and the Llap valley.27   
Large-scale massacres of Ballist fighters like that in Tivat in Montenegro 
in 1945, involving the death of over 3,000 people after a forced march 
from Kosova, terrorised ordinary Kosova Albanian families and left them 
in awe of the power of Tito’s military and security machine.28  
 
Even so, “[t]hroughout socialist Yugoslavia there were always areas in central Kosova 
where Belgrade rule was only maintained by the most draconian threats of force and de 
facto martial law.”29 Targeted farms, for example, became the “frontline in the repression 
of Albanians.”30 By February 1949, “Forty-seven villages were burnt out by Titoists, and 
thousands of cattle and other livestock were plundered.”31    
                                                          
26 Pettifer, The KLA, 26. 
27 Pettifer, Express, 134. “In the nineteenth century Drenice had been at the forefront of the struggle against 
the Ottomans, and in the twentieth it had produced many brave soldiers who fought the Anglo-French 
imposition of royalist Yugoslavia in 1921 after the Versailles Treaty and the Axis occupation after 1941.  
But the most important Drenice rebellion in the twentieth century was after the Second World War, an 
uprising and guerrilla campaign against the Titoist communists that lasted until February 1949.” 
28 Pettifer, The KLA, 32.  Another example includes “the mass executions and mass graves of Balli 
Kombetar families, such as the pogrom in the Cekliku district of Prishtina in 1950.” Pettier, The KLA, 41. 
29 Pettifer, The KLA, 8. 
30 Pettifer, Kosova Express, 94.  “The farms never had any money to restore their great gates after a 
Serbocommunist police truck had crashed into them for the tenth time.” 94. 
31Pettifer, Kosova Express, 134.   
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As Tito put down the Ballist movement in 1948-49, he established an emigration 
policy that forced associated Albanian families to leave Albania and move to Turkey.32  
Persecution induced Albanians to relocate to not just to the former seat of the Ottoman 
Empire, but also to Switzerland, the United States, and Austria. In spite of terrorism and 
repression by the state, however, many supporters of Kosovar Albanian independence 
decided to remain in Kosovo in order to foster the Albanian identity in defiance of the 
communist regime.33 They maintained ties to family and friends who moved out of the 
country. 
To illustrate the generational and familial relationships that enabled the 
insurgency after Tito’s rise to power, “[t]he grandfather of Hashim Thaci, Sinan Idriz 
Thaci, was centrally involved in this resistance movement, and a close associate of Sadik 
Rama.”34 Rama was a nationalist leader after World War I and a kacak who worked to 
bring Kosovo into the state of Albania.35 Hashim would become a central figure to 
connect the diaspora leadership to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army during 
the early 1990s. He also served the region during its transition to statehood and became 
Kosovo’s first prime minister. 
In addition to expelling and suppressing radical rural communities in Kosovo, 
Tito instituted constitutive measures to strengthen the Yugoslav state and overcome the 
traditional Islamic and clan-based Albanian identity. First, he identified Pristina as 
Kosovo’s capital and directed the growth of infrastructure to serve as the focal point for 
                                                          
32 Roughly 246,000 Turks, Muslim Slavs, and Albanians left Yugoslavia for Turkey.  Malcolm, Kosovo: A 
Short History, 323. 
33 For example, in the fifteen-year period from 1952 to 1967, approximately 175,000 Muslims immigrated 
to Turkey. See Judah, What Everyone Needs to Know, 52.  
34Pettifer, Kosova Express, 134.   




Rankovic’s regional administration. During World War II, the Nazi’s considered Pristina 
and Kosovo to be backward and underdeveloped; it contained a population of less than 
10,000, had few paved roads and exhibited poor levels of public health. Second, Tito 
instituted a policy of urbanization to drive Kosovar Albanians to settle in Pristina and 
grow its communist constituency.36 Other reforms included Albanian conscription into 
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), collectivizing the region’s agricultural production,37 
and developing both industrial and extractive capacities.38  
[M]ost investment in Kosovo was concentrated in ‘primary’ industrial 
projects such as mines, basic chemical works and power stations, which 
supplied raw material or energy for use elsewhere in Yugoslavia. This 
primary industry was capital-intensive but not labour-intensive, which was 
also unfortunate, given that Kosovo was the area of Yugoslavia with the 
fastest-growing population.39 
 
Like the rest of Yugoslavia, the secret police tightly controlled religious institutions, as 
well as vocational unions that began to emerge.40 
In 1948 Tito split with the Soviet-led international communist movement while 
Enver Hoxha initially remained party to the Soviet controlled bloc.41 After the split, 
Russia supported an industrial revolution within Albania and Hoxha hoped to gain Soviet 
support for the armed overthrow of Tito’s government.  
                                                          
36 “[T]he only way for socialism to make progress in Kosova was by the construction of cities which would 
hopefully destroy the radical rural communities, in alliance with the growth of mining and the extractive 
industries.” Pettifer, The KLA, 32.   
37 After collectivization, “a graph of grain production in Kosovo, accordingly, shows dramatic falls in 1949, 
1951 and 1953.  Serious food shortages developed in many parts of Yugoslavia by 1950. Malcolm, Kosovo: 
A Short History, 320.  
38 “Industrial development was slow: it was only after 1957 that Kosovo began to receive investment funds 
for industrialization under the federal budget.  By 1958 there were forty-nine industrial enterprises in the 
whole of Kosovo, employing 16,000 people;” Kosovar Albanians became relatively poorer in comparison 
to other demographics in Yugoslavia. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 323.  
39 Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 323. 
40 For example, Rankovic’s forces engaged in “massive searches for weaponry in the mid-1950s” and 
registered the dossiers of over 120,000 Albanians “who bought the official Albanian language newspaper.” 
Malcolm, Short History, 327. 
41 Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 320.  The Cominform expelled Yugoslavia in June 1948, potentially 
because Tito’s and Hoxha planned to unify Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. 
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Hoxha began to organize infiltration of Kosova of trained militants, who 
were tasked ostensibly with beginning the formation of underground cells 
of ‘sleepers’ to be ready to fight against Belgrade’s control in the long 
term future and to provide intelligence to Tirana and Moscow in the short 
term.42 
 
The Russians, however, were more concerned with intelligence and espionage than with 
the success of a resistance.43 Regardless of the discrepancy, a relationship developed 
between rural Kosovar Albanian leaders and contacts within Albania. These relations 
enabled persistent resistance to Yugoslavia, first supported by the Russians and then by 
the United States after the 1990s.44 Albanian backing endured whether or not the official 
Tirana government supported Kosovar Albanian efforts.45 For example, during times 
when the Albanian regime did not officially foster the resistance, or worked with 
Belgrade against it, both ties of kinship as well as “informal networks of sympathy within 
the Albanian Party of Labour and key organisations in Albania, particularly the secret 
service, the Sigurimi and the military” supported sustained efforts.46 
During the 1950s, remnants of the Ballist resistance in Drenica and Peje (Pec) 
continued to fight communist control. For example, the Organizata per Bashkimin e 
                                                          
42 Pettifer, The KLA, 34.  Malcolm, Short History, 320. 
43 Hoxha walked a fine line with the Soviets; both he and Tito feared Soviet interference in their communist 
regimes similar to the Moscow invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1968 and 1956, respectively.  
“While Tito remained alive, Hoxha moderated his calls for the establishment of a Greater Albania, and kept 
his eye on the most radical Albanian nationalists who might threaten Hoxha’s Marxist dictatorship” thereby 
bringing the Soviet Union into a war.  The resistance represented a tool and a threat to Hoxha.  Henry H. 
Perritt, Jr., Kosovo Liberation Army, The Inside Story of an Insurgency, (Champaign, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2008), 22.   
44 Pettifer, The KLA, 36.  Pettifer argues that the Serbians developed a paradigm which convinced their 
leaders that “virtually all future work against Yugoslavia” would come through Albania.  This proved to be 
a weakness later during the insurgency when the KLA and the insurgency moved away from a platform 
advocating reunification with Albania.   
45 Albania’s relationship with Russia changed after Stalin died and Khrushchev came to power.  Krushchev 
rehabilitated the Yugoslav standing with the international communist movement and split with Albania by 
1960.  Albania feared future interference and did not support reunification.  “National activists who sought 
shelter in Albania were… swiftly handed back to the Yugoslav authorities while others were jailed under 
suspicion of spying – a practice that continued well into the 1980s.” Miranda Vickers, Between Serbs and 
Albania: A History of Kosovo, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 206 and 224. 
46 Pettifer, The KLA, 39. 
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Trojeve Shqiptare operated in Peje between 1959 and 1964 when it was disbanded by the 
secret police.47 Also, Adem Demaci came onto the scene to reinvigorate the resistance 
community.48 While the Ballists served a conservative Islamic support base, Demaci 
advocated an anti-Stalinist communist agenda to unify Kosovo with Albania proper. He 
developed his own political theory on liberation and eventually led a small clandestine 
organization49 called the Revolutionary League for the Unification of Albanians (Levizja 
Revolucionare per Bashkimin e Shqipteve-LRBSH).50   
The novelist and short story writer who attended the university in Belgrade 
became a psychological symbol of twentieth century resistance against the Serbians.51 He 
“was first arrested and charged with offences against the state in 1956, and first went to 
prison in 1958. In total he spent 28 years of his life in Yugoslav prisons.”52 Even though 
Demaci’s organization obtained limited physical results, it provided an opportunity to 
maintain the resistance community of interest broadly and gained a small committed 
following. For example, in April 1964, Llap valley member Ahmet Haxhiu coordinated 
the flying of Albania’s illegal flag in several cities – for which he was imprisoned.53 In 
addition, Demaci sought to overcome the divide between conservative Islamist 
                                                          
47 Pettifer, The KLA, 44. 
48 Demaci’s mother watched members of the Serbian army murder her four uncles in front of her and her 
family in their front yard during the First Balkan War. Pettifer, The KLA, 43. 
49 Malcolm suggests a membership of 300.  Malcolm, Short History, 322. 
50 For example, he rejected the Soviet and Chinese Communist models. See Shkelzen Gashi, Adem Demaci 
– Biography, (Prishtina: Rrokullia, 2010).  
51 Malcolm, Short History, 322. “Kosovar Albanian Nelson Mandela, and his courage in prison was the fire 
that kept the colors of Albanian hope vivid in the early days.” Perritt, KLA, 34. 
52 Pettifer, Kosova Express, 28.   
53 Pettifer, Kosova Express, 117.  The Haxhiu family was famous for resisting Serb colonization within 
Llap after 1912.    
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nationalists and communist nationalists, an example that the KLA would eventually 
incorporate as well.54  
Rankovic and Tito began to hold different beliefs regarding the Kosovar Albanian 
population and the direction of Yugoslavia. Similar to Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic 
nationalism, Rankovic believed in an ethnic hierarchy of Serbs over other Yugoslav 
ethnicities. Tito, on the other hand, began to move closer to the egalitarian ideology of 
communism. “Rankovic had been opposing the new tendency in Tito’s thinking, which 
was to abandon the attempt to create a homogeneous ‘Yugoslavism’ and encourage more 
elements of national self-direction instead.”55 As a result, Tito deposed Rankovic in 
1966, after which he “made an effort to address Kosovar Albanian grievances,” briefly 
providing “breathing space” for Kosovar Albanian nationalism.”56   
In 1968, for example, Tito made constitutional reforms, reduced certain repressive 
measures and offered new freedoms to the Albanian people, investing heavily in the 
development and growth of Pristina. His intent was to improve the republic’s economic 
well-being and begin a period of rapprochement.57 Rather than calming tensions, 
however, Kosovar demands reemerged for greater independence and autonomy, leading 
to riots that same year. In compromise, Tito reinstated the use of Albanian language in 
schools and founded the University of Pristina as an independent institution; previously 
the school served as a satellite of the University of Belgrade.  
                                                          
54 Pettifer recognizes “clear links between the old Ballist organisations such as the Second League of 
Prizren who still had a few underground activists in the Llap region and Demaci’s Marxist allies in the 
LBRSH” (Pettifer, The KLA, 297). 
55 Malcolm, Short History, 324. 
56 Perrit, Kosovo Liberation Army, 21. 
57 Kuntzsch, Violent Politics, 303. 
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In 1974, Tito again revised the state constitution to enable certain self-governing 
authorities in Kosovo and Vojvodina.58 The province became the Socialist Autonomous 
Republic of Kosovo within the Socialist Republic of Serbia.59 As in the other larger 
Yugoslav republics, Kosovar Albanians could now provide for their own local “banking, 
police, legal, and parliamentary system.”60 They could also develop their own communist 
base and send representatives to the greater federal institutions.61 The process of 
Albanians coming to the table to join the political and institutional ranks in Kosovo   
took time; in 1971, while Serbs and Montenegrins made up 21 per cent of 
the population, they still occupied 52 per cent of the managerial positions. 
In fact the overall imbalance in public employment was never overcome; 
in 1980 it was calculated that one in five Serbs had a state-salaried job, but 
only one in eleven Albanians. But where the Albanians made most 
progress was in entering the ranks of the party and the local 
administration. By the late 1970s the proportion of Albanians in the 
League of Communists in Kosovo had risen to roughly two-thirds; and by 
1981 it was claimed that the police and other security forces were three-
quarters Albanian.62 
 
Kosovar Albanians, particularly in the cities, became accustomed to a nationalized 
political process – both organizationally based within the political and administrative 
systems as well as within the socio-cultural system.  
Evolving avenues for Kosovar Albanian political expression undermined 
nationalist goals for independence and relegated their agenda to the political fringe; 
“Albanians, particularly those among the emergent urban elite, experienced significant 
gains. The success of the elites and their complaisance worried more ardent nationalists, 
who feared assimilation unless some conscious effort was made to keep Albanian culture 
                                                          
58 Tito’s motion to change the constitution relates more to demands from the 1971 Croatian Spring than it 
to a response to Kosovar Albanian grievances specifically. 
59 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 7–22.  This was the fourth constitutional revision since World War II.  
Like Chechnya, Kosovo was never attained the status of a federation republic with the right to secede.  
60 Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 4. 
61 Judah, What Everyone Needs to Know, 57. 
62 Malcolm, Short History, 326.    
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and national symbols alive.” 63 The political will and experience of life within growing 
urban areas became more removed from the experience and aspirations of the rural clans 
and villages. Because the political apparatus in Kosovo derived its power from Belgrade, 
the constituencies that supported Kosovar Albanian constitutive and destructive 
mechanisms came from separate populations. They operated in separate spheres and did 
not interact.  
This is not to say that isolated resistance activity disappeared. Adem Demaci, for 
example, formed another revolutionary organization called “the Levizjes per Clirimin 
Kometar te Kosoves (LCKK), the League for the National Liberation of Kosova, founded 
during his second prison term with Jusuf Gervala.”64  Then, in 1976, they founded 
another small underground organization called the Organizata Marksiste-Leniniste e 
Kosoves (the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosovo or OMLK). In 1978, Gervala and 
Metush Krasniqi formed a league called the Levizja Nacional-Climitare e Kosoves dhe 
Viseve Shqiptare ne Jugosllavi (the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo or 
LNCKVSJ). These groups espoused Demaci’s communist political theory but included 
no political capacity, remaining as hidden as possible underground. 
Although Tito made progress within a socio-political context for the Kosovar 
Albanians, Yugoslavia’s economic policies made conditions worse in Kosovo. His 
industrialization policies attempted to integrate Kosovar Albanians into Yugoslavia, 
unlike the case in Chechnya where jobs were primarily reserved for the Russian elite. 
Tito did, however, require parity between ethnicities as well as bilingualism from the 
                                                          
63 At the time, “the goal for most of the militant Kosovar Albanians was to become part of a ‘Greater 
Albania.’” Perritt, KLA, 21-22. 
64 Pettifer, The KLA, 48.    
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Albanians as a condition of employment.65 In fact, between 1971 and 1982, 45,000 
Albanians left Kosovo.66   
The changes Tito affected within Kosovo created disparity between rural and 
growing urban components within region. Conditions for Kosovar Albanians varied 
greatly under Tito’s direction and impacted the potential for insurgency across the 
phasing framework. For example, Tito enabled the development of a regionally aligned 
political party and corresponding political mechanisms for Kosovar Albanians. As a 
result, their political capacity moved from Phase 0 levels to Phase 4, with associated 
public support for this political line of effort at Phase 2 and three levels. Recall that Phase 
4 represents the sum of earlier phases that support elections and regional political 
administration – to include the development of political committees and incorporated 
provisional leadership structures. The nuance here, however, is that these capacities 
supported the Yugoslavia regime and not an insurgent movement. So in terms of the 
insurgency itself, that capacity remained at zero. It would need to be coopted by the 
vanguard if the movement were to scale. 
Comparatively, the capability for violence decreased under Tito and Rankovic. 
The Ballists and families traditionally aligned with Kosovar Albanian resistance 
organizations left the country or were heavily suppressed. Resistance mechanisms could 
no longer support guerrilla warfare at World War II levels although public support in 
rural communities remained consistent in their collective excitement and limited 
coalitions. The nascent origins of a true vanguard, however, emerged as the most 
important development to the future insurgency at the time. Adem Damaci’s impact and 
                                                          
65 Vickers, Between Serbs and Albania, 180. 
66 Peter Prifti, “Kosova’s Economy: Problems and Prospects,” in Arshi Pipa and Sam Repishti (eds.), 
Studies on Kosova, East European Monographs, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 125-129. 
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the evolving supportive networks that began to move across Albania and Europe would 
enable the growth of a constitutively-minded leadership to connect national political 
goals and aspirations to mechanisms of violence and base areas. For example, members 
began to interface with different interest groups in the public domain, gaining access and 
placement in organizations such as student unions and construction workers. (See the 
next section.)  While previously independent clandestine organizations and areas of 
resistance operated separately, Damaci became a public figure that might unify or draw 
these organizations to a single rallying point. Needed connections to national level 
political mechanisms stood further in the future, but now at least existed as a possibility 
due to Tito’s reforms.    
7.4   A National Reawakening and the Emergence of the Vanguard (1980-1987) 
After Tito died in May of 1980, turmoil and ethnic tensions within Kosovo 
increased once more. In fact, people throughout Yugoslavia began to identify more 
closely with their sub-national ethnicities than with the contrived Yugoslav nation that 
Tito advocated.67 Pressure rose incrementally, however, and began in Kosovo with 
Serbian objections to pro-Albanian changes since 1974. Serbians “had already begun to 
mobilize against what they perceived as discriminating policies and growing Albanian 
assertiveness in the wake of the 1974 constitution. Now their complaints received even 
greater attention in central Serbia.”68 Events less than one year after Tito’s death would 
serve to catalyze ill will on both sides of the ethnic divide and lead to the consolidation of 
Serbian power over Kosovo.  
                                                          
67 Vickers, History of Kosovo, 214-217. 
68 Kuntzsch, Violent Politics, 305. 
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In March 1981, Kosovar Albanian students openly protested overcrowded and 
underfunded conditions at Pristina University.69 Two weeks later, as demonstrations 
continued and became increasingly violent, several thousand construction, mine, and 
metal workers joined to protest their own conditions. Demonstrations and violence 
expanded across six additional cities and villages within Kosovo as police responded and 
as some protestors targeted local Serbian and Montenegrin businesses and homes.70   
Yugoslavia’s federal government declared a state of emergency while police and military 
units armed with tanks and riot gear came from all over Yugoslavia to take control.71        
Given the history of resistance within Kosovo, Serbian authorities attempted to 
paint a picture of revolutionary activity connected to Tirana. And there are some 
indications that the Prishtina demonstrations were impacted by the OMLK’s “hundred or 
so activists.”72 
When students and other demonstrators took to the streets in 1981, 
arguably the issue was primarily one of status rather than a desire for 
independence. It was true that the rapid growth of the university and the 
influence from Tirana had fed nationalist aspirations; in 1978 there had 
been festivities all over Kosovo to celebrate the centenary of the founding 
of the League of Prizren - the so-called Albanian “national awakening.” 
But the dominant emotion underlying the demand for republic status 
seems to have been resentment that nationalities, i.e. Albanian or 
Hungarian, were somehow inferior to nations i.e. Serbs or Croats. In other 
words they felt like second-class citizens. Among the demonstrators, there 
were members of clandestine radical groups, generally declaring 
themselves Marxist-Leninist, who favored unification with Albania. But 
interviews and commentaries suggest that these were marginal.73 
 
                                                          
69 Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 4. 
70 Malcolm, Short History, 335. 
71 “The Kosovo Report,” Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000. 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303E3B-
thekosovoreport.htm. 
72 Pettifer, The KLA, 48. 
73 The Kosovo Commission Report. 
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As a result of the demonstrations, not only were Albanians purged from teaching 
positions in the university, over the course of the next few years, 1,200 people received 
“substantial prison sentences… and another 3,000 sent to gaol for up to three months.”74  
Frequently students were sentenced for a range of minor offenses, including possession 
of tape-cassette recordings of radio broadcasts about the protests, as well as for writing 
anti-Yugoslavian slogans in chalk on walls and sidewalks.75 Public support for Kosovar 
Albanian autonomy reached Phase 1 levels though not necessarily in support of violent 
insurgent methods.  
Furthermore, while the legitimate social and political grievances expressed by the 
population were ignored, Belgrade directed a long-term aggressive imprisonment policy 
against Kosovar Albanians that resulted in more than half a million citizens being either 
arrested or questioned by police before the end of the decade. The imprisonment policy 
coincided with purges of Albanian politicians throughout the 1980s;76 for example, “[i]n 
July 1982, 1,000 Albanian members of the League of Communists of Kosovo (LCK) 
were expelled, and some of the basic units of the LCK were dissolved altogether.”77     
Imprisonment impacted a large percentage of Albanian families whose relations 
spent time in jail. Although “[p]ockets of armed resistance existed in the 1980s and 
before,… [a]s the scope and intensity of Serb repression grew, the number of pockets of 
                                                          
74 Malcolm, Short History, 335.  Malcolm references the Financial Times of 8 September 1981 which 
provides a figure of 2,000 arrests at that time.  The other figures come from: K. Magnusson, “The Serbian 
Reaction: Kosovo and Ethnic Mobilization among the Serbs.” Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European 
Studies, 4, no. 3 (1987), 11n.  
75 Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 
2001) 18. 
76 Finding revolutionary activity supported by Tirana “became the main preoccupation of the security 
clampdown and the trials: secret organizations and cells were constantly being named, and the authorities 
seemed obsessed with locating a ‘general command’ which was assumed to have coordinated them all.” 
Malcolm, Short History, 336. 
77 Julie Mertus, “Operation Allied Force: handmaiden of independent Kosovo,” International Affairs, 
85(2009): 465.  Malcolm says that “[f]inal estimates of the number of expulsions from the Party ranged 
from 900-4,000” (Malcolm, Short History, fn 6, 425).  
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resistance also grew. In many cases, those taking up arms had little choice: The Serbs 
came to arrest members of their families and they simply fought back.”78 As a result, the 
high number of incarcerations created a radicalizing environment for insurgency and 
established the foundation of a resistance network, substantiating Phase 1 levels of 
violent mechanisms and vanguard behavior. “In February 1982 the remnants of the 
OMLK membership joined with the tiny Partia Komuniste Marksiste-Leniniste 
eShqiptare nen Yugoslavi (the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians in 
Yugoslavia or PKMLSHJ) and the equally small Levizja per Republiken Socialist 
Shqiptare ne Jugosllavi (the Movement for Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia or 
LRSSHJ that became the National Liberation Movement of Kosovo and other Albanian 
Regions or LNCKVSHJ) to form a new organization, the Levizjen Popullore per 
Republiken e Kosoves (the Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo or LPRK).”79 The 
LPRK argued that Kosovar Albanians could only achieve freedom through an armed 
uprising.  
Time in jail forged connections and sharpened a “desire to see Kosovo liberated 
from the rest of Yugoslavia.80  Still considered to be on the fringe of Kosovar Albanian 
opinion, many future insurgency participants joined the LPRK in jail or soon after.81  
Upon release, influential leaders, political activists, as well as movement supporters went 
                                                          
78 Perritt, KLA, 69. 
79 Pettifer, The KLA, 50. 
80 Perritt, KLA, 23.   
81 Judah, What Everyone Needs to Know, 58. Also see Tim Judah, “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo 
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into exile to join what might be considered a “radical” movement.82 Those members 
inside Kosovo “operated with a secret cell structure, members being called upon to help 
produce and distribute radical leaflets.”83    
During the early 1980s, other Kosovar Albanians also fled Kosovo to Switzerland 
and Germany in order to escape arrest and repression as well as to improve their lives and 
raise funds for their cause.84 They describe the humiliation experienced by a generation of 
men under thirty who “left their homeland by the thousands to seek political refuge or to 
earn a living, or both.”85 The intergenerational component to the resistance and its ability 
to be open regarding political alternatives to Islamic fundamentalism or communism 
offered a unique agility in exile for networking across nationalist groups and to maintain 
relevance politically. Phase 2 levels of public support developed within the diaspora 
community even though Serbian repression kept support within Kosovo to Phase 1 
attributes of coalescence and collective excitement.         
Recall that while the Ottoman Empire came to Kosovo during the fourteenth 
century and converted the majority of the population to Islam, Albanian identity 
remained “defined less by religion and race than by language, culture and history.”86 For 
example, by 2001, only 5.8% of Kosovar Albanian Muslims attended daily religious 
                                                          
82 Tim Judah explains that, “Throughout the 1980s, the LPRK remained a marginal, extremist and 
underground organisation.” Tim Judah, “The Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA-UCK,” Perceptions 5 
(September – November 2000): 66. Radical, however, often implies some kind of strict adherence to a 
religion or ideology.  For the Kosovar Albanians, the concept of radical describes the member beliefs that 
violence would be required to protect Albanians from Serbians and to gain independence.  
83  Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 64. 
84 On initial fundraising, see Perritt, KLA, 88. 
85 Perritt, KLA, 7.   
86 Perritt, KLA, 5; Judah, What Everyone Needs to Know, 9. The Albanian language itself is distinct from 
the Slavic languages used by the Croatians, Serbians, and most Macedonians. 
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services.87  Subsequently, the insurgency never depended upon an Islamic narrative and 
rather drew resources from the Vatican and the Catholic Church.88 Unlike the Serbians 
who aligned with their own Orthodox Church, a popular sentiment explains that “[T]he 
religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”89… “fueled by a rich set of historical myths, 
distinctive folk music closely tied to traditional celebrations of marriage and harvest, and 
a well-developed body of clan-based law.”90   
By 1985, interconnected clandestine organizations under the LPRK umbrella 
worked from Switzerland, Germany, Albania, and Kosovo to intensify Albanian 
nationalism and to develop further resistance capabilities.91 For example, a resistance 
newspaper called Zeri I Kosoves operated from Switzerland and published media in 
Albanian, German and English.92 Jusuf and Bardosh Gervalla and Kadri Zeka attempted 
to create an armed group in Germany during the early 1980s, though it was “snuffed out 
by a combination of Serbian intelligence and the South German police.”93 They also 
“sponsored Albanian music concerts, Albanian Flag Day celebrations, and coffeehouse 
discussions of politics. On January 17, 1982, while emerging from a political meeting, 
the Gervalla brothers and Zeka were gunned down (by the Yugoslav Secret Service, as 
most people believe).”94   
                                                          
87 International Crisis Group, “Religion in Kosovo,” 2-4.  In addition, many Kosovar Albanians drink 
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91 Perritt, KLA, 7.   
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93 Pettifer, The KLA, 52. 
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Judah asserts that, “[f]ollowing the assassinations, those who had been close to the Gervallas and to Zeka 
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Overall, and critical to the development of the insurgency, Kosovar Albanian 
leadership in Switzerland and Germany began to advocate a separate identity for 
Kosovo’s political future, studying and comparing different ideological perspectives and 
revolutionary theories.95 
The breeding ground for the Kosovo Liberation Army was as much in 
Germany and Switzerland as it was in Kosovo itself. Young 
revolutionaries like Jashar Salihu, Xhavit Haliti, Jusuf and Bardosh 
Gervalla, and Kadri Zeka made their way to Germany, Switzerland, and 
Belgium, among other European countries, and began to organize a 
resistance against the Serb presence in Kosovo… The exile phenomenon 
contributed to the possibility of insurgency—to the consciousness of 
potential because it brought tens of thousands of young people in contact 
with the West, and thereby broke the effect that isolation had on much of 
the Albanian community.96   
 
Contact with Albania proper, not just activity in Europe, also played an integral role in 
the development of the resistance during this time. Recall that fostering international 
support is a Phase 3 vanguard function. 
 For example, Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985 brought a new supportive regime from 
Tirana. President Ramiz Alia established formal links between Albania’s secret 
intelligence service that operated in Switzerland and the LPRK leadership.97 Similarly, 
communications between the LPRK and rural networks in Kosovo began to run through 
Albania.98 Alia connected the insurgent organization to international revolutionary 
movements such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).99 He also began a program to train 
                                                          
95 Pettifer, The KLA, 51.  Members “also tried to learn how to organize a guerrilla insurgency by studying 
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a small number of resistance fighters from Kosovo at the Tirana Defense Academy, again 
a Phase 1 attribute of maturing mechanisms of violence.100 
 During the early and mid-1980s, while repression of Kosovar Albanians 
reemerged, fear also increased among Serbians living in Kosovo who witnessed the 
effects of student violence against their businesses and homes. Serbian political rhetoric 
and sensationalized propaganda attempted to convince Serbian citizens that they were 
being pushed out of Kosovo because of increased harassment, discrimination, and 
hostility by ethnic Albanians.101 For example, A Book about Kosovo accused Albanians 
of making Kosovo ethnically pure.102 Other publications argued that Albanian men 
rampantly raped girls and women across the region.103 Slander accompanied increased 
politicization and nationalist rhetoric by the Serbian Central Committee. 
In addition, Serbian nationalists highlighted the risk of rising Serbian emigration 
from the Kosovo region that would shift the political power structure back in favor of 
ethnic Albanians. Serbian sentiment was underscored by a September 1986 memorandum 
published by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences that warned Kosovo Serbs of an 
impending genocide against them unless government policies were put in place to 
promote the permanent return of exiled Serbs.104 The memorandum advocated the “de-
Albanianisation” of Kosovo and the “immediate limitation of Kosovo’s autonomy” – two 
                                                          
100 Pettifer, The KLA, 55. At this time, “the Albanian army itself was in rapid decline.” Pettifer, The KLA, 
67. 
101 Malcolm, Short History, 337-344. 
102 The Kosovo Commission Report.  Also, Malcolm, Short History, 338.    
103 Malcolm, Short History, 339. 
104 Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 4. According to census data, in 1948 there were roughly 27.5% 
Serbs and 
Montenegrins in Kosovo with 68.5% Albanians. In 1991, even though Kosovar Albanians abstained from 




tenets that soon became central to the political platform of Communist party leader 
Slobodan Milosevic.105 
By the time Milosevic arrived on the scene in the late 1980s, the level of public 
support for an outright Kosovar Albanian insurgency still remained low within Kosovo 
itself. Between 1971 and 1981 the population in Pristina grew from roughly 70,000 to 
110,000 inhabitants; and, by 1988 at least half of Kosovo’s population lived in urban 
areas.106 Although areas of resistance could be found, the heavy majority of Kosovar 
Albanians still participated in the communist political process and supported peaceful 
means of protest and advocacy. Overall, Kosovar Albanians did not seek or practice in 
political organizations separate from Yugoslavia’s regime at this point in time although a 
collective desire for increased autonomy continued. Fear of the state played a large role 
in pacification as well as some continued footprint in the national political process.  
During the decade after Tito’s death, the vanguard made important strides in 
organizational and ideological maturity, reaching Phase 2 and three levels by expanding 
the network, incorporating numerous illicit networks, and garnering international support. 
Because of Yugoslavia’s imprisonment policies, the resistance network became tangible, 
developing institutionally inside Kosovo and flourishing in Europe. While methods of 
communication remained limited, support from Albania in terms of a communications 
pathway and training connected external and internal members and interests. The number 
of resistance members dedicated to liberation from Yugoslavia via violent mechanisms 
opened up new opportunities for the vanguard and the movement at large, though the 
absence of a broader political mechanism still posed a significant weakness. Milosevic’s 
                                                          
105 Leurdijk and Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, 18. 
106 Kuntzsch on page 304 cites: Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens: 19. - 21. Jahrhundert. (Wien: 
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actions in 1989, however, drove the disassociation of the Kosovar Albanian political 
machine from the state of Yugoslavia and created an opening for the vanguard to pull in 
further public support and mechanisms of power. 
7.5   Kosovo’s Parallel Government (1987-1993)  
 Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to the presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia 
rested upon inflammatory and fabricated arguments depicting the victimization of 
Serbians in Kosovo by Kosovar Albanians intent on genocide. For example, a critical 
point in Milosevic’s career occurred during a visit to Kosovo in late April 1987 while 
serving as the deputy-president of the Serbian Party.   
Milosevic arrived at the meeting place in Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje in 
the middle of a scuffle between Serbs and the police. He then uttered the 
famous words: “No one should dare to beat you,” and proceeded to give a 
speech about the sacred rights of Serbs. He became a national hero 
overnight. With the support of Radio TV Belgrade, and with mass rallies 
throughout the country known as “Meetings of Truth”, he was able to 
mobilize popular feelings and to take control of the party leadership.107 
 
The following year, further anti-Albanian government purges led to “the November 1988 
and January 1989 dismissal of central Albanian leaders, including Kaqusha Jashari, Sinan 
Hasani and Azem Vllasi.”108 Mass demonstrations protested Serbian actions hoping to 
regain Albanian influence within the government and similar acts continued through 
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1989, often led by Trepca miners.109110 After the last Trepca strike was put down in 1990, 
Serbian officials condemned 3,388 miners to prison; “[m]any fled abroad, most to 
Germany and Switzerland, and laid the foundations of the continuously tough and 
creative opposition to Yugoslavia in the Albanian diaspora there.”111   
In May 1989, Milosevic assumed the presidency of the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia and implemented the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status, including the 
abolishment of its semi-independent provincial governments; he also passed “a series of 
decrees aimed at changing” Kosovo’s ethnic composition in support of a policy of 
Serbian colonization.112 As a result, “[t]housands of Albanians were dismissed from 
public employment; according to the independent Kosovar Albanian Association of 
Trades Unions, 115,000 people out of a total 170,000 lost their jobs” and had to find 
income or resources for survival elsewhere.113114  
Kosovar Albanian nationalism surged in response to Serbian repression and 
membership grew in both moderate and underground groups seeking full independence 
from Serbia within Yugoslavia.115 For example, similar to Poland’s Solidarity movement, 
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University of Pristina intellectuals and Kosovar Albanian members of the communist 
party founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in December 1989 under the 
direction of literary historian Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.116 “The LDK drew on village 
organizations and the traditional clan structure of Kosovar Albanian society. It was also 
able to fill the void left by the collapse of the previous Albanian political movement.”117  
Rugova’s LDK connected Kosovar Albanians to a broader international political 
community, particularly because he became extremely popular to Western governments 
and news organizations almost overnight.118 
The fact that the League was accepted by Milosevic played both positively and 
negatively with the Kosovar Albanian constituency over time. Initially it provided hope 
and legitimacy that the Albanian interests garnered an avenue of political expression with 
Milosevic on the national stage. People wanted to believe that they would win without 
fighting and that differences could be resolved without war.119 Over time, however, 
Rugova’s platform lost relevance and slowly members of his party lost faith in his 
policies. It is difficult to understand the inside of Rugova’s organization. Because he was 
accepted by Milosevic, he cannot at this point be considered part of the insurgency. At 
the same time, the insurgency certainly touched and leveraged the LDK. 
Members of Rugova’s organization eventually connected with the KLA. For 
example, Jakup Krasniqi, an “articulate school teacher and regional leader of Rugova’s 
party in the Glocovac (Drenas) municipality… became a senior strategist and 
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spokesperson for the KLA. He began working with” them clandestinely in the 1990s.120 
Although still early at this point, by 1997 the relationship between LDK members and the 
KLA exhibited signs of connection as reporters used LDK representatives to arrange 
meetings with KLA leaders.121 This relationship will gain further attention in future 
sections, but it should be highlighted that Phase 1 vanguard activities require expansion 
and placement inside legitimate political institutions and parallel organizations. 
In order to mature and develop at home and abroad, the LDK maintained a 
national and international presence that drew followers within Kosovo and the diaspora.  
Believing that the tide of history was turning their way many members of 
the LPRK and other underground groups loosely known as the 'the 
movement' left their secret organisations to join Rugova. So, only the 
hardest of the hard remained; men who said it was beneath their dignity to 
be members of a party legal in the eyes of the Serbian state.122 
 
Others resistance leaders also disagreed with Rugova’s methods. For example, Hashim 
Thaci, whose grandfather helped to lead resistance efforts after World War II, argued 
with Rugova regarding his stance on passive resistance; Thaci was the “president of 
Prishtina University’s student union and a secret member of the banned League for the 
Liberation of Kosova organization.”123 He, like other radicals operating in secret against 
Serbia, could not yet alert the public or the Serbians to their presence and developed a 
longer term plan to introduce their ideas and activities to Kosovo and would-be external 
supporters.  
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During the government’s initial period of growth, Rugova maintained his 
conviction that a nonviolent movement would gain international backing for Kosovo’s 
cause. He hoped to see the introduction of a United Nations peacekeeping force in 
Kosovo.124 Rugova also passionately denied the existence of any other resistance 
organizations other than his own, claiming that talk of Kosovar Albanian clandestine 
activity were constructions of the Serbian government. Until 1995, the LDK garnered 
overwhelming public support and claimed a membership of 700,000 by the spring of 
1991.125  
Kosovar Albanian representation in Kosovo’s parliament continued until In July 
1990 when its Albanian membership took a stand against Milosevic. At that time,    
a referendum was held in Kosovo in which 114 of the 123 Albanian 
members of Kosovo’s parliament voted in favor of establishing a Republic 
of Kosovo that remained part of Yugoslavia yet which was independent of 
Serbia.126 In response to this vote, the Serbian government dissolved 
Albanian participation in the Kosovo government and assumed full control 
over the administration of the province.127  
 
During a second secret meeting the following September, the Albanian delegates agreed 
to the new Republic of Kosovo’s constitutional provisions and claimed it superseded both 
Serbian and Yugoslav law.128   
By 1991, the Kosovar Albanian population held a referendum in support of 
independence, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992.129 The LDK 
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won 96 of 130 seats and Rugova became president while his new government 
headquarters operated in exile from Bonn, Germany.130 Other parties that developed 
during the 1990s but interacted with Rugova and the LDK included the Albanian 
Christian Democratic Party (PSHDK), whose members comprised a majority of Muslims, 
the Parliamentary Party (PKK) led by Adem Demaci, the Social Democratic Party 
(PSDK), and the Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK).131 Given this political parallelism, 
Milosevic continued to allow Rugova’s activities overall while addressing its outcomes 
on a tactical level. They constitute Phase 2 and Phase 3 levels of growth for political 
mechanisms, though they cannot necessarily be counted as part of the insurgency.132   
 For example, Serbia’s response to Kosovar Albanian political actions yielded 
numerous human rights abuses, including segregation practices and the continued 
dismissal of thousands of Albanian employees from their jobs, particularly in healthcare, 
education and local security forces. New Serbian laws permitted extended questioning for 
three days “without being told the reason for the summons… in 1994 15,000 people in 
Kosovo were questioned in this way.”133 Due to systemic abuse, more Kosovar Albanians 
left the country for Western Europe: 217,000 in early 1992 and 368,000 in 1993.134   
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In order to maintain some quality of life and tradition, Kosovo’s Albanian 
leadership established a system of government that included tax collection, schools, and 
medical clinics.135 Fundraising based in Germany enabled these parallel systems to 
operate. Both of these functions represent Phase 3 and 4 political functions, although they 
don’t exercise the full capacity expected regarding hierarchical levels of regional political 
administration. Once the LDK-led government established its headquarters in exile, 
however, friction developed between Rugova’s government and the LPRK, particularly 
in terms of competition for resources and fund-raising.136 Both groups looked to finance 
their respective interests from the same broad constituency.  
For example, radical leaders like “Bardhyl Mahmuti137 and Jashar Salihu,138 
another Swiss-based exile, began to solicit money for their campaign amongst the 
gastarbeiters and to prepare for war.”139 The LDK needed the money to support its own 
efforts. From the perspective of the LPRK,  
The League (LDK) was run in an obscure and impenetrable way by a 
group of families140, and it was known to have many critics in the 
Albanian political underground, mostly in the diaspora—people who had 
been forced to leave Kosova to escape the police or find work. But at this 
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stage their (radical) movement was limited and fragmented, and appeared 
to have little practical influence.141  
 
During the early 1990s, most of the funding and support from the diaspora funneled 
through the LDK-led organization. But the LPRK-led movement also began at this time 
to better develop its own fundraising mechanisms, an important Phase 3 task for the 
vanguard. 
In addition to conflicts over funding between the LDK and the LPRK, the 
potentiality to develop a competing armed organization within Kosovo’s new government 
emerged. A Defense Ministry was provided by the Kacanik Constitution142 and Bujar 
Bukoshi, the exiled prime minister of Rugova’s Kosovar Albanian government in 
Germany, believed that “armed resistance would be necessary to attract the attention of 
the international community and keep pressure on diplomacy.”143  As a result, his 
leadership in Germany began to form “a ‘Ministry of Defence’ (MoD), although it was 
uncertain what substance or military capacity it would have.”144  Bukoshi saw an 
opportunity to organize the Albanian security forces in Kosovo that the Serbians had let 
go from service. He appointed a Minister of Defense145 and collaborated with the LPRK 
leadership in Germany on a limited basis.146  For example, he worked to support the 
LPRK’s members involved in President Alia’s training program in Albania.147     
                                                          
141 Pettifer, Express, 46. 
142 Pettifer, Express, 66. 
143 Perritt, The KLA, 15. “As early as 1992, Bukoshi, unlike Rugova, recognized that Kosovo could never 
be liberated from Serb control without armed resistance.  The international community simply would not 
pay serious attention in the absence of armed resistance.  Regardless of the prospects for a purely military 
victory, a visible armed resistance in Kosovo was a necessary lever for any successful diplomatic initiative” 
(Perritt, The KLA, 86). 
144 Pettifer, Express, 33. 
145 Pettifer, KLA, 66.  “Ramush Tahiti, a close associate of Bukoshi, was appointed the first Minister of 
Defence of the Kosova Republic, but in fact the title represented very little.” 
146 “Bukoshi, from the early 1990s, was whispering in some ears and informally encouraging those like 
Haliti to go ahead with their plans for military action” (Perritt, KLA, 86-87). 
147 Perritt, The KLA, 15. 
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The establishment of an MoD within the new LDK-led government did not 
endure although it illustrates some level of tension even within Rugova’s small network. 
While the new president insisted on nonviolence, his administration did not stand 
monolithic. Bukoshi’s efforts “to make the Ministry functional and form an army were 
stymied by Rugova’s intense pacifism; so although the ministry existed as a post in 
Germany, on the ground in Kosovo, it did not exist at all.”148  The opportunity to 
transition the Kosovar Albanian police and army officers who had lost their jobs from the 
former state organization in 1989 and 1990 dissipated. “The LDK did not provide a 
political perspective that had any military credibility” and as a result, “[a]fter a year or 
two, the ‘government abandoned any pretence of having a military component… [B]y 
early 1993 little was ever heard again of the ‘Ministry of Defence’” although members of 
the defense ministry would be seen again once Bukoshi successfully established an LDK-
led force years later.149   
Bukoshi’s support and collaboration with the LPRK diminished significantly in 
1993, although it is likely that he maintained contact. The change in perspective occurred 
as a result of the infiltration of guerrilla training camps in Albania by Serb secret police 
that year. The operation represented a Serbian success that severely degraded the 
resistance movement.150 (At the same time, it also served as a catalyst to reorganize and 
reenergize the movement.)  Ultimately,  
About one hundred Kosovar militants, including Adem Jashari had 
received training in Albania. When they returned to Kosovo at least half of 
them were immediately arrested, and the other half—except for Jashari—
                                                          
148 Pettifer, KLA, 66.   
149 Pettifer, The KLA, 67.  Pettifer quotes Gjeloshi, op. cit., pp. 59 ff.  He provides 3 sources for N. Gjeloshi 
in his bibliography but does not indicate which one it is.   
150 Perritt, KLA, 8. 
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felt so threatened that they left Kosovo almost immediately for Germany 
and Switzerland.151  
 
Bukoshi could not afford official links that would point fingers toward the LDK’s 
political movement and hold it liable for the actions of the LPRK.  
The LDK needed to exude both legitimacy and consistency within Kosovo and 
the international arena. Rugova, for example, reasoned that, “’the Serbs only wait for a 
pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do 
nothing and stay alive than be massacred.’”152  Bukoshi remained tied to Rugova’s 
narrative for the time being and stood overtly responsible for fundraising that supported 
Kosovo’s parallel government inside and outside the province. He established the LDKs 
principal financial mechanism called the Three Percent Fund and “developed a formal 
system for getting” the “money where it needed to be spent. He established an Albanian 
bank, the Dardania Bank, and transferred money out of German accounts and into 
accounts there.”153  He then found creative ways to work contributions while maintaining 
the perception of a clean record internationally and in the eyes of the Serbian 
government.154  Formally termed the Fund for the Republic of Kosovo (RFK), the RFK 
called for Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo and in the diaspora to contribute three percent of 
their income to help the resistance.155   
                                                          
151 Perritt, KLA, 56.  Jashari did not leave, but did remain within his own limited territory. 
152 Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 65. Also, recall that around this time, evidence of Serb run 
concentration camps in Bosnia were beginning to emerge. Pettifer, Express, 53. 
153 Perritt, KLA, 96.   
154 “Many of the Three Percent Fund donors were Kosovar Albanian businesspeople who had amassed 
considerable wealth from a variety of business activities, most at least formally illegal under Serbian law, 
some involving various kinds fo trafficking in weapons, narcotics, and human beings, and many involving 
efforts to evade economic sanctions imposed on Serbia.” Henry H. Perritt Jr., The Road to Independence 
for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2010), 35. 
155 Perritt, KLA, 16. “Very little of the fund’s proceeds were funneled to the KLA.  The fund’s primary role 
was the maintenance of Kosovo’s parallel system of education: 20,000 teachers and administrative staff, 
5,291 preschool pupils, 312,000 elementary school pupils, 56,920 pupils in sixty-five secondary schools, 
two special schools for disabled children, and 12,000 students enrolled in twenty faculties and colleges.  
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 As Rugova dug in to his pacifist stance for Kosovo’s resistance, any link to the 
LPRK became an even greater danger to his overt efforts. And negative feelings ran both 
ways along the national divide. Those Albanians espousing force grew increasingly 
suspicious of Rugova’s motives and methods;156 in fact, many radicals believed that 
Rugova worked for Milosevic.157  “Rugova was on television regularly, never failing to 
reaffirm his commitment to independence but discouraging any form of real 
resistance.”158  Those who joined the resistance concluded “that there was little 
difference between Rugova’s LDK and Milsoevic’s regime.”159  To them, Rugova 
appeared to enable the Serbian president’s interests in Kosovo rather than make 
improvements to the lives of Kosovar Albanians. For example, on 13 October 1992, 
when Serbian forces “teargased and crushed” a mass Albanian demonstration, Rugova’s 
negotiations with the Serbs produced little effect.160  In Rugova’s defense, Serbia was at 
this point six months into war with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo was in no way 
prepared to defend against similar Serbian led atrocities.161   
In addition to a lack of impact on the social and political rights of Kosovar 
Albanians, Rugova simply could not improve the standard of living in Kosovo. For 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The fund also supported both social welfare programs (food, health care, and sports) and the work of 
Kosovo’s parallel government” (Perritt, KLA, 89).   
156 Perritt argues that “Rugova also sought to minimize the KLA because it was a political movement with 
the potential to derail the LDK’s dominance over Kosovo political life… So Rugova made a political 
decision to reinforce Milsoevic’s propaganda minimizing the significance of the KLA.” Perritt, The Road, 
34-35. 
157 Another argument exists that Rugova was “under the de facto control of the secret intelligence service in 
Rome,” closely tied to the Pope and Mother Theresa.  It may be one reason that Milosevic did not explicitly 
target Rugova.  Pettifer, Express, 47. 
158 Perritt, The Road, 32. 
159 Perritt, The Road, 32.  Rugova refuted the existence of the KLA through broadcasts and print media, 
“describing its members as a motley collection of bandits and archaic Marxists.  When KLA activity could 
no longer be dismissed so easily, Rugova insisted that the KLA fighters and martyrs were Serb secret 
police and collaborators in disguise” Perritt, KLA, 15.  
160 Pettifer, Express, 36.   
161 Bosnian War: April 1992-December 1995.  The Croatian War began roughly a year in 1991. 
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example, “[I]n 1952 Kosovo’s Gross Material Product (GMP) per capita was 44% that of 
the Yugoslav average. It had declined to 29% in 1980 and to 22% in 1990. 
Unemployment had reached 27% in 1980 and was to increase to 40% in 1990.”162 
Hyperinflation across Yugoslavia and the rise of a black market made life extremely 
difficult as Milosevic further destabilized the economy; by 1994 inflation was over a 
trillion per cent annually and the “government in Belgrade had stopped giving banks any 
cash.”163  Kosovo’s “shadow state”164 could not accommodate for Serbian economic 
repression. In 1993, 250,000 Kosovar Albanians depended on food supplies provided by 
aid organizations.165    
 In spite of these negative fiscal and constitutional trends, by the end of 1992 and 
the beginning of 1993, Kosovo’s insurgency changed drastically in terms of independent 
political mechanisms and the level of public support for those mechanisms. The majority 
of its Albanian population stood behind the LDK-led government, nominally reaching 
appearances of Phase 4 levels in both areas of the phasing model. Political leaders 
defined goals, established political campaigns, grew a multi-party system, held elections, 
collected taxes, published a constitution, and administered a semi-successful if 
underground education and medical system. In this respect, Kosovar Albanians were on 
their way to becoming a supportable state.  
In reality, limitations caveated this level of strength. Kosovo’s parliament was not 
allowed to meet and did not conduct routine or daily operations of a state. The 
administration in exile and not at home held the key to political continuity and funding. 
                                                          
162 Kosovo Commission Report.  
163 Pettifer, Express, 44. 
164 Leurdijk and Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, 21. 
165 Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 20. 
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Also, at this point in the resistance, the new government eschewed a defensive 
organization and lacked full budgetary/economic control or conscription policies. One 
might argue that it needed to stay separate from mechanisms of violence in order to 
remain viable and ignored by the Serbian authorities.166  Regardless of ethical 
discrepancies or practical necessity for forgoing violence, the LDK remained overtly 
separate from the LPRK’s vanguard leadership.  
Although certain relational links between the LPRK and the LDK did exist, like 
those with Bukoshi and Krasniqi, they did not, impact Rugova’s larger organization that 
grew more contentious with the LPRK over time. Where certain traditional insurgencies 
might already have entered a weeding out process with perceived competition, Kosovo’s 
movement did not take an immediate violent internecine track. The LPRK had no interest 
in alienating its own constituency. Additionally, while the LPRK intended to lead the 
resistance of Kosovar Albanians against Serbia, it had yet to create any kind of pathway 
or institutional links that would authoritatively control the political activity of any 
ensuing state. Members maintained an expectation to participate politically once 
statehood became fully viable.   But culturally and historically, Kosovar Albanian 
resistance movements hinged upon volunteerism and choice. This attribute would persist 
across the breadth and depth of the emerging insurgency for participating KLA 
membership, even though relationships became extremely intense – even violent – at the 
top of competing organizations. 
To provide a small amount of foreshadowing, many KLA leaders were accused of 
assassination and purges later in the insurgency. For example, Hashim Thaci, Azem Syla, 
and Xhavit Haliti were accused of murdering “as many as half a dozen top rebel 
                                                          
166 Or to keep the international backing that supported its operations. 
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commanders,” although State Department Spokesman James Rubin did not substantiate 
any of the allegations.167 Also, once the LDK-led administration stood up the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) in 1998, numerous tribunals insinuate that 
assassinations and weeding out occurred on both sides.  
To return to phasing attributes during the early establishment of the LDK and 
Kosovo’s parallel government at this time, Kosovo’s vanguard leadership coordinated 
with underground organizations interested in violent resistance. In spite of the Serbian 
infiltration of training camps, the vanguard capability expanded to accommodate Phase 2 
and 3 levels. And public support for violent methods grew from Germany and 
Switzerland as more and more Kosovar Albanians left Kosovo under duress. In spite of 
growing activity, the majority of Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo continued to be unaware 
of the LPRK, even though local rural pockets maintained their traditional commitment to 
violent resistance. Finally, although the violent mechanisms on the ground experienced 
materiel and logistical setbacks after Serbian infiltration, networking inside Kosovo 
prepared for armed hit and run tactics. Shortly they would return to Phase 1 and 2 
capabilities.168  
7.6   The Founding of the KLA (1993-1995) 
While still considered radical in the eyes of most of the Kosovar Albanian 
constituency, the LPRK rallied its underground networks and regrouped in 1993 to 
                                                          
167 Chris Hedges, “Kosovo’s Rebels Accused of Executions in the Ranks.”   
168 Pettifer notes that during the winter of 1991-1992, the “Belgrade Communist party newspaper Politika 
was regularly reporting the expansion of areas of northern rural Kosova that were out of control of the 
Yugoslav security forces.” Pettifer, The KLA, 68. 
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propose an alternative path to Rugova’s pacifism.169  After a series of meetings in 
Kosovo, the future of the insurgency fundamentally changed for three reasons. First, 
there emerged a new primary resistance association called the Popular Movement for 
Kosovo (LPK) that organized into sub organizations and operational zones on the ground 
in Kosovo.170  For example, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo 
(LKCK) took on the task to condition Kosovar Albanian citizens to accept 
violence;  members like Valon Murati secretly distributed leaflets and newsletters at 
considerable risk in Pristina from door to door arguing for violence against the Serbian 
government.171   
Second, as the LPRK disappeared and the LPK became the apex of resistance 
leadership, its top members comprised the insurgency’s new vanguard and focused on 
fostering an international constituency and presence, raising money, providing a political 
face to the insurgency, and arranging necessary logistics to the internal network. Leaders 
in exile set up a funding mechanism called Homeland Calls172 to control money and 
                                                          
169 Pettifer writes that these meetings included the LPRK, the LPK, and the LKCK.  The LPRK represented 
the “intellectual founding-father Enverists” while the LPK was originally comprised of “the slightly 
broader church of younger militants.” Pettifer, The KLA, 69. 
170 Judah says that the LPRK split into the LKCK and the LPK. Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 66. 
171 Perritt, KLA, 25-26. Perrit writes that the LKCK originally competed with the LPK vision and argued 
“fighting should be deferred until after the population had been conditioned to accept violence.”  Also see 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (2010).  
Unlike Pettifer, he does not connect the LKCK to the LPK at this time.  Interestingly, however, individuals 
maintained membership in both organizations at the same time.  For example, Hashim Thaci is connected 
to the Liberation organization as well as the LPK.  Pettifer says that the LKCK was formed in March 1993 
by a “small group of activists” who wanted to prepare “the population for mass mobilization against the 
Serbs and a popular uprising.” Pettifer, KLA, 68.  Regardless, the LKCK originally was likely a student led 
movement.  Eventually it took up arms under the KLA command in May 1997 and then transitioned back 
to its own political party, “holding two posts in the provisional government.”  International Crisis Group 
(ICG), Who's Who in Kosovo, 31 August 1999, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6cf0.html [accessed 29 June 2015].  Also see Perritt, The Road, 32. 
And Pettifer, The KLA, 133. 
172 “In the spring of 1993, Homeland Calls was organized in Arau, Switzerland, under Swiss banking law, 
by Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, Jashar Salihu, and others.  Ibrahim Kelmendi, based in Bonn, coordinated 
fund raising for Germany… Homeland Calls grew from early, and very modest, efforts by the LPK and its 
predecessor, the LPRK, to organize an infrastructure for Albanian resistance in the late 1980s for an 
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support available to zones on the ground. LPK leaders would become the basis for the 
KLAs General Staff in 1998 that reorganized Kosovo’s guerrilla forces, interacted with 
NATO leadership, and ran lines of intelligence during the height of the insurgency – all 
capabilities premature to the 1993 association.  
Finally, with respect to the armed ground component, the LPK needed a 
capability to network the independent pockets of resistance throughout Kosovo. It set up 
a “'Special Branch' of four men including Hashim Thaci whose job it was to prepare for a 
guerrilla war.”173  By December of 1993, the insurgency determined the name of the 
intended armed component would be the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – also known 
as the UCK in Albanian, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës.174  The LPK did not fully 
control any part of the broader organization. Similar to the Chechen resistance, field 
commanders on the ground were tied to their territory by clan and to the broader 
resistance by choice, often for convenience.  
Operational zones across Kosovo were initially associated with self-made 
individual commanders and eventually numbered seven by the end of 1998. For example, 
Ramush Haradinaj led the Dukagjini Zone that held routes across the Albanian border.175 
Rrustrem Mustafa, also known as Commander Remi, and Zahir Pajaziti were leaders in 
the Llap Valley Zone; Remi was one commander who developed a local “training 
academy.”176  And Adem Jashiri and Sami Lushtaku led resistance in the Drenica zone. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
eventual armed resistance, and had a small fund supported by fifty Deutschmarks per month from each 
member (though some members, of course, contributed more).” Perrit, KLA, 94. 
173 Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 66. 
174 “A delegate meeting of about 100 people was held in Drenica where leaders of the LPK and of the very 
Marxist LKCK, mainly a student group, joined the LPRK contingent and the orientation and military 
symbols of the KLA were chosen.”  Over time, other families joined the alliance, some with historic ties to 
the Bali Kombetar. Petifer, KLA, 69. 
175 Perritt, KLA, 19. 
176 Perritt, KLA, 19. 
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These three zones saw the most violence across the insurgency. (See Figure 7.3.)  Each 
commander acted with significant independence and made external financial connections 
to families in Europe and the United States. Some zones were directly supported by 
independent diaspora contributors who worked around the Homeland Calls process.177  
“Although the zone commanders universally respected the General Staff’s contribution to 
the war, they often resented the orders that came from ‘above,’” particularly at the 
outset.178 
 
Figure 7.3 Three Principal KLA Zones179 
Over the course of the next year, the LPK and the KLA became more comfortable 
regarding their coordination and solidified the go-betweens who could connect activity 
across the board. 
Leaders of the Planners in Exile met in November 1994 in Tirana, 
agreeing on a division of duties. Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, and Ali 
                                                          
177 Perritt, KLA, 89. 
178 Perritt, KLA, 84. 




Ahmeti, among others, would work outside Kosovo, concentrating on 
political representation of KLA, and would supply money and weapons to 
the group, which would coordinate operations. Hashim Thaci, Rexhep 
Selimi, and Nait Hasani would work inside Kosovo, forging linkages with 
the fragmented Defenders at Home. In the meantime, the Planners in Exile 
would launch a public relations campaign aimed at making the KLA seem 
more coherent than it actually was at the time.180   
 
With respect to internal recruiting efforts, KLA efforts built up a “network of sleepers – 
secret sympathisers ready to fight and take command of their village or town when the 
time came.”181  Family networks were engaged from rural locations into the cities to find 
potential supporters and ask them to be ready to support the cause when needed. 
It is likely that certain members of the LDK understood the changes occurring 
within the LPRK. For example, after 1993, Bukoshi became even more reticent and 
“slow to provide resources to the KLA because he feared their recklessness, naiveté, and 
disorganization;” he particularly distrusted Hashim Thaci182 and Xhavit Haliti who began 
to coordinate “requests from commanders for arms and other supplies within Kosovo.183  
Again, Bukoshi feared the more radical resistance “would get slaughtered and would 
bring down the wrath of Milosevic’s Yugoslav Army on the heads of innocent Kosovar 
Albanians.”184  For this reason, the LPK leadership worked independently from the LDK 
to secretly recruit, train, develop logistics, and fund its own organization.185      
                                                          
180 Perritt, KLA, 81-82.  Perritt drops the term LPK quickly and considers the KLA to have two primary 
components: the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at home.  This is a simplification that works well as a 
heuristic in his work. 
181 Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 66. Also Pettifer, The KLA, 67. 
182 Pettifer explains that Thaci “focused on recruiting ‘sleepers’ who were to continue their normal 
occupations until the appropriate moment to open the armed struggle.” Pettifer, KLA, 67. 
183 Perritt, KLA, 16 and 94.   
184 Perritt, KLA, 16.   
185 The LPK “was nearly invisible inside Kosovo, among the Diaspora, and to the international community” 
(Perritt, KLA, 8).   
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  In order to prevent Serbian penetration, the KLA and LPK entered a “silent 
period” until 1996 that relied upon clandestine tactics.186  Members mitigated future 
attempts at penetration by relying “on family linkages and other indicia of trust within the 
closely knit, village-oriented Albanian culture.”187 They also “hid their roles from each 
other,” asking few questions to distinguish between fund raisers, supply managers, and 
other links between the organization.188  
The early KLA was a horizontal organization with a strong emphasis on 
rank and file initiatives and no ranks, officers or non-commissioned 
officer class. This was in line with Enverist theories of underground 
military-revolutionary work, but would later pose very serious problems 
when the KLA ‘came out’ and engaged in open warfare on a large scale 
with the Yugoslavs. There was no theoretical model for a command and 
control system. Here there was a residue of the old kacak ethos, where 
military authority resided with charismatic local family leaders who led 
their local men into battle, much as happened in eighteenth-century 
Scotland at Culloden.189 
 
Alternatively stated, at this stage, hierarchical command did not exist; commanders felt 
“they did not need soldiers” but could depend on traditional forms of local resistance.190  
Loose linkages connected like-minded small units determined to target Serbian security 
forces and related threats.191  The vision from the leadership in exile understood that this 
paradigm would need to change if the KLA was to act as and appear to be a professional 
army.  
                                                          
186 This meant “eliminating or intimidating individuals who were formally or informally part of the Serb 
secret police” (Perritt, KLA, 8).   
187 Perritt, KLA, 49-50.   
188 Perritt, KLA, 50.   
189 Pettifer, KLA, 70. “Despite these efforts to connect pockets of resistance ‘horizontally’ on the ground in 
Kosovo, it was easier to connect them vertically with the growing political leadership of the Planners in 
Exile in Albania, Switzerland, and Germany.  Horizontal connections on the ground inside Kosovo were 
too dangerous; the SDB (Serbian Secret Police) would find them.  But everyone in Switzerland and 
Germany, it seemed, had a cousin or two involved in armed resistance in one of the pockets in Kosovo, and 
the cousins found ways to stay in touch with each other.” Perritt, KLA, 82. 
190 Perritt, KLA, 81. 
191 Perritt, KLA, 81.  According to Rexhep Selimi, “It was all the same group; we just found ourselves in 
different places.  We couldn’t do politics and logistics from inside; they couldn’t do operations from 
outside.”      
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Under the new framework, small armed groups began to conduct hit-and-run 
operations across Kosovo.192  “Resistance increasingly took the form of offensive attacks 
on police stations and police patrols, as by Jashari in the Drenica Valley, the Haradinaj 
family and others in Dukagjini, and Pajaziti in the Llap Valley.”193  Attacks increased 
over time and by 1996 they “were occurring almost weekly throughout Kosovo” using 
“surprise, popular support, terrain, and local knowledge” to engage “in hit-and-run 
tactics.”194    
The Milosevic regime appeared to have adequate resources to keep urban 
Kosova under full control. This was not the case in the countryside. The 
nascent KLA grew most effectively on or near the borders, as in Llap and 
Dukagjini. It had little purchase in towns and cities. Between 1992 and 
1995, about 135 armed attacks195   
 
occurred against Serbian security forces without official attribution.   
Then, after a coordinated series of attacks in June 1995, the first official KLA 
communique came out that publicly introduced the name of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army.196  In 1996 the KLA developed a stronger media voice. Citizens slowly became 
aware that Milosevic and Rugova’s claims were not valid; the KLA was real and the pace 
of attacks would only accelerate.197  At this time, however, weapons were in extremely 
limited supply and the use of explosives was nonexistent. Without needed technology, 
increased personnel, and training, the insurgency would stay confined to Phase 2, small 
unit hit-and-run tactics. 
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 By 1995, the vanguard operated comfortably through Phase 3 levels of capability. 
Infrastructure to collect funding and arms continued to solidify, as well as operational 
networks within and outside of Kosovo itself. Rural leaders and supporting operatives 
controlled territory, leveraged safe houses, and set up a handful of training camps within 
Kosovo and beyond. Certain rural regions approached Phase 3 levels of localized 
enduring control due to associated clan social norms and insular demographics.198   
A chasm still existed, however, across elements of the relationship framework. 
While the vanguard interoperated with illicit networks and the armed resistance, the 
majority of the public still supported Rugova’s variation of passive resistance. In order to 
overcome this challenge, “the KLA thought the best way to win over the population was 
to start fighting” and increase local perceptions regarding their “likelihood of success.”199   
The KLA organizers not only had to overcome the perception that defeat 
was certain. They also had to persuade the mass of Kosovar Albanians that 
the KLA was the right agency to lead the rebellion, that the potential for 
the KLA and its predecessors was greater than that for Ibrahim Rugova’s 
passive resistance.200  
 
And although the small attacks against police targets across Kosovo made a small impact, 
three major events between 1995 and 1998 would serve to change the playing field and 
the standing of the foundational insurgency relationships. These events include the 1995 
Dayton Peace Accords that undermined Rugova’s position and enabled the Serbian 
government to turn its focus back on Kosovo; the dissolution of the Albanian regime in 
1997 and the opening of a sizeable source of arms from Albanian armories; and the 
                                                          
198 For example, “In December 1996 the Serbian authorities became seriously concerned about totally 
losing control of parts of the important Llap district in the north-east bordering Seria, and ordered a 
crackdown.  Newly emerging local KLA leaders like Edmond Hoxha were targeted and he was duly shot 
down with others near Pestove on 31 January 1997.” Pettifer, The KLA, 99. 
199 Perritt, KLA, 26-27.   
200 Perritt, KLA, 31.    
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Serbian attack in the spring of 1998 on the entire Jashari family, killing approximately 
sixty men, women and children.  
7.7   Three Catalyzing Events (1995-Spring 1998) – Mainstreaming the KLA 
The uptick of KLA attacks against Serbian targets within Kosovo in 1995 
coincided with the ratification of the US-backed Dayton Peace Accords between Serbia, 
Bosnia, and Herzegovina. Although continuing sanctions against Serbia aimed to bring 
Milosevic to the negotiating table and to motivate respect for human rights in Kosovo, 
the final December agreement ended Yugoslavia’s secessionist conflict without any 
mention of Kosovar Albanian rights or autonomy.201 The absence of Kosovo’s plight 
from the agreement signaled that the international community would treat Kosovo as an 
internal issue for Serbia and that Rugova’s methodology to achieve independence would 
not work.202   
Consequently, the KLA’s logic of force gained instant credibility and increased its 
potential for additional public support.203 As espoused by the LPK and KLA leadership, 
the relative success of the Bosnian example illustrated that Kosovar Albanian 
independence could come through armed mobilization and the intervention of NATO or 
the United States in response to violent conflict. The international community would not 
force Serbia to let go of Kosovo simply because the cause was just.204  Therefore the 
                                                          
201 Richard Holbrooke, the lead U.S. negotiator brought up Serbian behavior toward Kosovo during the 
negotiations but lost leverage on the issue because he needed Milosevic’s cooperation for higher priority 
concessions. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 10. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning 
Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000). 
202 William Hayden, “The Kosovo Conflict and Forced Migration: The Strategic Use of Displacement and 
the Obstacles to International Protection,” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 14, 1999, 
http://jha.ac/articles/a039.htm. 
203 Perritt, KLA, 32. 
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actionable key for the KLA would be to find a tipping point that invited intervention and 
provide Kosovar Albanians a voice in the political process.  
The KLA wanted LDK elites to “believe that passive resistance was hopeless”205 
and Dayton effectively impacted that thinking. Soon after Dayton, members of Rugova’s 
administration defected from his policy of nonviolence. Bukoshi, for example, publicly 
disagreed with Rugova206 and pursued the development of an armed force aligned with 
the elected LDK-led administration in exile. Eventually, Rugova himself came around to 
this line of thinking. Because the LDK did not turn to the KLA as the lead organizing 
body for the growth of violent resistance, however, the relationship between the two 
became increasingly complicated over the next few years. If the LDK developed a 
separate armed component, then it would directly compete with the LPK/KLA. The 
absence of a legitimate KLA political mechanism would give Rugova’s organization a 
substantial leg up in directing the insurgency if it could also develop its own army. 
In terms of alternative options outside of the LDK in 1996, the KLA was still an 
unknown entity to the Albanian constituency; it did not have the political maturity or the 
infrastructure to provide a greater role in the insurgency at the time. The “political 
directorate,” eventually called the “‘general staff’—was diffuse and disorganized” and its 
forces were nowhere near a strength that could defend against Serbia’s conventional 
army.207  Protective and secretive regarding their hidden organizational associations, the 
KLA had no more than about one or two hundred active armed members – even though 
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206 Perritt, KLA, 15.  
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its support network extended well beyond these numbers.208  For logistical and 
operational security reasons, zone commanders could not accommodate more recruits on 
the ground at the time. 
Therefore, in order to overcome immediate limitations, as Rugova unilaterally 
pushed back presidential elections and extended his term as president, the KLA acted 
inside Kosovo without a spokesperson, focusing instead on conducting hit-and-run 
attacks, avoiding annihilation, and upping its political and strategic game. For example, 
the LPK leadership worked logistics and fund raising in both Europe and the United 
States to increase the organization’s future access to weapons and associated pass-
through capability. Additionally, the handful of liaisons moving between the zone 
commanders on the ground and the enablers in the diaspora expanded interconnective 
relationships and communications to facilitate future cross-zone dynamics. 
Even without a spokesman, KLA public communiques proliferated during 1996 
and 1997, targeting messages for various audiences. Press releases reached the BBC209 as 
well as local newspapers such as Koha Ditore and KD Times; the KLA also “established 
a radio station called Free Kosovo and a news agency called Kosova Press.”210  It is 
possible these organizations were augmented by the new U.S. Information Agency’s 
cultural center that opened in Pristina in 1996.211  Regardless, as will be seen, the role of 
                                                          
208 Perritt, KLA, 137.  Perritt says around 100.  Judah says, “perhaps no more than a couple hundred” 
(Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 69). 
209 For a large bundle of numbered communiques, see “The KLA In Its Own Words,” compiled by Andy 
Wilcoxson. July 26, 2007.  http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/kla_communiques.htm. Each 
document was published by the Albanian media or entered into evidence at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. 
210 Perritt, KLA, 149. 
211 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 10. “The Western press, working side by side with the local 
Kosovar press, was an essential communications conduit.  But it took a while to get plugged in.  When the 
KLA leaders introduced themselves to the world in November 1997, it did not take long for them to make a 
big splash.” Perritt, KLA, 137. 
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the press became increasingly important to the KLA strategy – both in terms of enticing 
intervention from the West as well as establishing connections to emerging supporters 
within the local and diaspora populations. Mounting attention afforded by the 
international press assisted insurgency methods of communication over time.  
Although the KLA designed a strategy to trigger external intercession, the 
vanguard and armed component committed to a path of violent resistance regardless of 
whether the United States and the West intervened. Its leadership in Europe, however, as 
well as zone commanders such as Ramush Haradinaj, believed that NATO and US 
support would prevent a fate for Kosovo similar to that of Northern Ireland;212 an 
insurgency that might take decades to resolve unaided could tread a much shorter path 
given Western state backing, particularly because the Warsaw Pact could no longer aid 
Serbia.213  Kosovo needed state sponsors who could help it find a place within the 
international community. Without sponsorship, total independence from Serbia’s 
dictatorial power and arbitrary control might be impossible; without help, Phase 2 and 
Phase 3 violence would continue almost in perpetuity unless Serbia could crush the 
resistance. 
Both the KLA message and corresponding insurgency activities, however, had to 
relate consistently enough for potential international stakeholders and the Kosovar 
Albanian demographic to fully invest in the effort.  
In order to build the popular support for armed resistance, the KLA had to 
undermine the credibility of the myth of Yugoslavia; it had to convince the 
Albanians in Kosovo, in western Europe, and in the United States that 
                                                          
212 By the summer of 1998, for example, “Although Serbian armour could overwhelm the KLA in 
particular battles, the Serbs did not have the size of infantry resources available to effectively occupy and 
pacify the territory they had ‘gained’ and often the KLA moved back into it when the heavy armour 
withdrew.” Pettifer, The KLA, 148. 
213 Perritt, KLA, 13-14. 
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Kosovo was a police state—that the Serbs were an occupation army, not 
the agents of Yugoslav interethnic tolerance.”214  
 
Moreover, through word and deed, the KLA would have to show that it could handle the 
responsibility of speaking for an emergent state and managing the violence in which they 
engaged.215   
Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on the perspective, convincing internal 
and external constituencies would soon become easier; “Milosevic’s forces, now freed 
from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, began to turn their attention to Kosovo, intending to 
stamp out the emerging insurgency.”216  Some sources suggest that Milosevic began to 
revive “the 1930s theory of Vladislav Cubrilovic, who wrote the first coherent plan to 
subject Kosova to ethnic cleansing.”217  Although increasing violence and brutality 
against Kosovar Albanian civilians provided some indication of what was to come, 
actions in 1997 could not yet substantiate this claim.  
Among the increasing flow of KLA press releases in 1997, a number of 
communiques requested financial support of Kosovar Albanians globally but did not ask 
for volunteers.218  Until late that year and through the beginning of 1998, Serbian policies 
regarding weapons control and pacification made it extremely challenging for Kosovo’s 
armed component to obtain ordnance at all; the lack of munitions posed a serious 
limitation to their expansion. Many recruits exercised creativity by using ceremonial 
family weapons or by bribing corrupt Serbian police and military officials to obtain 
                                                          
214 Perritt, KLA, 30. 
215 “The war was not going to be a matter of simple Albanian territorial advance and Serbian retreat, 
culminating in some liberation of Prishtina like the liberation of Berlin in 1945. Kosova was actually a 
highly complex operating environment that demanded local military leadership with a clear final vision of 
victory but an almost infinite tactical flexibility in achieving it.” Pettifer, The KLA, 140. 
216 Perritt, KLA, 8 
217 Pettifer, Express, 92. 
218 Perritt, KLA, 32 and 196. He cites KLA communiques Nr. 30 (3 Feb. 1997); 33; 35 (12 Aug. 1997); 36 
(15 Sept. 1997; 38 (7 Nov. 1997) and 39 (22 Nov. 1997).  
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guns.219  Members who went without functioning arms could not directly contribute to 
the fight. And until this logistical situation changed, “sleepers” waited across Kosovo to 
be called to service. When the insurgency could develop a more mature ability to provide 
both organized leadership and traditional sustainment capabilities – beans, beds, and 
bullets – and when the operational context required it, the vanguard and zone 
commanders would call upon this surge capacity and act.220   
In January 1997, the weapons limitation became less of a constraint for the 
insurgency as Kosovo’s peripheral environment changed. Massive protests broke out in 
Albania and led to the collapse of Sali Berisha’s regime.  Albania’s arms stockpiles 
became available and an emerging market of weapons signified that more recruits could 
join the KLA ranks. “Out of the 70 million Kalashnikovs that have been produced world-
wide, Albania stored about 600,000 in local magazines in March 1997.”221  As weapons 
for $10 a piece moved toward Kosovar Albanian buyers,  KLA numbers increased and 
“multiple supply lines developed, many of them controlled by Dukagjini Zone 
commander Haradinaj, whose forces were astride the border” and knew the local 
region.222   
Over the next two years, new recruits walked through the mountains and across 
the Kosovo-Albanian border to acquire their own weapons, often through the bodies of 
men and horses killed by Serbian gunfire, staying some nights in villages and other nights 
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in the open air.223  Once in Albania, they met volunteers from Germany and Switzerland, 
sleeping in camps set up on empty school grounds along the border.224  After a two week 
stay, soldiers received old or broken AK-47s as well as ammunition that they then had to 
carry back on their person, or sometimes on donkeys.225  As weapons first became 
available in Albania, weapons training occurred only after recruits returned back to their 
original zone headquarters. 
Although somewhat cavalier and filled with the risk of Serbian reprisal, the LPK 
leadership furthered a KLA strategy that garnered visibility in the West, “even at the cost 
of inducing greater Serb repression.”226  Accelerating attacks in 1996 and 1997 did not go 
unnoticed or unanswered by potential friends and foes thanks to the media. Although 
Rugova still advocated that the KLA was a fabrication, a January 1998 article in The 
Times claimed that KLA rebels forced the withdrawal of “hundreds of police,” from areas 
along the Albanian border resulting in a breakdown of Serbian control.227  Similarly in 
much of Drenica, police were also “forced to withdraw” by February.228   
Ultimately, Kosovo’s insurgency began to make the radar of the international 
community, although not necessarily in the way the KLA hoped for. Western officials 
                                                          
223 Detail in this paragraph provided during 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis 
Maryland.  Xhavit ended up being one of many recruits dedicated full time to the weapons supply routes.  
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227 James Pettifer, “Kosovo gunmen for Serb police to beat retreat,” The Times, August, 1, 1998, 
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still questioned the KLAs legitimacy as a “back-able” organization. For example, in 
February 1998, the American envoy to the Balkans called the KLA a terrorist group229 
even though it purposefully avoided suicide attack methods and sparingly engaged 
civilian targets.230  Due to allegations of kidnapping and murdering Serbian civilians, 
however, the appellation continued to be used by many members of the international 
community, even after NATO entered into a relationship with its leadership and began to 
interface with its zone commanders. 
The vanguard did not want the KLA to be perceived as a terrorist outfit by NATO 
or by the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. Besides methodology, additional characteristics 
differentiated them from standard terrorist organizations. Regarding ideology and 
political theory, often a Phase 0 vanguard task, although the “LPK and LPRK was in 
origin Enverist… it did not have a single coherent theorized ideology by the year 1997” 
and appeared politically agnostic; similarly, its General Staff wanted to become a capable 
army but lacked a clear doctrinal model for its insurgent force or a conventionally minded 
leadership that could develop its capability.231   
Accordingly, it issued a political statement in late April of 1998 regarding its 
agenda.232  First it stated an objective of liberation of Albanian occupied territories. 
Second it denounced terrorism and violence against civilians, stating that the KLA 
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observed international war conventions. Next, it expressed a desire to cooperate with the 
international community and would negotiate with Serbia under the auspices of 
international mediation. The statement declared invalid any attempt at peace without its 
express participation. Finally it expressed dependence on its own legal funding 
mechanism and asked for the help and intervention of the United States and the European 
Union. 
Left alone or given the wrong sponsorship, it might have turned into a radical 
terrorist organization like the Chechen resistance. At this early point in time, however, 
the KLA took efforts to overcome any association with terrorism and strove to look like a 
credible army, to include using standardized uniforms and grappling with the execution 
of more conventional tactics. Allegations of KLA/LPK connections to illicit trafficking 
and organized crime are expansive throughout the press and academic literature. While 
this kind of behavior does accompany terrorist organizations, it is not exclusive to them. 
That said, organized crime plagues the Kosovar Albanian government today and quickly 
played a heavy role in political affairs after Serbia withdrew. 
In the end, Milosevic might have stayed ahead in international opinion and in 
overall control of the region by minimizing Serbia’s counter reaction to KLA hit-and-run 
attacks. This, however, was not to be. On 5 March of 1998, Serbian forces massacred the 
family of a prominent Drenica-based resistance leader over a three day period, killing 
Adem Jashari and fifty-eight of his family members.233  During the week leading up to 
                                                          
233 “Several years before (Adem Jashari) had killed a Serbian policeman and been convicted, but the Serbs 
were frightened to get him because he would shoot at them from his house. They had tried in January but 
were forced to retreat. Jashari was a maverick. He hated the Serbs, and although he was one of the KLA's 
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the “Jashari Massacre, Serb forces killed another twenty-four, including ten members of 
the Ahmeti family and rounded up other suspected KLA leaders from around the country, 
once again decimating” a portion of the armed leadership.234  Uniformed Serbians “beat 
ten local Albanian residents to death in front of their families in a classic reprisal action” 
for the killing of a Serbian policeman by the KLA.235  While the international community 
struggled to respond to the massacres, KLA diaspora leadership returned home within a 
week of the incident to revector efforts on the ground and to quickly reconstitute its 
leadership in effected regions. For example, “Hashim Thaci, Agim Bajrami, Shukri Buja, 
Fatmir Limaj and Ismet Jashari” took the reins of the new General Staff in Kosovo.236    
The Kosovar Albanian response to the Jashari Massacre “forced the KLA to 
become an army some years before it had planned to do so.”237  Even in Pristina where 
the KLA held low levels of popular support, over 100,000 citizens marched against the 
Serbian government. Very quickly the compounding momentum of overlapping 
insurgency mechanisms and lines of effort successfully leveraged financial assistance and 
additional manpower from the global Albanian diaspora.238  Without help from this 
broader network, the KLA could never have mobilized in such a short amount of time.239  
At the beginning of the buildup particularly, weapons shortages and the absence of local 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Interesting that while Judah describes Jashari as an early KLA recruit, Pettifer calls Adem and his brother 
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administrative frameworks or training programs made mobilization extremely 
challenging.  
At the time of the massacre, the size of the KLA armed component “was only 
about 500-600 organized fighters.”240   
Overwhelmed with volunteers and struggling to arm them through the 
supply chain now functioning through the recently collapsed state of 
Albania, the KLA made use of its newfound riches by broadening its 
attacks and declaring itself to be an ‘army’ rather than a mere guerrilla 
movement.241  After the massacre, young men from all over Kosovo, from 
Europe, and from the United States242 swarmed to make contact with the 
KLA, seeking to enlist in the fight to defend their families.243  
 
Over the course of a year, approximately one in every one hundred Kosovar Albanians 
would try to join the armed resistance; that’s roughly 18,000 in a prewar population of 
1.8 million.  Similar estimates figured 15,000-17,000 KLA fighters in Kosovo and 
another 5,000 in Albania.244    
Furthermore, to provide some detail of capabilities discussed more fully in the 
next section, over the summer, the KLAs executive political committee established itself 
as a General Staff and redefined 
operational zones and appointed zone commanders, inevitably ratifying 
the identity of those who had already emerged as regional insurgency 
leaders.245  It instructed zone commanders to reorganize their forces into 
brigades and battalions and to appoint commanders of each subordinate 
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unit… The “battalions” were platoon size—ninety to one hundred men 
each.246 
 
Where volunteers were turned away in March of 1998, because the organization was not 
ready to access them, they were given a signal by June that the KLA was now better 
organized and ready to enlist them.247  For example, even though weapons were 
unavailable for hundreds of new recruits, between the summer of 1998 and March of 
1999, training became organized and more formal.248  Llap and Drenica stood up four to 
eight week programs and Albania organized a number of camps, “both for KLA soldiers 
coming from Kosovo for weapons and for recruits coming from the Diaspora.”249 
In parallel to directed KLA activity, “village militias began to form and clan 
elders, especially those in Drenica decreed that now was the time to fight the Serbs. 
Whether they were KLA or not, they soon began to call themselves KLA.”250  The 
massacre of the Jashari family ignited values intertwined with the rural kacak tradition in 
Drenica and became a symbol across Kosovo and the diaspora that families were unsafe 
against the Serbian regime. 251  The KLA worked with many local elements, helping them 
gain weapons and to build trenches around their positions.  
 With respect to the insurgency phasing model, the period between 1995 and 1998 
saw the continued bifurcation between the political mechanisms of the LDK-led shadow 
state of Kosovo and the LPK-led vanguard alliance with the region’s underground 
resistance networks and violent mechanisms. A complication regarding this assessment, 
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however, is that by 1998, it can be argued that two competing vanguards existed. This is 
because Bukoshi and the other members of Rugova’s administration, now with Rugova’s 
permission, established an LDK-led military component and decided to abandon 
compromise or coordination with Milosevic.252 By June 1998, the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Kosovo (FARK, Forcat e Armoatosura te Republikes se Kosoves) moved 
from Albania into Kosovo and began limited operations on the ground, creating further 
tension between competing leaderships.253   
In line with Phase 2 vanguard behavior, press reporting indicates that Colonel 
Ahmet Krasniqi, the newly appointed defense minister, attempted to push FARK 
commanders to take control of KLA forces, and was murdered soon after on 21 
September.254  Additionally, in September, Sabri Hamiti, one of Rugova’s closest 
advisers was gunned down.255  Although inter-Albanian violence was likely the cause, 
the attack may have been conducted by the Serbian secret police who hoped to further 
divide the two Albanian factions and deter the West from entering into any arrangements 
with the Albanians.256   
Evidence suggests that the FARK/LKD leadership worked with the KLA/LPK as 
often they worked against one another during the war, complicating the phasing 
description. First, “Bukoshi and other critical members of the Kosovar Albanian elite 
came around. Having initially refused KLA requests for money from his Three Percent 
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Fund, he was actively channeling money into the KLA by late 1998.”257  In fact most of 
the funds collected by both funding mechanisms after 1998 went to “buy arms and 
counter Serb aggression.”258   Second, Bukoshi attended demonstrations in Europe with 
KLA families who had lost soldiers in the fight, like the Jashari’s.259  And third, the small 
teams running weapons between Albania and Kosovo provided arms to both FARK and 
KLA forces even though they were members of Haradinaj’s Dukagjini zone.260    
On the ground, the KLA consistently outperformed the FARKs smaller 
organization of a few hundred soldiers261 and zone commanders received Rugova’s 
forces differently across zones.262  Variation in acceptance is a fourth example of the 
complicated FARK/KLA relationship. While rejected outright by some commanders, for 
others “FARK units ceased to operate under their own name” and “began operating as the 
KLA, though their chain of command remained unclear as they co-operated with other 
KLA units on the ground but still had their own Minister of Defence.”263 
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The detailed role played by FARK soldiers in the conflict has yet to be 
investigated on any objective basis. Anecdotal evidence would suggest the 
FARK may have contributed something to the liberation of Peje but 
played a very negative role in border logistics, in Albania, in the fighting 
at Rahavec and around Prizren at later stages of the conflict.264 
 
Comprised at the outset of former Yugoslav military members and originally the creation 
of a Pan Albanian assembly sponsored by the Democratic League of Croatia, certain 
FARK units frequently left their posts during or before battle.265  For all these reasons, 
for purposes of phasing designations, FARK and KLA are considered together in the 
category of violent mechanisms. Led and funded by overlapping leadership, the 
discrepancies of their commanders are looked at as internecine competition. 
Between March and July, the KLA developed supply corridors between Kosovo 
and Albania, set up rear bases areas, reorganized the armed component, pushed initial 
Serbian security forces out of rural strongholds, and prepared for Phase 3 guerrilla 
warfare, rather than just small unit tactics.266  Adem Demaci, who was released from 
prison in 1990, kick started a new beginning to his political career and became a KLA 
political spokesman, lending legitimacy to its efforts and going as far as to say that he 
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266 Zone commanders and the General Staff still focused primarily on “personal revenge for aggression” 
rather than on “sabotage to undermine the Serbian war effort by taking out vital infrastructure such as 
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didn’t recognize “Rugova’s ‘Parliament in Kosova.”267  Public support and 
organizational development in rural areas rose to Phase 3 and 4 levels where local 
militias identified with and called themselves the KLA.268  Although the KLA did not 
have the technology, training, or transportation to conduct mobile warfare against Serbia, 
the momentum attained by the relationship between the vanguard, the public and 
associated mechanisms of violence far surpassed the KLA capacity of the pre-Jashari 
massacre period.269  
Milosevic did little to counter the swell in insurgent activity between March and 
June, likely needing time to register what was actually happening on the ground as well 
as devising a counterinsurgent strategy.270  Serbian intelligence believed that the KLA 
was much larger in March than it actually numbers suggested, 3,500-4,000 strong rather 
than 500-600 strong; Milosevic’s intelligence also misinformed him that KLA motivation 
spurred from neighboring Albanian leadership to “create a ‘Greater Albania’ rather than 
simply liberate Kosova.”271  Because of this, heavy Serbian tactics began along the 
Albanian border, and only encouraged people to support or join the KLA.272  While 
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was on in Kosovo” (Perritt, KLA, 76). 
271 Pettifer, The KLA, 122-123. 
272 Pettifer, The KLA, 123. 
280 
 
Haradinaj’s zone took the brunt of the initial fighting, the KLA worked to expand its 
presence across all the other zones. 
 Serbia’s actions in March 1998 catalyzed the insurgency for two reasons. Not 
only did the series of attacks set off the next phase of insurgent mobilization, it also 
brought significantly more outside attention to Milosevic than the KLA could have hoped 
for on its own. In this way, Jashari and the others truly were martyrs. For example, on 5 
March, NATOs North Atlantic Council offered to help Albania, Macedonia, and the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) cope with crisis consequences. In June, NATO 
began exercises in Albanian airspace to demonstrate power projection and also issued 
directives to develop response options in support of international efforts, “including a 
phased air campaign and a full range of options for using ground forces.”273  In July, the 
“United States, Russia, and the EU established the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission 
(KDOM) to monitor developments in Kosovo.”274 
   The UNSC passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 
and UNSCR 1199 on 31 March and 23 September, respectively.    
Within days of the Serb crackdown that left eighty-five people dead, 
foreign ministers from the six countries met in London to condemn the 
attack. The ministers demanded that Milosevic agree to cease all action by 
Serb security forces against the civilian population, withdraw Serb special 
police units from the territory within ten days, allow humanitarian groups 
to enter Kosovo, and commence an unconditional dialogue with the 
Albanian community.275 
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The United States reinstated sanctions lifted only days before the massacre and Europe 
froze Serbian funds, additionally placing an arms embargo on the country.276   
 Finally, on 25 June, as violence escalated, US special Balkans envoy Richard 
Holbrooke visited KLA strongholds to gauge the Liberation Army’s partnership potential 
and determine how to “merge Kosovo’s political and military structures.”277  After 
meeting with Holbrooke, KLA Commander Sami Lushtaku stated that although Rugova 
was an obstacle to Kosovo’s independence, the KLA would be willing to accept Rugova 
as president “provided he changed his line on the KLA, and gave it credit.”278  According 
to some interpretations, Holbrooke hoped to determine if the KLA was a “local defence 
force” or a “terrorist conspiracy,” whether it had political designs of its own or could 
become part of a broader future political process. 279  According to others, his intention 
was to lay down behavioral boundaries for the KLA in order to pave the way for future 
coordination.280 Both interpretations are likely valid. After speaking to KLA members in 
Kosovo, Holbrooke met a week later in Switzerland with KLA spokesman Bardyl 
Mahmuti. Behavioral changes ensued. For example, following the meeting, the KLA 
leadership altered Partisan habits and eschewed communist symbols for the duration of 
the insurgency.281 
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At this point in the conflict, the West wanted to obstruct Serbian-led violence 
while preventing Kosovar Albanians from demanding full secession from the tenuous 
state.282  From the American diplomatic perspective, 
Spring 1998 was likely one of the last moments that Western action might 
have influenced the course of events in Kosovo at relatively little cost. The 
local population still supported its elected ‘president,’ Ibrahim Rugova, 
including his nonviolent policies of civil disobedience. The KLA was little 
more than a small, unorganized, ragtag band of rebels that would most 
likely have disappeared once a serious political dialogue aimed at granting 
greater autonomy had started. By summer, (however,) the conflict in 
Kosovo had escalated as Serb forces responded to KLA advances by 
terrorizing the civilian population.283   
 
Once Milosevic’s forces began routine abuse of Kosovar Albanian families and civilians, 
“the Albanian population became more radical in its demands; the KLA became stronger 
politically, financially, and militarily; and the Serb desire to take drastic measures in 
Kosovo correspondingly intensified.”284   
Milosevic’s actions, however, did not end in mere abuse. Starting in July of 1998, 
Serbia’s counterinsurgency campaign transitioned from direct attacks on the population 
made in retaliation for KLA strikes to a policy of full scale ethnic cleansing. For 
example, in July, as a result of poor tactical judgment, the KLA lost the town of Rahavec 
to the Serbs where the infantry terrorized inhabitants for three days.285 Conventional 
military forces (VJ) augmented Special police and Interior Ministry (MUP) troops across 
the region. By August, more “than eleven thousand MUP and twelve thousand VJ” forces 
supported by tanks and artillery forced roughly 1.3 million Albanians from their 
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homes.286 By 1999 the number of troops increased to sixteen thousand MUP, twenty 
thousand VJ, and five thousand paramilitary troops.287  “Had Milosevic not escalated the 
conflict dramatically by creating the largest forced exodus on the European continent 
since World War II, and had alliance leaders not then realized they had to radically 
overhaul their military strategy, NATO could have lost the war.”288 
Section 7.8 further explores the phasing dynamics across the insurgency’s final 
year of fighting and highlights associated political developments during that time. In 
terms of the phasing construct and the relationship framework, the period exhibits waxing 
and waning military capabilities, volatile political alliances, and intensified public 
support. Because Milosevic attempted to ethnically cleanse Kosovo – his actions induced 
extreme swelling in the KLA membership and in levels of community assimilation. At 
times, however, internal public support proved difficult; Serbian forces temporarily 
routed increasing numbers of civilians from the country. Conversely, international state 
support successfully impacted the vanguard’s political behavior and credibility, as well as 
the overall range of the mechanisms of violence available to the insurgency. Because of 
Western intervention, Kosovar Albanians enjoyed a leveling of the playing field, 
temporarily attaining needed conventional capabilities to repel Serbia’s conventional 
military. Although the international community did not immediately allow Kosovo to 
become a state, or even publicly support its growth in that direction, NATO and the UN 
took measures to further state-like institutions and mechanisms that benefited insurgency 
aspirations. 
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7.8   War, Exodus, and Western Intervention (Summer 1998-1999) – A Seat at the 
Table and an End to the Insurgency 
  As Serbian forces pushed Kosovo’s Albanian civilian population out of KLA held 
areas in July 1998, the resistance movement did not have the capacity to hold newly 
gained territory or to protect the civilian population.289  The KLA augmented guerilla 
warfare with frontal engagements but frequently fell back to avoid annihilation, 
particularly in the three zones where the majority of fighting occurred.290  
Whether or not the Serbs had lured the KLA into such a position 
intentionally, the KLA’s efforts to create free zones and to demonstrate its 
capacity to conduct frontal warfare like a regular army, aimed at defending 
civilians and increasing its credibility with the Kosovar population and 
with Western powers, put it in a position that allowed the Serb forces to 
use their superior military power more easily. The free zone strategy made 
the battlefield more symmetric, while the quantity of forces and fire power 
were still as asymmetric as they had been from the beginning.291  
 
As a result, over 200,000 civilians fled burning villages to hide in forests and find safety 
outside of Kosovo. They faced a myriad of threats such as hand-held weapons, grenades, 
anti-personnel mines, tank and truck mounted artillery, as well as the systematic rape of 
girls and women.292   
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 To compound the displacement problem, the KLA zone leadership found it 
difficult to keep troops engaged on the battlefield. New members on the front lines were 
little more than armed and uniformed civilians. According to zone commander Haradinaj,  
It was the right of everyone to agree to fight and it was the right of 
everyone to leave. They were inexperienced and they were scared. When 
they saw that a battle was not going so well or saw two or three of their 
friends killed or wounded, they just sought the safest possible place. They 
would run for a half-day until they got there.293 
 
Consequently, even though on paper KLA numbers expanded by accommodating new 
recruits, at their base, on a level of capability, the insurgency still constituted a guerrilla 
organization – albeit one with potential for more. While each zone targeted an end 
strength of two thousand men divided into battalions, companies, and platoons, zone 
forces constantly waxed and waned depending on battle circumstances.  
For example, shortly after the beginning of Serbia’s July offensive, “FARK leader 
Tahir Zemaj deserted the Dukagjini zone with most of his troops and weapons;” the 
FARK members, like other volunteers, fought when conditions became favorable to 
them.294 Tahir’s desertion hit Haradinaj hard and reflected the zone commander’s greater 
problem: although he led eight to ten thousand soldiers in June of 1998, by September his 
forces stood at less than 100 armed insurgents.295  The zone’s armed component came 
extremely close to being eviscerated and needed external support in order to survive. 
   From the vanguard perspective, Haradinaj’s September Dukagjini zone crisis 
provided the reengineered General Staff an opportunity to prove itself as an adaptive and 
supportive leadership, overcoming initial judgments that the organization served as a 
titled figurehead over the zone commanders. The outcome of the summer’s 
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reorganization moved away from the “Partisan-derived principle that the army was a 
collection of semi-independent units, with minimal communication between them.”296  
Not only had the LPK-KLA implemented a new vertical governance structure, it also 
made improvements in radio sets, satellite phones, and hand held devices to better enable 
coordination across zones. Empowered by these changes, the General Staff “responded 
quickly with several hundred fighters, just in time to mitigate Serb attempts to completely 
wipe out Haradinaj and his remaining resisters.”297 The KLAs maturing capability 
represented improvements in communications and coordination between the General 
Staff and zone commanders.  
As the Serbian offensive in July 1998 continued to establish positive gains for 
Milosevic’s regime, ethnic cleansing practices expanded and became more aggressive, to 
include a scorched earth policy and further village bombardment from tanks carrying 
rockets and cannons.298   When civilians left their villages ahead of VJ troops, Serbian 
forces took the opportunity to destroy their homes, livestock and crops; they also 
poisoned wells with dead animals and shut down hospitals that served Kosovar 
Albanians.299  With roughly 300,000 displaced persons on the move, the West finally 
decided to act. In October, the United States sent Richard Holbrooke back to Kosovo to 
negotiate a ceasefire agreement and establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in 
Pristina.300  
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In a parallel mode of support, on 12 October, NATOs governing body, the North 
Atlantic Council, voted to authorize force in support of UNSCR 1199. On 13 October, 
the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) “announced the deployment 
of two thousand unarmed personnel” to support the KVM and to monitor compliance on 
both sides.301  Serbia signed Holbrooke’s ceasefire agreement on 15 October and the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1203 eight days later on the 24th. UNSCR 1203 provided a 
“substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration” for 
Kosovo and demanded compliance by Serbia with all previous agreements and 
verification missions. It also called for the development of a timetable for a future 
negotiated settlement. 
Although the pause in hostilities and the required withdrawal of Serb heavy forces 
from Kosovo enabled the KLA to recover from the previous months of battle, the Serbian 
military did not fully pull out of Kosovo.302 UN figures place drawdown numbers after 
the ceasefire to be around 14,000 from an initial 30,000.303  For example, a “battalion of 
Yugoslav tanks and anti-aircraft weaponry” maintained a position “near KLA strongholds 
and refugee camps in central Kosovo.”304  Inevitably, given continued Serbian placement 
and the KLAs returning strength, violence resumed in the region without any reprisal 
from the UN or NATO and the war moved into urban areas like Pristina and Prizren.305   
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On Christmas Eve in 1998, Serbian “security forces launched a major new 
offensive around the town of Podujevo.”306 And, in January 1999, they massacred forty-
five civilians in the village of Recak. 
Army artillery had pounded the village for three days before Serb forces 
entered. All had been executed. Monitors of the Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM) organized by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had been sent to the area as fighting 
escalated in the days and hours preceding the massacre. They entered 
Racak within twenty-four hours of the killing and described a scene of 
unspeakable horror.307 
 
The massacre in Recak pushed the international community to engage its own 
mechanisms of violence and set the NATO alliance in motion. It also spurred Milosevic 
to increase ethnic cleansing activities, to include associated atrocities such as beatings, 
killings, rape, sexual violence, extortion, and “the use of women for forced labor.”308 
It should be noted that violence in Kosovo was perpetrated by both sides during 
the fall and winter of 1998-1999 as the KLA surged in popular support and presence. 
After Christmas, for example, the KLA began to “attack some of the few ethnic Serb 
villages” in the north of Llap and Podujeve where it “expanded considerably in the 
previous three months.”309  
[T]he KLAs numerical strength had grown to about 6,000 men and women 
across Kosova, with no less than a minimum of 2,000 in and around 
Podujeve. The insurgency here had reached a new point, of the de facto 
merger of the people with the army on a scale that was absent elsewhere in 
most of Kosova.310   
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On the other side of Kosovo, VJ troops engaged Albanian border forces along the 
northern Has region where refugee tent cities supportive of the KLA provided a “bustling 
market for munitions and food supplies.”311 
The cumulative violence that mounted in December and January convinced the 
Contact Group to push a final diplomatic solution in France. During the Rambouillet 
Conference that February and March, KLA leaders Jakup Krasniqi and Hashim Thaci sat 
at the negotiating table and found themselves directly in the public eye for the first 
time.312  Under the KLA banner, Thaci led the Kosovar Albanian delegation that also 
included LDK political leaders such as Bukoshi and Rugova as deputy.313  Thaci’s 
signature on the resulting agreement signified a brief period of unity across Kosovar 
Albanian resistance entities as well as the interim supremacy of the KLA over the LDK. 
Practically speaking, Thaci, not the LDK leaders, would have to convince each of the 
seven zone commanders on the ground to comply with resulting agreement conditions.  
Thaci’s participation and position at Rambouillet applies to both Phase 3 and 
Phase 4 vanguard attributes. He not only worked to secure international support, but also 
began to move in the open as a leader of political and military forces in Kosovo. At the 
same time, however, his designation as an international political representative within a 
legitimate treaty-making space is absent the composite insurgency phasing model and 
identifies a weakness in the framework. Signing internationally significant political or 
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military treaties on governance should be included in Phase 5 political mechanisms and 
coordinated with Phase 5 vanguard assimilation into formal political and security 
mechanisms. Recall from Chapter 2 that Belligerents are considered to be state 
representatives according to the Law of Armed Conflict.  
While the KLA accepted the Rambouillet terms, Milosevic not only refused its 
conditions but further “escalated the conflict, forcing well over a million ethnic 
Albanians from their homes.”314  His forces targeted Kosovo’s Albanian civilian 
population even more than its KLA defenders who worked to leverage their winter 
capability gains. For example, after the ceasefire, the KLA advanced its organizational 
and logistics capabilities, declaring a force size of 30,000 troops and obtaining upgraded 
weapons such as grenades and landmines.315  Also, to bolster its international face, 
former Croatian armed forces Brigadier General Agim Ceku was named the top KLA 
military commander. Ceku “had developed a close relationship with U.S. Army General 
Richard Griffiths, who, as head of MPRI (a private defense contractor), had administered 
the ‘Equip and Train’ program in Croatia.”316  By the time NATO’s Operation Allied 
Force began an air-led bombing campaign on 24 March 1999, the KVM pulled out of 
Kosovo due to unsafe and deteriorating conditions.317   
In terms of political objectives of the involved parties, while the KLA declared a 
right to full autonomy and Milosevic desired an Albanian-free Kosovo, NATO still hoped 
to bring both parties back to the negotiation table. The KLA, at this point, purposefully 
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remained agnostic to political ideology in order to substitute a coherent political platform 
with desired Western intervention. Although the General Staff stood in as a political 
committee as well, KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi related that because the pace of 
events within the war escalated so quickly in 1998, the higher priority concerned the task 
of liberation.318 
In order to further claims of KLA-led statehood, Thaci founded and led a new 
“Provisional Government of Kosova” at the beginning of April.319  Hypothetically, this 
represented a significant step in publicly aligning phasing efforts across insurgency 
components, even though his administration did not yet participate in day-to-day actions 
required of state political mechanisms. Observers noted that Thaci succeeded in the 
interim, “in large part because the KLA had then built close ties or melded with much of 
Rugova’s” LDK.320  Rugova, however, refused to participate or lend support to the 
mechanism, preferring to wait conditions out and effectively ending a brief period of 
LDK/LPK/KLA alliance. Thaci hoped Rugova’s absence would diminish the LDK 
leader’s political appeal to the Albanian nation. Rugova, however, maintained the 
backing of both Italy and the Vatican and patiently waited out the war outside of 
Kosovo.321  He chose to reenter the political process under the security and safety of a 
Kosovo protected by international institutions.  
Between March and June of 1999, the KLA confronted Serbia’s conventional 
army and suffered losses in force numbers that varied by zone.322  By May, KLA pockets 
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remained across Kosovo, but “were mostly isolated from each other… smaller than the 
KLA free zones of 1998.”323  When fighters retreated in the face of overwhelming force, 
KLA members and supporters often reoccupied “lost territory soon after the VJ vacated 
it.”324  Given the Serbian offensive, KLA behavior continued to waffle between Phase 2 
and Phase 3 insurgency attributes. In numerous zones, guerrilla warfare and limited 
mobile warfare capabilities diminished in conjunction with the KLAs ability to control 
territory.  
External conventional capabilities and assistance eventually permitted the KLA to 
sustain itself and turn its strategic position around once more. In March, however, even 
with NATO air power supporting them, the KLA failed to make substantive gains against 
the Serbian army. Surprisingly, the initial NATO bombing efforts provided only limited 
aid to KLA efforts on the ground, offering poor support to KLA activity and sometimes 
even mistakenly hitting insurgency forces. This strategic picture persisted because the 
rules of engagement confined NATO’s military offensive to Serbian targets in Kosovo. 
Additionally, aircraft were prohibited from flying below 15,000 feet.325   
Over time, collaboration between NATO and the KLA increased, to include 
small, joint force patrols326 and better air support to activity on the ground. 
[I]t was more effective to combine NATO’s airpower with the KLA’s 
ground forces synergistically and simultaneously, profiting from whatever 
the KLA could do to force Serbs out of their protected defensive positions. 
Using intermediaries such as the Albanian military, and possibly working 
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through the CIA rather than direct military channels, the alliance knew 
what the KLA’s general patterns of operations were by war’s end.327 
 
Llap’s Commander Remi, for example, thanks the US army members in his memoir War 
for Kosova for the advice and assistance they provided him.  
 In addition to improving tactical coordination, three environmental conditions 
soon changed wartime dynamics in Kosovo and enabled a final international settlement in 
June 1999.328  First, NATO initiated a secondary strategic bombing campaign inside 
Serbia proper. “[E]lectricity grids were being severely damaged, water distribution was 
adversely affected in all major cities, and the businesses and other assets of Milosevic’s 
cronies were being attacked with growing frequency.”329 Second, Milosevic believed that 
he had already won; not only did he drive the KLA back down to a small guerrilla force 
of around 3,000, but he also believed that he successfully removed the entire Albanian 
population from Kosovo.330  And third, Moscow intervened to work with NATO to 
develop a new agreement, pressuring Milosevic’s full acceptance.331   
  As a result, Milosevic reentered negotiations and on 09 June signed the Military-
Technical Agreement in Kumanovo, Macedonia. Under NATOs eye, Serbian troops fully 
withdrew from Kosovo this time, taking their equipment with them. On 10 June, the UN 
                                                          
327 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 152.  Daalder and O’Hanlon cite Dana Priest and Peter Finn, 
“NATO Gives Air Support to Kosovo Guerrillas, but Yugoslavs Repel Attack from Albania,” Washington 
Post, June 2, 1999, p.A1. There are also unconfirmed reports of NATO Special Forces working inside of 
Kosovo with the KLA; see Philip Sherwell, “War in the Balkans: SAS Teams move in to Help KLA ‘Rise 
from the Ashes,” London Daily Telegraph, web version, April 18, 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/.   
328 A conjectured fourth condition might also play a role.  Milosevic was told “about NATO’s likely 
invasion plans by Victor Chernomyrdin during the latter’s first visit to Belgrade on May 27” 1999, even 
though President Clinton never publicly committed to a ground force combat operation.  Daalder and 
O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 160. 
329 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 4.   
330 Stephen Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Project 
Air Force Series on Operation Allied Force), (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001): 87-88.  Perrit, KLA, 59 
& 198.  Pettifer states that, “By the end of April, the number of KLA soldiers probably amounted to about 
18,000 men and women, of all ages, from raw teenagers to men of seventy or more.  They were scattered 
all over Kosova.” Pettifer, The KLA, 219. 
331 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 172-175. 
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Security Council passed Resolution 1244 and called for the demilitarization of Kosovo. 
While UNSCR 1244 mandated a new United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to 
run the autonomous province, 50,000 NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR) prepared to enter 
the region in a supporting role.332  Contrary to Serbian hopes, within weeks, almost all 
displaced Albanians were able to return to the country.333 
  Initial friction after the Serbian withdrawal occurred between Thaci’s provisional 
government, UNMIK, and NATOs KFOR. UNSCR 1244 lacked the legal basis and 
“authority for what the KFOR head (General) Mike Jackson and the UN Representative 
Bernard Kouchner regarded as a ‘parallel’ government to the international 
administration.”334  Jackson and Kouchner feared the development of a “nationalist 
government under the control of ex-KLA figures.”335  Consequently, they projected that 
their plans would be undermined when the “Serbian administrative structures collapsed 
across all but a few Serbian majority areas of the province;” this is because the KLA 
filled the resulting “power vacuum, installing not only its own people in town halls, but 
also institutionalizing” Thaci’s provisional government.336  
Events would soon verify these projections to be unfounded, however, as Thaci 
remained true to the agreements he signed at Rambouillet.337  By late September he 
dissolved the provisional government and worked to demilitarize the KLA, incorporating 
                                                          
332 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 3, 176.  The first KFOR troops arrived on 12 June. 
333 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 4. 
334 Pettifer, The KLA, 222. 
335 Pettifer, The KLA, 226. 
336 Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 74. 
337 Pettifer, The KLA, 222.  Pettifer argues that Thaci lacked the “means of preserving the Provisional 
Government from the forces that wished to destroy it.”  He blames the UN and NATO’s misplaced 
objectives, Thaci’s naiveté and lack of political experience, Rugova’s accommodation to external interests 
in order to reenter the political scene, as well as other KLA members who looked to continue the 




its members into the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Protection Corps led by General 
Ceku.338  These kinds of actions represent the integral assimilation of Phase 5 
mechanisms of violence, the consolidation of armed components into the new national 
force. General Jackson certified KLA compliance with international provisions and 
released an early October report that accounted for over 36,000 voluntarily turned-in 
weapons.339  
As might be suspected given the history of violence in Kosovo, “demobilization” 
needs further interpretation. The dissolution of the KLA represented a transition of the 
armed component led by the KLA back to an armed people. Although soldiers might 
have handed in their uniforms and a plethora of weapons as they returned to civilian life, 
many veterans kept and hid their rifles and pistols. “Although KFOR and UNMIK were 
able to demobilize the KLA… they were unable to stop the Albanian population restoring 
their traditional heritage of small arms possession in households.”340  Regardless, for 
Kosovo, this action represented a return to Phase 0 violence, defining the status quo of 
Kosovo’s existing military and violent culture.  
Although many revenge attacks on Serbian communities ensued during the 
transition period from Serbian control, the KLA contributed to the execution of UNSCR 
1244, to include their own demilitarization, “creating a secure environment for refugees 
and the internally displaced to return to their homes, ensuring public safety, and 
                                                          
338 Perrit, KLA, 151.  In August of 1999, Ramush addressed Xhavit Gashi’s company information about the 
KLA’s future.  “We were in KLA uniforms when they told us about the September transformation to the 
protection corps.  There were lots of fights talking about whether the KLA should be dissolved or whether 
to create a new organization.  We wanted to be an army without having a country yet.  Until statehood, we 
would need to join the civil protection organization, similar to the National Guard.”  01 May 2015 
interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.     
339 Wade Boese, “Belgrade, KLA Move Forward on Arms Control, Disarmament,” Arms Control Today 29, 
no. 6 (September/October 1999): 37. 28-07-2015 15:12 UTC 
340 Pettifer, The KLA, 229. 
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providing support for the international civil presence.”341  KLA members helped Kosovar 
Albanians come back to ruined homes by cleaning and rebuilding, digging new wells, 
and identifying victims.342  And of note, by early 2000 a Serb in Kosovo was no more 
likely to be killed than an ethnic Albanian.”343  
  With respect to insurgency political mechanisms and transition, while KLA 
members never worked to develop political parties before or during the war, after 
hostilities ceased, former regional zone leaders, KLA alliance organizations, and 
members of the General Staff developed independent and competing political parties. 
A priority was the formation of political parties, with the Swiss-based 
KLA spokesman Bardhyl Mahmuti leading the field by holding a party 
formation conference in Prishtina as early as July 1999.344 
 
Thaci, for example, established his own party called the Party of Democratic Kosovo 
(PDK) while also contributing to a UN-led joint administration. Former underground 
organizations such as the LKCK and the LPK became their own parties. The vanguard 
assimilated into formal political mechanisms – as did a number of former military 
veterans. Even Rugova would rejoin the fray. 
For although he sat out much of the war time fighting, Rugova still remained 
popular among the Kosovar Albanian citizenry, hovering above much of the KLA 
centered drama and corruption. 
Even as support for the KLA grew, popular opinion in Kosovo remained 
divided. Opinion polls conducted by the U.S. State Department during the 
NATO bombing campaign showed Rugova commanding more popular 
support than KLA leaders. And, after the war, Rugova’s party consistently 
led the KLA parties at the ballot box.345   
                                                          
341 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 176. 
342 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland. 
343 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 177. 
344 Pettifer, The KLA, 225. 
345 Perrit, KLA, 35. 
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In terms of the phasing model and public support, the Albanian population rejoined the 
political process and assimilated to the leadership choices provided by their new 
autonomy.  
Overall, by September of 1999, the Kosovar Albanian insurgency against the 
Serbian regime in Kosovo ended. And yet its path toward statehood continued. External 
intervention in the form NATO and the United Nations interceded in the insurgency 
process, taking ultimate responsibility for the rest of Kosovo’s transition to statehood. 
Although still unrecognized by the United Nations, The Kosovo Assembly declared its 
independence on February 17, 2008, an action that was affirmed as legal in July of 2010 
by the International Court of Justice. Under the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission, NATO-led KFOR peacekeepers continue to monitor activity in Kosovo between 
Albanians and Serbians. 
7.9   Insurgency Transformation 
In order to better illustrate the transformation of Kosovo’s insurgency across phases, 
it may be helpful to look at improvements across each line of effort over time. See Figure 
7.3. The narrative that accompanies the figure explains that the KLA/LPK vanguard 
eventually became the forcing function that led Kosovar Albanian political mechanisms, 
violent mechanisms, and the public to autonomy and independence from Serbian control. 
Granted, without UN, NATO, and Russian intervention, the outcome would have been 
drastically different – perhaps finding a fate closer to that of Chechnya. But the ultimate 
vanguard strategy succeeded in eliciting desired behavior from Serbia and the 
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international community, even though the KLA force never fully entered Phase 4 military 
operations or local political administration.  
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Table 7.2 Kosovar Albanian Insurgency Maturity by Phase 
After Tito’s death in 1980, the vanguard steadily increased its capability by 
leveraging the safe haven and support afforded by the diaspora in Europe and the United 
States, as well as Albania. The Chechen community described in Chapter 6 enjoyed no 
such haven. Also, unlike the Chechen insurgency, whose vanguard lost control of field 
commanders and associated mechanisms of violence, Kosovo’s vanguard maintained 
influence over zone commanders by providing resources in funding, weapons, and 
manpower. In its formative period, the KLA leadership brought like-minded resistance 
groups together by staying ideologically adaptive. It also successfully transitioned those 
organizations to become new institutions supportive of the emergent regime within 
Kosovo.346 Unlike the Chechen pathway, the KLA did not just weed out competition 
within the movement, it also coopted it to serve in its political and violent mechanisms. 
This speaks to the kind of government that would arise from the insurgency were it to be 
successful. 
                                                          
346 Some members did break off of the KLA in the fall of 1999 to establish the short-lived Ushtria 
Clirimitare e Presheves Medvegjes dhe Bujanocit (UCPMB).  This organization hoped to liberate 
Albanians in Preshevo and Macedonia with Western Help.  Interestingly, NATO troops did enter 
Macedonia in August of 2002.  This led to the Ohrid Accords that gave “major human rights advances to 
the Albanians.” Pettifer, The KLA, 246.     
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Similarly, the KLA did not interfere with the growth of Kosovar Albanian parallel 
political mechanisms that fed, taught, and medically administered to the population. By 
doing so, it enabled future compromise with the LDK, thereby allowing the KLA 
representatives to lead the Kosovar Albanian delegation at Rambouillet. In accordance 
with a practice of noninterference, the KLA never forced its agenda at the point of a gun 
on fellow Albanians. Rather, it let participants come and go in support of the movement. 
As long as individuals were not considered to pose a threat to the organization, the 
majority of KLA members worked hard to defend civilians from Serbian aggression. In 
this way, by the time Milosevic enacted a policy of ethnic cleansing, the KLA became 
perceived by its constituency as a protective force as opposed to a radical organization 
intent on claiming power at the expense of other Kosovar Albanians. 
This chapter, as well as the Chechnya exemplar, serves multiple purposes in the 
dissertation. First, it illustrates that insurgencies progress through the conceptual phases 
presented in Chapter 5 and that the nature of their manifestation speaks to the attributes 
of the emergent regime. Second, it explains that in order to scale towards statehood, 
phasing capabilities are determined by tasks that connect the components of the 
relationship framework. And third, the phasing model can be used as a tool to compare 
varied insurgent pathways and practices, so that over time, enough data might be 
gathered to determine preferred policy objectives.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion: The Politics of Insurgent Movements 
8.1        The Blind Men and the Elephant 
In the old Buddhist parable of the blind men and the elephant, a group of blind men 
are asked to describe an elephant for the raja of Savatthi. Each man approaches a 
different part of the elephant and explains his own subjective experience.  
"The elephant is a pillar," said the first man who touched his leg.  
"No! It is like a rope," said the second man who touched the tail.  
"No! It is like a thick branch of a tree," said the third man who touched the 
trunk of the elephant.  
"It is like a big hand fan" said the fourth man who touched the ear of the 
elephant.  
"It is like a huge wall," said the fifth man who touched the belly of the 
elephant.  
"It is like a solid pipe," Said the sixth man who touched the tusk of the 
elephant. 1  
 
Throughout the parable’s narrative, while each individual perception explores a limited 
aspect of the larger elephant, no one accounts for the totality of the full animal.  
 The lesson of the parable provides an interesting corollary to the politics of 
insurgency, and further represents the idiomatic elephant on the table. Meaning, political 
science has failed to broadly define the anatomy of insurgency or its basic components 
and processes as part of a contiguous spectrum. For example, Petersen and Wood focus 
on triggering and sustaining mechanisms of civilian mobilization during Phases 2 and 3. 
Chenoweth and Stephan singularly look at elements of Phases 1 through 3. Fearon and 
Laitin see insurgency solely as guerrilla warfare. Lyall and Wilson see insurgency as a 
protracted violent struggle for political objectives that leverages small mobile groups.  
                                                          
1 “The Elephant and the Blind Men,” http://home.earthlink.net/~insure/Elephant_and_blind_men.html. 
Also see http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rywang/berkeley/258/parable.html.  
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Many academics espouse that insurgency requires a death count of at least 1,000 people 
accompanied by annual kill rates.  
Such attempts caveat external observables that result from insurgent behavior 
when the phenomenon is more aptly explained by internal processes and milestones that 
cause them in the first place. Similarly, revolt, rebellion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, civil 
war, and revolution are each given their own separate category of study in traditional 
academic literature. This is in spite of the fact that respective forms are tightly 
interconnected by varying levels of political and violent capacity, often moving fluidly 
from one form to another. The counterinsurgent’s belief that he is not at war due to low 
levels of internal violence does not signify that an insurgency hasn’t begun. Those 
committed to a cause are at war well before coordinated and collective violence begins.  
Accordingly, this dissertation argues that insurgencies – at least when involved 
populations desire access to state political power and decision-making – exhibit 
consistent organizational requirements and processes across a defined relationship 
framework during comparative levels of scale. From a systems perspective, it proposes a 
connective theory on insurgency to assess why certain movements expand or ignite while 
others degrade or get stuck in a particular phase. Such a paradigm leaves room for 
numerous more detailed explanations regarding individualized pathways of resistance 
and insurgent growth.  
Think back, for example, to the introductory vignettes of Chapter 1. Now 
acquainted with the maturation cycle of the relationship framework, recall the familiar 
component parts of the eighteenth-century American Revolution, Urabi’s Revolt of 
nineteenth-century Egypt,  Mao’s rise to power in twentieth-century China, and the role 
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of transnational criminal organizations in twenty-first-century Mexico. Each insurgency 
case revolves around the emergence of political goals to alter or gain access to an existing 
state regime. Each attempts to develop new behavioral norms through constituting 
institutions and mechanisms. And each fosters networked relationships to grow an 
internal constituency and secure support from external actors. Even the cartel vanguards 
in Mexico work with state actors and other members of the transnational illicit 
community to achieve their desired ends. Regardless of initiating political goals, the 
outcome of all four introductory cases hinge upon vanguard interaction with multiple 
forms of collective violence (specifically framed for insurgency thresholds) and illegal 
political and civic acts of resistance.  
Based on the work of the last seven chapters, each of these insurgencies now nests 
within a cohesive comparative model of aligned mechanisms, the advancement of which 
comprised the first objective of the dissertation: to develop clear conceptual categories 
regarding a theory of insurgency that begins to define its scope within a coherent domain 
and to provide analytic leverage for future study. Where insurgency is concerned, 
indigenous guerrilla groups don’t just appear and start wars. They grow and form from 
within a contextual environment that is political at the heart, aimed at increasing power 
and supportive membership. Constitutive and destructive mechanisms are crucial to their 
development at every level. Resulting administrative benefits or acts of violence define 
the kind of relationship a new regime will have with the people in a given region; in some 
cases, they predict whether the insurgency will successfully scale to become a state.  
By synthesizing associated competing and complementary models on insurgency, 
Chapters 2 through 5 developed an empirically based conceptual model to account for the 
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evolution and variation of insurgency over time, place, groups, and forms. For example, 
through the analysis of two detailed case studies and four existing operational models in 
Chapters 3 and 4, repeatable processes, relationships and requirements emerged. See 
Table 8.1. Mao’s seven steps and Galula’s five-step orthodox theory applied to the 
Chinese Communist Revolution while Galula’s shortcut steps applied to the Algerian 
Revolution. SORO’s work applied to both historic cases. While each perspective is 
useful, they fall short of proposing a repeatable model of scalable processes and 
requirements across mechanisms.  
Mao’s Steps Galula’s Orthodox Steps Galula’s Shortcut Steps SORO Phases 
      1. Clandestine Organization  
    1. Blind Terrorism 2. Psychological Offensive 
    2. Selective Terrorism 3. Selective Terrorism 
  1. Create the party   4. Militarization 
1. Arouse and organize 
the people 
2. Establish a United 
Front    
2. Achieve internal 
political unification       
3. Establish bases 3. Execute guerrilla warfare 
3. Execute guerrilla 
warfare  
4. Equip forces “ “  
5. Recover national 
strength      
6. Destroy enemy 
national strength      
4. Execute movement 
warfare    
4. Execute movement  
warfare    
  5. Annihilation campaign 
5. Annihilation 
campaign  
7. Regain lost territories     5. Consolidation 
Table 8.1 Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison 
This theoretical synthesis, therefore, was the work of Chapter 5. In order to frame 
a meta-model on insurgency, Chapter 5 grouped existing model requirements from Table 
8.1. According to the relationship framework and then arranged processes within 
associated mechanisms by levels of scale. It also introduced additional political and 
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social behaviors observed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 cases. Integrating considerations 
for practical use, each suggested phase coordinates with legally accepted categories of 
intrastate warfare. Identified processes are signified by observable actions that map to the 
health and maturity of insurgent movements as political and violent phenomena. Actions 
taken by the leadership and the public are intimately connected to constitutive and 
destructive mechanisms. Phasing categories represent initial placeholders for itemized 
behaviors that should be further operationalized by additional study over time.  
For example, with respect to milestones across maturing phases of destructive 
mechanisms, Phase 0 represents a level of violence indicative of the existing culture – 
provided it is free of active insurgent violence. The Phase 1 threshold is triggered by the 
advent of training programs geared toward collective violence and the beginning of 
terrorist tactics. Phase 2 is reached when an insurgency can conduct strategic terrorism 
and coordinated small unit tactics on a routine bases. Phase 3 is met when the insurgency 
can execute guerrilla warfare and begins to professionalize its armed component. By 
Phase 4, the insurgency begins to acquire more advanced technologies to carry out 
mobile warfare and act like a professional army. During Phase 5, the insurgency is able to 
stand up a nationalized conventional capability which then transitions into the new armed 
forces of the emergent state. These forces may be geared toward self-defense, internal 
defense, or first response requirements.  
With respect to political phasing milestones for an insurgency, there exist 
corresponding maturity thresholds that constitute an altered governmental framework and 
associated rule of law. The definition of initial political goals and a political agenda for 
the perceived movement is accomplished in Phase 0. Phase 1 establishes targeted 
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political campaigns and grows the party infrastructure. Phase 2 includes the development 
of supportive political committees that lay the groundwork for the growing political and 
administrative infrastructure. Local provisional leadership stands up during Phase 3 with 
the ability to collect taxes. Phase 4 expands to the establishment of regional political 
administrations and the use of elections to substantiate legitimacy. And Phase 5 matures 
to the creation of a national political administration founded upon an accepted 
Constitution, guided by a nominal budgetary process, and in charge of conscription.  
While the model’s nominal political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency 
scale according to the phasing construct in a parallel path, their success depends upon 
two other contributing components of the relationship framework: the support of the 
public as well as the coherence of the vanguard. In most cases the growing political and 
violent mechanisms are enabled by the public and associated constituencies such as a 
global diaspora. For this reason, the model incorporates traditional social movement 
theory into the phasing levels that do not at this time distinguish between 
bureaucratization and coalition development for political as opposed to violent 
mechanisms. This is a weakness of the model that should be accommodated in future 
iterations. Because there are often discrepancies between phasing levels across lines of 
effort at any given time, sometimes exceptionally so, it will be important to better 
measure distinct pockets of support for one or the other.  
Phase 0 public support is defined by the existing social grievances of the 
population absent any formal political or violent mechanism of redress. Phase 1 then 
transitions from perceived inequities to targeted collective excitement and coalescence. 
The counterinsurgent government might become designated as the cause of injustice as a 
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result of the campaigning accomplished by the insurgency’s parallel political line of 
effort. Phase 2 engenders broader coalition building to mobilize elements of the 
population. The goal of this phase is to build resilient networks that will support both 
political and violent entities. Phase 3 looks for localized public assimilation to the 
insurgency, cooptation through a united front, and repression of dissent. Phase 4 does the 
same but at regional levels that penetrate higher percentages of targeted populations at 
scale, perhaps moving from rural communities into urban environments. In order to 
achieve this phase, the public has to commit to support a growing army rather than a 
guerrilla network. Additionally, it will need to feed regional political administrations 
aligned with the movement, participating in activities such as election processes, tax 
collection, and governance services. Finally, Phase 5 signifies widespread public 
repression by the insurgency or support of the movement by the public as the insurgency 
transitions toward a state-like entity. It is similarly possible that suppression will come 
from the counterinsurgent.  
In order to prevent the momentum of increasing entropy that violence induces in 
any social system, and in order to maintain a balance between constitutive and destructive 
mechanisms, successful insurgencies rely upon a coordinating entity that aligns political 
mechanisms, violent mechanisms, and public support with the overall movement. 
Ultimately the vanguard enables the insurgency to scale. As such, this frequently 
amorphous entity manifests differently across every insurgency and is based on the 
assumption that the insurgency framework is not complete until some kind of cephalized 
enterprise forms to lead and grow the resistance. In complex environments, there may not 
be just one vanguard that arises within the Phase 0 environment. For the purpose of 
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simplicity, however, the cases here leverage conceptual builds based on a single 
vanguard. Ultimately, the vanguard provides connectivity between political and violent 
mechanisms but may have less direct interaction with the public than the other two 
framework components.  
For example, during Phase 0 the vanguard comes together to define the 
insurgency’s elite core membership. It delineates a central ideological allegiance and end 
state that may differ from goals expressed by the united front or from the narrative 
professed by political elements. The determined ideology will likely include important 
concepts regarding initial boundaries associated with the use of violence and the 
insurgency’s desired relationship with the public. During Phase 1, the vanguard expands 
elite access and placement into licit and illicit political, economic, military, and financial 
infrastructure, often including elements of the existing state infrastructure. It begins to 
grow the united front, forming broader alliances of convenience that may become threats 
to future goals. Once the united front is established and different interest groups begin to 
emerge across the insurgency, the vanguard initiates a weeding out process that 
frequently begins during Phase 2.  
The primary Phase 2 requirement is to capture the leadership of illicit networks 
and to neutralize threats within the united front. While earlier phases may look to identify 
international support, the insurgency must secure external backing by Phase 3. This phase 
also establishes fundraising mechanisms and expands its hold on the political and violent 
growth of the resistance. Appointed vanguard leadership moves into the open during 
Phase 4; it is hidden during previous phases. Public leaders assume responsibility for 
political and military forces and often a secret service type of organization is instituted. 
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Finally, in Phase 5, the vanguard begins the process of assimilation into formal state 
mechanisms, followed by the rest of the insurgency’s members. See Table 8.2.  
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Table 8.2 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model 
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Divided into phases and lines of effort, the proposed model surpasses past 
attempts to accommodate the broad range of insurgent political goals, processes and 
violent typologies. For each phase, the four relationship components must maintain 
linkages and activities that build and grow in strength. How that happens, either through 
attraction and goodwill, or through violence and fear, is unique to each insurgency and 
ideally controlled by the vanguard. And, as long as the nation-state signifies the 
grounding unit of measurement and power within the international system, the 
fundamentals of the proposed framework should hold. This is because the most mature 
insurgency phase, also called belligerency, is defined by the attainment of statehood or 
state power. To be clear, reaching the status of a belligerency is not necessarily needed in 
order for an insurgency to reach its political goals, particularly if it is willing to share 
power with the existing regime.  
After Chapter 5 proposed the initial composite phasing model in accordance with 
the components of the relationship framework, Chapters 6 and 7 leveraged two case 
studies to explore their adherence to the model as well as their comparative behavioral 
development. The Chechen and Kosovar Albanian insurgencies successfully engaged the 
breadth of the model which proved useful to explain the maturity, growth, and decline of 
each movement. In the first case, the phasing model and associated relational theory 
explained the weaknesses and failures of the Chechen endeavor, predicting political and 
collective violence scalability limitations, and offering a strong explanation for the 
insurgency’s transition from a national movement to a terrorist organization. The 
Chechen vanguard fed the violent component of the insurgency at the expense of the 
public and political component.  
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In the second case, the analysis approached the relational context and processes 
that the Kosovar Albanian insurgency leveraged to increase their political and violent 
capacity to advance toward statehood. The Balkan insurgency allowed political 
mechanisms and public support to grow while moving strategically to trigger 
international support that validated its organization. Although its inner core would have 
transitioned toward a model akin to the violent resistance of the Irish Republican Army, 
the vanguard held out hope of external assistance and behaved in a manner consistent 
enough with Western norms of applied violence to elicit intervention.  
Such behavior highlighted a limitation of the model in the violent mechanism 
categories of Phase 1 and 2. Although terrorism was used against civilians considered to 
be a threat to the organization, as well as against some Serbian populations, it was 
eschewed on a strategic level. Future iterations of the model will need to consider 
alternate forms of collective violence other than terrorism as an option for these phases. It 
is possible that the vanguard and the leadership running an insurgency’s violent 
mechanisms may decide to use violence absent the use of strategic terrorism. This level 
of capability would still be less than the skill required of small unit tactics at the platoon 
or company level.  
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 illustrate the growth and decline of insurgency capabilities 
over individualized timelines for each studied insurgency. The analysis within Chapters 6 
and 7 divided phasing momentum within the relationship framework into chronologic 
segments in order to more easily digest scaling attributes. These segments account for the 
subheadings in each table. In the future, as various indicators become apparent within 
each phase and mechanism, it will be possible to measure and track more specifically the 
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phasing footprint of a given insurgency. There is the possibility for real time awareness 
that might also indicate the strength of the relationships between each component of the 
relationship framework over time. An indications-based model could determine whether 
an insurgency is tending toward directed violence, growing political institutions, or how 
it is supported by various public constituencies. If aligned with a demographic or terrain 
mapping layer, one could see by region where supportive affinities exist.  
              
  Origins of Insurgency  in Chechnya by 1991 
  
  
  Vanguard Phase 1-2 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 2-3 
   
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 1-2 
   
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 2-3 
   
  
  Territory Phase 2 
   
  
  
     
  
  Initial Autonomy, 1991-1994 
   
  
  Vanguard Phase 2-3 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 4 for violent mechanisms 
 
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0   
  
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 2-4 
   
  




     
  
  The First Chechen War (1994-1996) through 1999 
 
  
  Vanguard Phase 2   
  
  
  Public Support Phase 1 
   Political Mechanisms Phase 0-1 (Phase 1 for alternate Sunni network) 
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 2-3 (Phase 2-3 for alternate Sunni network) 
  Territory Phase 2 
   
  
  
     
  
  The Second Chechen War (1999-2002 ) through 2005 
 
  
  Vanguard Phase 1-3 focused on violent mechanisms   
  Public Support Phase 1   
  
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0   
  
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 1-2 
   
  
  Territory Phase 2 
   
  
  
     
  
  Chechnya Today, 2005-2015 
   
  
  Vanguard Phase 0-2 




  Public Support Phase 0-1   
  
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0   
  
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 0-2 
   
  
  Territory Phase 0-1 
   
  
              
Table 8.3 Chechen Insurgency Maturity by Phase  
              
  Origins of Insurgency  in Kosovo by 1945 
  
  
  Vanguard Phase 0-1 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 0-2 
   
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0 
   
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 1-3 
   
  
  Territory Phase 0-2 
   
  
  
     
  
  Birth of the Political Mechanism and Continued Rural Resistance, 1945-1980 
  Vanguard Phase 0 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 0   
  
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0   
  
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 0-1 
   
  
  Territory Phase 0-1 
   
  
  
     
  
  National Reawakening and Foundation of the Vanguard, 1980-1987 
  Vanguard Phase 1-2 (Phase 3 growth, international relations) 
  Public Support Phase 0  (Phase 1-2 pockets in rural areas) 
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0 
   
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 1  
   
  
  Territory Phase 1-2 
   
  
  
     
  
  Kosovo's Parallel Government, 1987-1993  
  
  
  Vanguard Phase 2-3 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 1 (Phase 2 rural and diaspora pockets) 
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0 (Phase 2-4 parallel Kosovar organization) 
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 1  
   
  
  Territory Phase 1-2 
   
  
  
     
  
  Founding of the KLA, 1993-1995 
   
  
  Vanguard Phase 3 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 1 (Phase 2 rural and diaspora pockets) 
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0 (Phase 2-4 parallel Kosovar organization) 
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 2 
   
  
  Territory Phase 1-3 





     
  
  Three Catalyzing Events, 1995-Spring 1998 
  
  
  Vanguard Phase 3 
   
  
  Public Support Phase 2-3 
   
  
  Political Mechanisms Phase 0 
 
(Phases 2-4 parallel govt. ) 
 
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phase 3 
   
  
  Territory Phase 1-3 
   
  
  
     
  
  War, Exodus, and Intervention, Summer 1998-1999 
 
  
  Vanguard Phases 3 to 4 to 5 
  
  
  Public Support Phases 3 to 0 to 5  (Diaspora 3 to 4 to 5) 
  Political Mechanisms Phases 0 to 1 to 2 (External Intervention) 
 
  
  Violent Mechanisms Phases 3 to 5 (Never Conventional) 
  Territory Phases 3 to 0 to 4       
Table 8.4 Kosovar Albanian Insurgency Maturity by Phase 
8.2        How did the Model Measure Up? 
The remainder of this final chapter further addresses the utility of the model to 
explicate the principal dynamics of each insurgency; it addresses their successes and 
failures based on framework requirements. It also provides potential improvements and 
future research opportunities that might prove useful to the proposed ontology. Finally, in 
addition to the ideas already introduced in the last section, policy implications are 
addressed in terms of relationship findings.  
8.2.1 Concept Utility 
Both the Chechen and Kosovar Albanian case studies illustrate that the skills 
needed to grow a maturing insurgency become progressively more complicated as an 
insurgency moves toward the embodiment of a nation state. The originating insurgent 
nucleus begins as a tight horizontal circle of conspirators with high connectedness. It then 
scales exponentially in task complexity and network nodes in order to build political and 
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violent capacity across a defined area of interest. 2  When this happens, the close 
relationships across the expanding membership become impossible to maintain 
individually and the vanguard’s intent is in jeopardy of dilution or contradicting motives 
and behavior; recall that Petersen and Shapiro speak of such a dilemma in terms of 
sustaining mechanisms and control and communication.3 Mao identified the dilemma as 
the potential for corruption from within the united front.  
The lack of scale toward socio-political maturity is a reason why so many 
insurgent movements stall in Phase 2, remaining confined to terrorism as a method of 
collective violence. First, leadership activities require minimal levels of public support or 
territorial safety zones. Second, the low numbers of active participants are also easier to 
control and sustain. And third, the skills needed to maintain an agile and resilient covert 
organization are more tenable than the political skills necessary to lead a dynamic 
society; successfully engage competing civic interest groups; promote internal and 
external national security; provide for public goods and services; manage a region’s 
natural and labor resources; maintain a balanced budget; and interact with the 
international community. 4 (These tasks are even hard for states to accomplish. Recall 
that we are speaking of the nominal best case competencies. ) If the counterinsurgent 
regime falls when the insurgency is still in early maturity phases, and if the international 
community does not step in, the resulting state will be limited to the attributes of the 
insurgent regime at the time.  
                                                          
2 This terminology is familiar to social network and big data analysts. I thank Ian McCullough and Kim 
Glasgow for emphasizing these terms within the context of the dissertation’s insurgency phasing theory. 
3 Shapiro, Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma, Managing Violent Covert Organizations, (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013). Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from 
Eastern Europe, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
4 And the need for covert organizations does not disappear with state formation; they just become licit in 
the form of internal security and intelligence services. 
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In order to overcome Phase 2 scaling challenges, maturing political and security 
mechanisms across subsequent phases require greater public support and organization. 
And if the full argument holds, as insurgent capabilities become increasingly powerful 
and membership within the resistance rises, the insurgency itself must become 
structurally less complex, more hierarchical, and more transparent. These three attributes 
sustain the movement’s clarity of purpose and behavioral efficiency in support of an 
emerging state. Results depend upon the vanguard’s ability to foster connectivity between 
all four relationship components. Simply framed, people need to know where to go and 
who to go to in order to join in the effort, whether their supportive activities include 
providing food and clothing, relaying messages and information, voting or not voting in 
elections, finding safe zones, or procuring weapons to join the fight. In order to 
psychologically align with the insurgency, they also need to understand why and for 
whom they are fighting. 5 
A growing insurgency that tends toward increasing network complexity without 
finding organizational efficiency moves toward greater and greater entropy, unable to 
effectively control the tools of state. As such, a balance must be reached between top 
down direction and bottom up spontaneity, as well as between the use of violence and 
civically-aligned political mechanisms. In each case, the combination of how these 
elements align depends upon the attributes of the working system. For example, in some 
circumstances, an insurgency is able to coopt existing forms of political and social 
institutions with little disturbance to the counterinsurgent’s original functioning units. In 
                                                          
5 Recall Wood’s emotionally-based endogenous variables of the righteousness of participation, the defiance 
of injustice, and the pleasure of agency. Elizabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in 
El Salvador, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 232-236.  
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other cases, however, the receiving society or ethnic group may have no history or 
precedent of national rule in a state capacity.  
The Kosovar Albanian and Chechen attempts at secession are examples of the 
latter circumstance. Additionally, at the outset, their organizations were shrouded in 
secrecy and lacked the organized hierarchy and efficiencies of modern state 
administrations. Because of these attributes, they relied on horizontal networks and 
relationships that were by definition illicit and outside of the law. Their united fronts 
encompassed numerous deals and affiliations with transnational organizations in order to 
obtain resources such as funding and arms. The Kosovar Albanians, however, had two 
principal advantages over the Chechens. First, Tito enabled a degree of self-rule during 
his administration that then transitioned into a viable shadow government prior to heavy 
fighting in Kosovo. Significantly, the KLA never interfered with this process and 
maintained many personal connections to the parallel political leadership.  
The Chechens, on the other hand, never historically evolved to socially support or 
participate in the mechanisms of a central state, in part because the Soviets excluded 
them from the USSR’s substantive political process. The Chechen vanguard also hosted 
numerous internal divisions, unable to scale, gain, and maintain control over rural based 
strongholds. As a result, the initial state-focused leadership quickly disintegrated. 
Chechnya’s vanguard proved most collaborative in the face of mandatory collective 
defense but clan governance defaulted to local desires for political autonomy rather than 
for a state-wide political form when state-building opportunities developed. Outside of 
the Chechen case, warlordism may not be the only possible outcome of similar 
circumstances though it is one of only a handful of comparable political forms; such 
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conduct, for example, might also yield an unstable mafia-like or gang-dominated 
environment such as in regions of Mexico.  
The necessity of scale regarding political mechanisms is highly apparent in the 
Chechen and Kosovo cases because of the model’s stipulated requirements. In the former 
instance, independent clan autonomy prevented political consolidation of the movement 
at the outset. Because the central vanguard was unable to provide resources or gain 
political momentum, military leaders turned toward Wahhabi donors who fundamentally 
transitioned the ideology of Chechnya’s armed operatives away from publicly acceptable 
behavior.  
Comparatively, in the Kosovo case, the vanguard successfully controlled funding 
and personnel resources so that its violent mechanisms relied upon the vanguard 
leadership for both international relationships and physical support. It catered internally 
and externally to adopt an increasingly open-minded political ideology, keeping within 
mainstream Kosovar Albanian public opinion. Over the course of the insurgency, the 
KLA perceptibly moved from the social fringes and toward a narrative of moderation. It 
also leveraged the illicit economy- an economic attribute that continues under former 
KLA-turned-civilian government leaders today. These insights are facilitated by the 
model’s systems-based approach across required relationships.  
Another advantage to an insurgency’s hierarchical transition revolves around its 
acceptance by the international community. In an ideal case, as an insurgency’s 
leadership not only increases and strengthens the number of connections required to 
sustain the relationship framework across its desired spatial and human geography, it also 
transitions its upward-facing organization. It has to look like a state so that it may interact 
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with the hierarchical structures of other states and resident international partners. Titles, 
authorities, and processes of states and international organizations speak a particular 
operating language grounded in law. The expectation from the existing system of states is 
that this language is consistent internally and externally.  
Internally, as the transition occurs, the domestic population finds stability in a rule 
of law that follows consistent procedures across political and violent mechanisms. 
Externally, as the transition occurs, new peers and regional alliances understand how to 
engage and accept or resist the new regime. Due to mismanagement and lack of capacity, 
Chechnya’s insurgency lost its very brief window to act like a state with the new Russian 
legislature. Additionally, because of its physical proximity to Russia’s territorial domain, 
it never enjoyed an opportunity to court Western support. The Kosovar Albanian 
leadership, on the other hand, worked very hard to appear as mature as possible in order 
to gain international acceptance and sponsorship. Once it garnered a guiding Western 
hand, the vanguard made specific behavioral choices to gain entry into the international 
system.  
8.2.2 Future Research Opportunities 
One of the benefits of a meta-framework on insurgency is that it provides a map 
to the preponderance of the current literature. And as such, contributions from previously 
stovepiped schools of thought may be connected and located across the phased 
continuum. Subsequently, as pockets of current research coalesce, gaps in understanding 
and areas that lack academic focus become clear. Besides addressing those gaps, future 
research opportunities might also look at processes involved in isolated phasing 
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transitions across mechanisms: between Phase 0 and Phase 1, or between Phase 2 and 
Phase 4.  
Additional detailed case studies could provide depth and specificity to verify 
model pathways and to distinguish actual methods of phasing operationalization. Even in 
the Kosovar Albanian case, a political behavior that needs to be added to Phase 5 
maturity is the development, signing, and execution of international treaties. What other 
kinds of actions provide legitimacy to the emergent regime? Given these broad potential 
future contributions, the rest of this section explores three detailed opportunities to 
address what I consider to be important research questions for the politics of insurgency.  
First, one of the most promising areas of study includes research regarding the 
transition between nonviolent movements and the adoption of violence mechanisms. This 
is an area that precedes the development of a guerrilla capability and incorporates a the 
question of how the utilization of one mechanism affects the capability of the other. 
Although Chenoweth and Stephan discuss the advantages of nonviolence to certain forms 
of insurgency, they do not attend to the fact that the use of violence in an insurgency is 
not necessarily a controlled choice. Take Kosovo as the primary example. What started 
out as a nonviolent campaign by Rugova’s inner circle transformed over a significant 
period to include the development of a supporting army – even against the leadership’s 
expressed interest and attempts to maintain a nonviolent stance.  
Additionally, the LDK could not in any way control the separate rise or 
development of underground movements in support of violence. As such, an excellent 
future area for study would be to determine the attributes of the relationship framework in 
circumstances where the vanguard, the political mechanisms, and public support mature 
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in the absence of violent mechanisms. A question to ask in such circumstances includes: 
where does the control of the use of force hold residence? Conversely, a study specific to 
the impact of high levels of violence on the political mechanism is called for. This is 
because when the use of violence increases to a certain level, political mechanisms often 
disappear. Associated research would then determine how comparative environments 
play into the relationship framework for scaling considerations.  
Second, an important aspect that should be further studied in detail includes the 
impact of external actors during different phases. In order for an insurgency to gain 
ground in the international domain, it requires an external state actor – or group of states 
– willing to guide and sponsor its transition. This may not be the case for insurgencies 
with lesser political goals, but it is certainly true in secession and circumstances which 
lead to Phase 5 insurgencies. It could even be argued that to reach any kind of 
conventional military capability, an insurgency requires another state to provide the 
weaponry and ordnance needed to conduct sustained mobile warfare. Therefore, the 
specific study of actions by external actors in support of and counter to insurgent goals 
deserves explicit study in light of their impacts on the relationship framework.  
And finally, the proposed model does not focus heavily on the scaling of 
insurgency requirements with regard to finance and economy. More work is required to 
develop a separate line of effort that teases out critical economic activities that are 
distinct from the political mechanism. The growth of modern economies, for the most 
part, is not controlled by hierarchical state forms and as such may not trend in the way 
that the political and military forms of state would. They would align more closely with 
the expanding civic networks in support of the insurgent regime.  
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Economic functions blend very closely with public support, and the existence of 
licit and illicit networks is vital to the resourcing of insurgencies. Future work may add 
this component in some way across the relationship framework. Regardless, an insurgent 
movement must learn to develop its own initial budget and resources and then scale 
economically to incorporate state functions – incorporating or influencing the presence of 
transnational criminal organizations within its midst and getting hold of economic 
development.  
8.2.3 Significance to Policy 
The arguments made regarding the ontology of insurgency within this dissertation 
illustrate the complexity of insurgent scaling based on the perspective of the insurgent 
organization. At the same time, however, they highlight opportunities for effective 
interaction across numerous points of contact – both in the support of insurgent 
organizations as well as against them. Security policies designed to drive nations toward 
stability without an understanding of the necessary mechanisms and processes of growth 
miss opportunities to find tailored solutions. They don’t significantly account for the 
nuances of the relationship framework at substate levels that might be leveraged or 
engaged to prevent or induce phasing transitions.  
For example, because territorial bases and safe havens are required to surpass 
Phase 2 efforts, the identification and development of geographically aligned supportive 
populations are integral to insurgency and counterinsurgency success. And, while fear 
motivates behavior to follow regime or insurgent law, psychological affinity lasts far 
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longer with less investment. 6 For this reason, both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent 
should develop civic support and mobilization directly aligned with their political visions, 
particularly among demographic areas of interest that can provide both cover and safety. 
Such areas would hide underground activity as well as host future training initiatives and 
house weaponry.  
The key of course is engaging the right location and population when and if there 
is a choice. In the United States at least, policy that might serve both information-
gathering and communications functions is mired in a confusing swirl of competing and 
ambiguous titles and authorities. One of the largest hurdles to accomplish these kinds of 
tasks as an external actor involves the coordination of disparate organizations designed to 
uncover the detailed relationship framework in a given region and those designed to 
communicate and interact with substate populations.  
Regardless of the intricacies of the American policy-making realm, if statehood is 
an insurgent goal, it is crucial for an emerging regime to mature aligned political 
mechanisms. And in order to scale, its vanguard must leverage existing civic networks 
that hold respect and moral dominion for inhabitants. Whether such networks originate 
within labor unions, student movements, diaspora communities, religious denominations, 
and historic clan or class divisions, engagement with these substate actors should 
reinforce intended regime outcomes with civic norms and desires. The counterinsurgent 
should additionally work with demographic populations that could go either way in the 
insurgency and maintain or foster a perception that the insurgent is radically outside of 
behavioral norms. The counterinsurgent should show that its standing regime looks 
                                                          
6 Recall that Wood accounts for higher levels of public mobilization and participation against an insurgent 
or counterinsurgent if that entity uses violence in against civilians in a given public. 
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toward negotiation and broader civilian interests. Sincere action would include looking 
more closely at insurgent and local grievances in order to address their validity and find 
areas of compromise with political leaders not connected to the insurgency.  
Growing grassroots political and cultural leaders supportive of the 
counterinsurgent and then bestowing legitimacy on those individuals, providing them 
decision-making power and access to violent mechanisms, is imperative to counter 
insurgencies in all phases. At higher phasing levels, both the counterinsurgent and the 
insurgent compete to drive their own civically-reinforced political systems that engender 
the public’s psychological priority. As such, insurgent policies must ensure that 
nationalism, or a hybrid form, drives the insurgency to create a modern state rather than a 
loose and ad hoc collaboration of local or regional partners. Russian actions in Chechnya, 
Crimea, and Ukraine are significant examples of this type of policy driven activity. In the 
cases of Crimea and Ukraine, Russia has used the same tactic but in support of 
insurgency against the existing state.  
From the perspective of an external actor, in order to determine what policies and 
actions will impact an insurgency, the relationship between the vanguard and political 
mechanisms should be closely studied to uncover areas of dissonance. And depending on 
whether interests lie in support of or against the insurgency, those areas should be 
targeted with persuasive information and activities designed to affect the strength of 
relationship framework. Knowing how to leverage the communications capability 
between the insurgent leadership, political mechanisms, and growing public support is as 
important as influencing the insurgency’s violent capabilities.  
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In the end, the biggest impact to policy from the suggested theory on insurgency 
derives from an improved ability to understand the operational environment. Policy 
cannot be made effectively in the absence of critical information about the problem at 
hand. A systemic perspective of insurgency strengths and weaknesses help to prioritize 
the placement of assets and activities that might keep levels of violence low while 
sustaining or building political institutions. In Kosovo, NATO became a proxy on some 
level to the insurgency itself. From the perspective of the insurgent, the KLA borrowed a 
conventional military capability so that it did not need to develop the capacity on its own. 
This is not necessarily a bad thing. The point is that policy should look at the scaling 
needs of an insurgency’s growing regime in order to understand relational levers to 
impact behavior.  
By opening up the framework to numerous additional comparative case studies, a 
better understanding of circumstances, actions, and effects might eventually elucidate 
best practices for potential adoption. Choices exist regarding insurgent behavior at each 
level of maturity, within and across each phase. The decisions made and actions taken 
across lines of effort affect the resulting regime’s impact and scalability. Knowing the 
challenges and requirements involved in each phase, particularly if further 
operationalization continues, will better elucidate the properties of insurgency practice 
and growth within the international system.  
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